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Abstract 
 
Drawing on both posthumanism and quantum theory, this thesis introduces what I am 
calling a framework of quantum posthumanism. Based on the epistemic and ontic aspects 
of entanglement, nonseparability, and becoming, and a reworking of ideas of agency and 
objectivity, the thesis embarks on an interdisciplinary (entangled) reading of J. M. 
Coetzee’s texts that seeks to move beyond the current historicist framing of his work. 
Utilising some of the key concepts and laws from various quantum interpretations, it 
seeks to show how such concepts effectively deconstruct boundaries between self/other, 
human/animal, animate/inanimate, body/environment and therefore, by extension to the 
literary, between fact/fiction, story/history, external/internal, and ultimately 
author/character/reader/text. The thesis approaches Coetzee’s writing by focussing on the 
centrality in his fiction of becoming, not only on the level of characters, but also in terms 
of the agencies of meaning within the literary event (the transactions amongst reader, 
author, and text). Quantum posthumanism deconstructs the fixed role and positionality of 
the external observer/Cartesian subject, represented as the reader/author outside the 
literary event. It proposes the term phenomenon of meaning to address the entanglement 
of reader/text/author that become part of the meaning they claim to own. The thesis also 
challenges traditional uses of concepts such as time, linearity, and origin with quantum 
posthumanist ideas such as multiplicity, emergence, contingency, and parallelism. 
Finally, through the framework of quantum posthumanism, the thesis hopes to support 
the argument for the entanglement of human knowledge and the detrimental illusion of 
the divide between the humanities and the sciences by demonstrating and exemplifying 
how inevitably entangled human knowledge is. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
 
This chapter sets the theoretical ground for introducing quantum posthumanism, a 
development and systematisation of some tendencies in the current discourses around 
critical posthumanism. In the first part of this chapter, ‘On Critical Posthumanism’, I 
review the cultural traditions that gave rise to critical posthumanism. Although the mode 
of linear conceptual and historical overview might seem counterintuitive to the 
philosophy of entanglement that is definitive of what I am calling quantum 
posthumanism, there is a need to begin with an outline of the historical and cultural 
aspects of the rise of critical posthumanism before establishing the terms of quantum 
posthumanism. This introduction will begin by briefly (and inevitably partially) 
addressing related terms such as humanism, antihumanism, transhumanism, and the 
different strands of posthumanism. Throughout the mapping of these terms, the aim is to 
reach a sufficiently clear theoretical framework for critical posthumanism, and to raise 
the question whether or not posthumanism might be a viable direction for theoretical 
work in the humanities. 
 ‘Quantum Posthumanism’ constitutes the second and core part of this chapter. 
Merging notions of critical posthumanism and quantum theory, I introduce the hybrid 
term quantum posthumanism [QP], the framework I will use in the hermeneutic approach 
to Coetzee’s texts in subsequent chapters.1 Informed by the work of Karen Barad on 
philosophy and quantum theory in her book Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum 
Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning, this section sets the ground for a 
quantum posthumanist reading of Coetzee’s texts; it attempts to redefine key ideas 
around subjectivity, objectivity, and agency, while introducing others, including 
entanglement, emergence, observation, and phenomenon. 
In the third section of the chapter ‘Towards Post/humanities’, I briefly discuss the 
future of the humanities in a posthumanist world. I contend that quantum posthumanism 
can offer several solutions to help the humanities move towards, or rather realise, its 																																																								
1 Coetzee’s texts selected for particular focus include Waiting for the Barbarians (1980), Life and Times of 
Michael K (1983), Foe (1986), Age of Iron (1990), The Master of Petersburg (1994), Disgrace (1999), 
Elizabeth Costello (2003), and Slow Man (2005). 
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posthumanist potentials. Finally, the last section, ‘Stories Beyond History: An Apolitical 
Reading of Coetzee’s Fiction’ argues for the underlying ontological universality of 
Coetzee’s narratives. 
Coetzee is the writer whose work I have chosen as a means of working through 
and exploring the possibilities of QP as a hermeneutic framework for engaging with texts.  
Coetzee’s work has been controversial; the decision to work with his texts was in part to 
explore whether the framework to be developed in this thesis might offer an alternative 
perspective on some of those controversial features of his writing. His novels have been 
read in the contexts of animal rights, antihumanism, postmodernism, feminism, and 
postcolonial theory, and with a more emphatically historicist reference to the recent 
historical and political context of South African politics.2 As will become apparent, 
unlike most of the critical writing on his fiction, my approach to Coetzee’s work avoids a 
specific or narrow historicism but instead utilises key concepts within posthumanism and 
quantum theory in order to investigate the ontological framework and underpinning of his 
writing, often underexplored compared to the more obviously political or historical 
aspects of his fiction. My approach not only attempts to shed new light on Coetzee’s texts 
but also implies a common posthumanist ground that might overcome some of the 
apparent contradictions in these current more specifically historical and political readings 
of his fiction. 
The thesis is built on the premise not merely of the desirability of 
interdisciplinarity within literary studies but also the necessary entanglement of human 
knowledge. Not only is entanglement more relevant to the context of this study, but it 
also invokes, as Felicity Callard and Des Fitzgerald note, different assumptions and 
presumptions than those simply of interdisciplinarity per se. The prefix ‘inter-’ presumes 																																																								
2 A few examples, among many, of the studies on, and readings of, Coetzee’s works include, in animal 
studies: Stephen Mulhall’s The Wounded Animal: J. M. Coetzee and the Difficulty of Reality in Literature 
and Philosophy (2008), and Frances E. Mascia-Lees and Patricia Sharpe’s ‘Introduction to "Cruelty, 
Suffering, Imagination: The Lessons of J. M. Coetzee"’ (2006); in feminist critique: Regina Janes’"Writing 
Without Authority": J.M. Coetzee and His Fictions (1997); in postcolonial and historical studies, David 
Attwell’s ‘Coetzee's Postcolonial Diaspora (2011); Attwell’s recent book J.M. Coetzee and the Life of 
Writing: Face to Face with Time (2015), Elleke Boehmer, Katy Iddiols, and Robert Eaglestone’s edited 
book  J. M. Coetzee in Context and Theory (2009), Lynn Meskell and Lindsay Weiss’s ‘Coetzee on South 
Africa's Past: Remembering in the Time of Forgetting’ (2006), Laura Wright’s Writing “Out of All the 
Camps”: J. M. Coetzee’s Narrative of Displacement (2004); in philosophy and literary theory: Anton Leist 
and Peter Singer’s edited book J. M. Coetzee and Ethics: Philosophical Perspectives on Literature (2010), 
Derek Attridge’s J. M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading: Literature In The Event (2005). 
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the existence of two inherently separate, pre-existing fields of knowledge, which ‘may or 
may not be integrated, and/or which may be integrated more or less well’  (8). The 
premise of the thesis, however, is not to verify whether or not interdisciplinarity is 
possible but rather to experiment with and emphasise the already inevitably entangled 
nature of human knowledge which always pre-exists disciplinary autonomisation. 
Owing to the relative novelty of developing and applying to literary texts 
interpretations of quantum theory, the thesis represents what I see as an early 
experimental step in that direction. It arguably invites more questions than it gives 
answers on the nature of literary experience, consciousness, meaning, and agency; 
nevertheless, it does not shy away from a presumption in openly promoting a more 
holistic view of the text and the text-reader relationship not only on an epistemological 
but also on an ontological level with consequences for the understanding of the categories 
and identities of characters, author, and reader alike. 
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1.1. On Critical Posthumanism 
 
1.1.1. Humanism and Posthumanism3 
As is the case with any ‘–ism’, the term humanism is hard to pin down. It is 
usually employed to extend over expansive historical, geographical and intellectual 
ground and is deployed via numerous strands, variants and historical accounts. The 
difficulty of taming such a concept arises from its remarkable irregularity of meaning 
across the various historical and geographical contexts in which it has been deployed. In 
his book Humanism (1997), Tony Davies traces the term back to its German coinage and 
Greek roots, demonstrating its historical, political and geographical complexity. 
However, when it comes to its relatively recent usage, Kate Soper makes a key 
comparison between the standard usage of the term in English and in French philosophy. 
While humanism has been synonymous with ‘secularism’ and used to contrast with 
‘theism’ in the English-speaking world, it has been regularly used in French philosophy, 
especially in recent years, to contrast with what has come to be known as ‘theoretical 
antihumanism’. Furthermore, there is a remarkable difference in the positive connotations 
the word has preserved that dates back to the Renaissance and forward to the ‘negative 
charge’ it later acquired through the French philosophical input into Anglo-American 
criticism in the 1960s onward (9-10), sometimes referred to as the ‘theoretical turn’.4  
My particular focus in engagement with the concept of humanism is its 
association with the historical movement that has come to be periodised and 
conceptualised as the Enlightenment and its ideals (rationality, reason, autonomy, 
subjectivity, freedom) that have served to centralise the human and assume its privilege 
and superiority over other beings. The human in question is the one ‘figured by the 
Enlightenment, psychoanalysis and other institutions of a universalizing modernity’ 
(Kuhn 1). According to Davies, even this type of humanism has its own various historical 
																																																								
3 Humanism and posthumanism are in fact humanisms and posthumanisms, due to their various approaches 
and trajectories. However, for the sake of brevity and familiarity, I use the singular form. 
4 Soper further demonstrates how the same definition of classical humanism has been both the source of its 
positivity and negativity. The very core (positive) values of humanism that are the source of its pride, 
‘consciousness, agency, choice, responsibility, moral value’, inevitably generate negative concepts such as 
alienation, inauthenticity, and reification (11-2). 
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trajectories.5 As Rosi Braidotti comments, this geo-political line of humanism, which she 
finds particularly problematic, is evidently irreducible to ‘one linear narrative’, making 
humanism even harder to overcome (Posthuman 51). This particular strand of humanism 
and its consequent connotations are what I refer to in any further use of the term. 
In the fields of the Sciences, and since the 19th century, the momentous findings 
in biology and inventions in technology have led to the blurring of borders between 
humans, animals, and machines. Beginning with the rise of Darwin’s theory of evolution, 
humans and animals were seen to share the same origins in effect so that the gap between 
living organisms was effectively reduced. The Darwinian view discarded the pure, sacred 
origin of Man, and reduced it to ‘a level of mechanics’ (Miah 83).6 While Darwinian 
theory reduces the gap between humans and animals, making differences of degree rather 
than kind, recent findings in genetics abolish these differences altogether. For example, 
as far as their genetic composition goes, Homo sapiens are not, biologically, even a 
distinct species. Dieter Birnbacher notes that the shared genome of the human and the 
chimpanzee is 98.5%. Even the idea of sexual reproduction between the two species is 
not ‘biologically impossible’ (98). Besides chimpanzees, Homo sapiens also share a great 
deal of their DNA with yeast, worms, and mice (Nayar 68). Furthermore, owing to the 
essential role performed by bacteria—more so than any other organism—in the 
formation, evolution, alteration, and sustainability of the planet and living organisms, 
including the human body, Stephen Jay Gould argues that there has never been The Age 
of Man; we live and have always lived in The Age of Bacteria (176).7 These and 
supporting biological findings not only erode the very biological foundation of humanism 
and the singularity of Man but also deliver a much more complicated view of living 																																																								
5 Davies illustrates the different historical trajectories of this type of humanism, ‘The romantic and 
positivistic Humanisms through which the European bourgeoisies established their hegemonies over 
(modernity), the revolutionary Humanism that shook the world and the liberal Humanism that sought to 
tame it, the Humanism of the Nazis and the Humanisms of their victims and opponents, the antihumanist 
Humanism of Heidegger and the humanist antihumanism of Foucault and Althusser, the secularist 
Humanism of Huxley and Dawkins or the post- humanism of Gibson and Haraway’ (130-1). 
6  Darwinian theory still supported the humanistic presumptions of Homo sapiens as having a more 
sophisticated sense of morality, conscience, and religion than other animals. This further accentuated the 
debate over the human being more genetically or socially determined—and thus further emphasising the 
culture/nature binary, which resulted in what could be called a ‘Darwinian biological humanism’ (Miah 
83). 
7 For the detailed explanation of the vital role bacteria plays in the planet and the composition of other 
species, see Gould’s Full House: The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin and Myra Hird’s essay on 
Haraway’s book When Species Meet ‘Meeting with the Microcosmos’.  
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organisms and the environment within which they exist—a view that has importantly 
contributed to posthumanism within the humanities. 
Similarly, however, posthumanism is as broad and hard to define—if not more so 
—as humanism.8 Francesca Ferrando notes that the term posthuman encompasses several 
movements and schools of thought, including, ‘(philosophical, cultural, and critical) 
posthumanism, transhumanism (in its variants as extropianism, liberal and democratic 
transhumanism, among other currents), new materialism (a specific feminist development 
within the posthumanist frame), and the heterogeneous landscape of antihumanism, 
posthumanism, and metahumanities’ (26). Ferrando comments that feminist critique in 
literary criticism has given birth to what is known as critical posthumanism.9 Critical 
theorists also paved the way towards what is later called cultural posthumanism. Ferrando 
notes that by the end of the 1990s, critical and cultural posthumanism developed into 
what came to be known as philosophical posthumanism (29). On the other hand, Braidotti 
offers a different classification. She identifies three major strands in contemporary 
posthuman thought. The first is what she calls ‘reactive posthumanism’, which descends 
from moral philosophy; the second is an analytical form of posthumanism, which stems 
from science and technology studies; and the third is critical posthumanism, which 
develops from the broadly antihumanist tradition (38). Other theorists also have their own 
distinctions. For example, in the introduction to his book, What is Posthumanism?, Cary 
Wolfe makes the distinction between two major strands of posthumanism: what he calls 
posthumanism (by which he means the trajectory that developed in the humanities and 
social sciences) and transhumanism—which he describes as ‘the cyborg strand of 
posthumanism’ (xiii). V. Andy Miah, on the other hand, discusses three strands: 
transhumanism, cultural posthumanism, and philosophical posthumanism. His definition 
of philosophical posthumanism differs significantly from Braidotti and Ferrando’s.10 As 																																																								
8 The origins of posthumanism in the sciences and in the humanities, although overlapping, are nonetheless 
distinct. As I shall soon explain in detail, in the humanities, the term posthumanism has developed in the 
1990s largely through an antihumanist tradition, including, especially, feminist critique and cultural theory.  
9 As will be discussed, several of the most prominent current posthumanist theorists, such as Donna 
Haraway and Braidotti, come from a feminist background. 
10 Miah acknowledges the overlap between cultural and philosophical posthumanism but, nonetheless, 
claims that there are crucial differences between them. He argues that while cultural posthumanism is 
mainly concerned with challenging humanist values, philosophical humanism, in contrast, carries the 
Enlightenment ideals of seeking to achieve human progress through knowledge (technology)—the project 
itself has come to be known as transhumanism. Furthermore, while both cultural and philosophical 
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is clearly evident from this brief comparison, these different classifications, on the whole, 
magnify rather than resolve the confusion around the uses of these terms. Not only does 
the use of a certain term change from one author to another but, in some cases, different 
terms are also used to refer to the same, or a similar, meaning.11 The specific definitions 
of these terms remain largely dependent on the scholar’s own perspective. 
 
1.1.2. Critical Posthumanism Versus Transhumanism 
It is useful at this point, therefore, to state my chosen classification for this thesis. 
I wish to simplify these comparisons by making a rough distinction between what I see as 
two major strands of posthumanism; the first is critical posthumanism, which develops 
from the antihumanist tradition in critical and cultural theory. The other strand is a 
particular brand of scientific posthumanism, widely recognised as transhumanism. 
Although both strands are within the boundaries of posthumanism and share some 
common grounds and assumptions, they are quite distinct and, in some aspects, even 
contradictory to each other.12  
Nick Bostrom, a founding director of the Future of Humanity Institute at the 
University of Oxford, and known for his writings on transhumanism, notes that 
transhumanism advocates improving human nature, not only through traditional means of 
‘education and cultural refinement’ but also through the more radical means of medicine 
and technology, in order for humans to overcome some of their ‘biological limits’ 																																																																																																																																																																					
transhumanism express fundamental interest in the notion of ‘otherness’, cultural posthumanism focuses on 
marginal communities such as transgender groups, while philosophical posthumanism is more interested in 
the ‘yet non-existent’ communities which are likely to be marginal, such as ‘the genetically modified or 
transgenic human’. (Miah 89-90). Evidently, Miah’s view of what ‘philosophical posthumanism’ means 
differs significantly from, if not contradicts, Ferrando’s and Braidotti’s. His definition appears to be more 
in tune with what Ferrando classifies as ‘transhumanism’, albeit with some notable differences. 
11 For instance, it appears that what Ferrando describes as ‘philosophical posthumanism’, Braidotti (and 
other authors such as Nayar) classify as ‘critical posthumanism’, whereas Wolfe simply calls it 
‘posthumanism’. 
12 While both share an emphasis on the entangled relationship between technology and the human, their 
views on the nature and implications of such a relationship vary significantly. Their stances on medical 
ethics, for instance, are approached from drastically different angles. For example, while transhumanists 
see the advantages of human cloning such as donation of body parts and learning more about human cells 
repair and replacements, posthumanists, on the other hand, are more concerned with the social and political 
status of clones, loss of genetic variations, compromising individuals, and the rise of a ‘black market’ of 
genes of desirable donors (Farnsworth ‘Clone’). 
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(‘Transhumanist’).13 Transhumanism appears oriented towards the technological 
possibilities that redefine human physical boundaries and blur the lines between man and 
machine. In so doing, it deploys technology as a means of enhancing already-established 
human qualities, thus potentially, for some, seeking the perfectibility of the human and 
aspiring to transcend the physical limitations of the human body (Nayar 16).14 
Transhumanists view these technological enhancements as a ‘linear model of the 
development of the human, from the “natural man” to the “posthuman cybernetic 
organism”’ (Zylinska 123). In this sense, transhumanism appears to seek to enable the 
human to further dominate the environment, a desire that ‘lies at the heart of every 
humanism’ (Soper 14); this has led Bradley Onishi to describe it as ‘ultra-humanism’ 
(102).  
Transhumanists themselves do not deny these humanistic routes; in fact, they 
adopt them wholeheartedly. Bostrom admits that transhumanism offers a more radical 
version of the secular ideals of humanism (‘Transhumanist’). It defends human rationality 
and individuality and continues to believe in the superiority and centrality of the human 
species. Transhumanism also emphasises other humanistic values, such as ‘individual 
freedom and individual choice’ in the field of enhancement technologies (Bostrom 
‘Transhumanist’). Bostrom acknowledges transhumanism’s ‘Enlightenment roots, [...] 
emphasis on individual liberties, and [...] humanistic concern for the welfare of all 
humans’ (‘History’ 4). 
As Onishi’s explanation of Heidegger’s critique of technology and the modern 
subject suggests, the essence of technology as understood by the subject is not simply an 
artifact that allows ‘a new kind of functionality’ (Miah 85); it is rather based on the 
presumption of the human as ‘the Being of beings’ (Onishi 105). The subject thus 																																																								
13 Bostrom summarises some of the areas of enhancement; they include: ‘radical extension of human 
health-span, eradication of disease, elimination of unnecessary suffering, and augmentation of human 
intellectual, physical, and emotional capacities. Other transhumanist themes include space colonization and 
the possibility of creating super intelligent machines, along with other potential developments that could 
profoundly alter the human condition’ (‘Transhumanist’). 
14 One of the problematic implications of the transhumanist idea of enhancement concerns the perception of 
disability. While disability studies seeks to identify the disabled body as a variant of the human species, the 
transhumanist quest for ultimate enhancement of the human body can be seen as a forced form of 
‘homogenisation’ (165) or denial of difference. Evidently, the process of homogenisation involves 
presumptions that inherently contradict the premises of critical posthumanism, including the figure of a 
‘perfect being’ which all other beings should aspire to become. 
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perceives technology as a means to further control the world. This view is what 
Heidegger terms ‘enframing’—reducing existence into a humanistic framework so that 
everything acquires significance in relation to the human (106). However, as Onishi 
further comments, not only technology but also all material entities too become subjected 
to the same perception, as they become evaluated based on their ‘use-value logic’ and the 
contribution they make to the human subject’s struggle for power and sovereignty (106). 
This radical view of technology is what leads Miah to describe it as an ideology or a 
certain kind of ‘instrumental attitude’ that structures the world (85). However, this 
perception inevitably extends to include the subject itself, as it becomes ‘enframed’ as yet 
another object to be used on demand, and thus becomes reduced to its use value in the 
new age of transhumanism.15  
Furthermore, transhumanism holds that the world is fundamentally and 
universally constituted out of information (Waters 31). The transhumanist thinker Max 
More expresses such a desire for disembodiment; he states, ‘[t]ranshumanists seek the 
continuation and acceleration of the evolution of intelligent life beyond its currently 
human form and human limitations by means of science and technology’ 
(‘Transhumanism’). This disembodied view, which reduces the human to informational 
patterns that can be stored and manipulated to overcome its physical limitations, sees the 
body as inhibiting and hindering the human mind and its desires (Onishi 105). Such a 
view clearly embraces the mind/body divide that is entirely rejected by critical 
posthumanism.16 
On the other hand, critical posthumanism, as I shall explain in detail, has 
developed from, or at least appears to have strong ties with, the antihumanist tradition 
which dominated the humanities from the 1960s to the 1990s. Unlike transhumanism’s 
visualisations of radical futures, critical posthumanism appears more oriented towards 																																																								
15 Although radical versions of this discourse can be found in ‘futurist’ critics such as Max More and his 
essays on transhumanism and extropianism, less radical versions are remarkably popular; they can be found 
‘in the pages of Time magazine and The New York Times, popular films such as The Matrix, the writing of 
scientists like Hans Moravec and Ray Kurzweil, and the public relations of the Monsanto Corporation’ 
(Simon 2). 
16 Another trajectory of transhumanism, called moral transhumanism, encourages the enhancing of certain 
positive human qualities, such as compassion towards others. This view, while it appears to serve 
‘otherness’, nonetheless, still advocates humanist assumptions about the nature of the human and the notion 
of essential, innate, desirable qualities of Man, thus further encouraging the centrality of the human (Nayar 
22).  
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socio-cultural reforms. It aims at questioning, rather than celebrating, human autonomy 
and power. This is evident in the writings of many posthumanist theorists, including Rosi 
Braidotti (The Posthuman 2013), Cary Wolfe (What is Posthumanism? 2010), Neil 
Badmington (Alien Chic: Posthumanism and the Other Within 2004), Katherine Hayles 
(How We Became Posthuman 1999), and Donna Haraway (‘Cyborg Manifesto’ 1984). 
Evidently, critical posthumanism naturally appeals to many scholars of feminism, 
postmodernism, postcolonial studies, animal studies, and monster and disability studies. 
In fact, many of its critics have postmodernist and antihumanist backgrounds, such as 
Haraway (feminism and animal studies), Hayles (postmodernism), Wolfe (animal 
studies), Braidotti (feminism)17, and Badmington (cultural theory) to name but a few.18    
1.1.3. Antihumanism 
Like humanism and posthumanism19, antihumanism has multiple strands; these 
range, as Kenan Malik notes, from ‘the conservatism of Burke, the Catholic reaction of 
de Maistre to the nihilism of Nietzsche and the Nazism of Martin Heidegger’ (169). 
However, despite their differences, what these approaches share is the rejection of 
Enlightenment rationalism and its idea of social progress, and the assumption of human 
superiority. Instead, they believe in ‘difference and divergence’, promoting particularity 
and authenticity over universality (169). At the risk of simplification, I shall limit my 
focus to the common ground they share in their criticism of humanism.20  
The antihumanist tradition was further advanced in postwar French structuralism 
in the early 1960s. Structuralist thinkers broadly rejected humanist ideologies, such as 
freedom, creativity, and subjectivity in favour of  the existence of underlying cultural and 
social structures that might be made available for description. It was inspired initially by 																																																								
17 Braidotti’s book Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist 
Theory (1994) clearly demonstrates her early feminist posthumanist mode of thought. 
18 Hayles postmodern inclination is evident in her book How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in 
Cybernetics, Literature and Informatics (1999). In The Posthuman (2013), Braidotti acknowledges her 
antihumanist, feminist roots. Haraway’s famous essay, ‘A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and 
Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century’, although presented as posthumanist project, is 
essentially a critique of humanist feminism and a move beyond gender politics. 
19 For purposes of brevity, and from this point onward, I shall use the term ‘posthumanism’ to refer to 
critical posthumanism. 
20 Malik distinguishes between two main strands of postwar radical antihumanism; one developed from 
anticolonial struggles, and the other through the French philosophy which later manifested itself in social 
movements such as feminism and environmentalism in the late 1960s and 70s. 
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Ferdinand de Saussure’s foundational work on the governing system of language in 
Course in General Linguistics (1906-1911). The term antihumanism, however, was used 
by the Marxist Structuralist Louis Althusser in his critique of Marxist humanism, and in 
particular, in his essay ‘Marxism and Humanism’ (1964).21 Althusser attributed primacy 
to structure and social relations over autonomous agency and individual consciousness, 
downplaying the Enlightenment philosophy of the subject. A variety of more or less 
antihumanist positions can also be traced in Claude Lévi-Strauss’ anthropological views 
on the existence of universal structural principles which left little room for individuality 
as singularity as understood in the humanist tradition, Roland Barthes’ announcement of 
‘The Death of the Author’ (1967) and its various legacies, and Lacan’s decentering of the 
subject in emphasising the role of language in the formation of the subject, and the 
symbolic nature of the unconscious that moves beyond the autonomous will of the  
subject.22 
The movement, if it can be called such given the variation of practices and 
intellectual trajectories with which it is entangled, could, however, be said to have 
matured particularly and markedly in the writings of poststructuralist theorists such as 
Michael Foucault and Jacques Derrida in the 1960s and 70s; it is perhaps at this moment 
that the tendency becomes named and articulated. In line with Nietzsche’s announcement 
of the death of God, Foucault famously announces ‘the death of Man’ through his 
critique of the epistemological and moral humanist tradition in The Order of Things 
(1966). Noting his historicity and contingency and denying the idea of his universality 
and intrinsic qualities, Foucault announces that ‘man is an invention of recent date. And 
one perhaps nearing its end.’ (Order 422). Throughout his early works, Madness and 
Civilisation (1961), The Order of Things (1966), and The Archaeology of Knowledge 
(1969), Foucault systematically eliminates the Cartesian subject, challenges the notion of 
autonomous agency, and announces its death as the ‘origin and foundation of Knowledge, 
of Liberty, of Language and History’ (Live 61). Similar to Foucault, Derrida’s work on 
the deconstruction of Western philosophy since the 1960s has considerably contributed to 
the antihumanist tradition. In his famous essay, ‘The Ends of Man’ (1968), Derrida 																																																								
21 Althusser’s essay ‘Marxisme et humanisme’ first appeared in the Cahiers de l’I.S.E.A., June 1964. 
22 Lacan deals with these topics across his work; a good example is his conference paper ‘La Dialectique’  
(1960), titled ‘The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious’. 
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deconstructs the position of the subject as a metaphysical point of reference. He argues 
that the history of man is questionable; it is constituted as if ‘man’ has no historical 
origin, or cultural, linguistic, or even metaphysical boundaries (35). 
Minority studies, including postcolonial studies, feminism, queer theory, 
disability and monster studies, and environmental studies, have also provided a major 
foundation for the antihumanist tradition. What these fields have in common is that they 
all criticise a form of exclusion that is the result or by-product of the classical definition 
of the human. They all share the study of ‘otherness’ that the definition of Man creates, 
with its variants, including ‘the sexualized other (woman), the racialized other (the 
native) and the naturalized other (animals, the environment or earth)’ (Braidotti 27). The 
universal human understood thus is merely a ‘system of differentiation’ in which some 
categories are classified as less or not human (Nayar 23). Hence, to fight exclusion and 
discrimination, antihumanists hold, is to fight Man. 
Postcolonial thought largely contributed to the critique of humanism by 
systematically deconstructing the centrality and dominance of ‘Western’ humanism. This 
is a trajectory that began with the works of postcolonial theorists, most notably Edward 
Said’s Orientalism (1978) and Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth (1961). Fanon’s 
book was one of the earliest postcolonial texts to propose that what is ostensibly a 
universal category of humanity is actually constructed through Eurocentric colonial 
thought, in particular that of so-called Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant and Rousseau 
for example, that has served ever since as the basis for the exclusion of the non-Western 
‘other’. Fanon describes this as ‘Western humanity as incarnated in the Western 
bourgeoisie’ (163).23 The later stages of postcolonial thought, represented in the works of 
thinkers such as Gayatri Spivak and Homi Bhabha, demonstrated the connection between 
antihumanism and postcolonial theory that sets the early ground for posthumanist 
thought.24 
																																																								
23 Although Fanon builds an antihumanist argument, his alternative is a renewed version of humanism that 
does not carry the seeds of Western imperialism. He calls for a creation of ‘a new man’ to which European 
thought has failed to give birth (313). 
24 In his book, The Location of Culture (1994), Bhabha reworks the notion of identity by putting forward a 
theory of cultural hybridity which demonstrates the intersection of gender, class, location, race, nation, and 
generation, deconstructs humanist hierarchies, and sets the early ground for the posthumanist notion of 
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Feminism is one of the fields most closely associated with antihumanism. Second 
wave feminism, which might be said to have begun with the translation and 
popularisation of the works of Simone de Beauvoir from the early1960s, offers, from a 
posthumanist perspective, a significant attempt to challenge masculinist universalism. 25 
However, this earlier phase of feminism was itself later subjected to critique of its 
universalising categorisations of gender and dependence on ‘activist and equality-minded 
Humanism’ (Braidotti 22), replacing the male figure with the female as founding subject. 
Third wave feminism, on the other hand, informed by postcolonial and poststructuralist 
thought and developed through the works of theorists such as Luce Irigaray, Julia 
Kristeva, and Judith Butler has been more oriented towards the deconstruction of those 
humanist values that were inscribed in the image of the Western white, able-bodied male, 
whose assertion of identity is primarily based on the exclusion/creation of minorities, 
including sexually-defined groups.26 The answer was not to replace the subject but to 
deconstruct the subject position altogether.27 Furthermore, these later feminists 
questioned the virtue of sexual boundaries and their cultural manifestations through the 
reworking of the notions of agency and subjectivity, which later constitute focal points in 
the posthumanist project.  
Building on the poststructuralist, deconstructivist, feminist critique of gender 
essentialism, queer theory further challenged earlier assumptions concerning gender 																																																																																																																																																																					
entanglement. Spivak’s famous essay, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ (1988), engages with the critique of the 
humanist ‘neo-postcolonial imperatives’ within the postcolonial studies, and attempts to questions the 
institutionalised centrality that, ironically, formed within the postcolonial studies. 
25 Beauvoir’s most prominent work, Le Deuxième Sexe, published originally in French in 1949 was 
translated into English and published in 1953 as The Second Sex. 
26 Some of the works include Luce Irigaray’s Speculum of the Other Woman (1974) and This Sex Which Is 
Not One (1977), which were translated into English and published in 1985. In the latter book, Irigaray 
draws upon Marxian economics to argue that women are treated as commodities, with use and exchange 
values. Although Julia Kristeva does not refer to her writings as feminist, her work has had a great 
influence on the Western feminist critique. Her famous distinction between the symbolic and the semiotic 
as elements of signification in language develops in her earlier works, including Desire in Language 
(1980), Powers of Horror (1982), and Revolution in Poetic Language (1984). According to Kristeva, the 
symbolic element is associated with the grammar and structure, while the semiotic is associated with the 
tones, rhythms, and movements of the signifying practices. Kristeva’s logic of signification is equally 
applicable on the level of matter and the materialisation of the body. Another significant contribution to the 
movement is Bulter’s work, and in particular, her famous books Gender Trouble: Feminism and the 
Subversion of Identity (1990), and Bodies that Matter (1993). Butler argues for an anti-essentialist view of 
identity through her insights on gender performativity.   
27 Butler, for example, refuses the notion of a founding female subject for feminism as it ‘presumes, fixes 
and constrains the very “subjects” it hopes to represent and liberate’ (189). 
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identity.28 Its anti-essentialist stance was at the heart of the postmodern antihumanist 
critique which sought to destabilise the established contours of the normative human 
body, identity, and desires. Among its pioneers were Judith Butler’s work on gender 
performativity in the 1990s; Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, in books such as Between Men: 
English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire (1985), Epistemology of the Closet 
(1990), and Tendencies (1993); Diana Fuss in Identification Papers: Readings on 
Psychoanalysis, Sexuality, and Culture (1995), and Essentially Speaking: Feminism, 
Nature and Difference (1989). In her essay ‘Queer Posthumanism: Cyborgs, Animals, 
Monsters, Perverts’ (2009), Patricia MacCormack argues for the promising compatibility 
between queer and posthumanist theories in their attempt to move beyond the established 
binaries of sexuality which, she argues, can still be found even in minority studies, such 
as gay studies29. Furthermore, both theories argue for the instability and hybridity of 
identity and the emergence of subjectivity. 
Disability and monster studies have offered a further critique of humanist cultural 
assumptions about the human body. Foucault’s earlier works in the 1960s offered a 
legacy to disability studies by posing critical questions regarding what is and what is not 
deemed ‘natural’.30 Similarly, Georges Canguilhem’s The Normal and the Pathological 
(1966) traced radical changes in the definitions of the concept of health and disease, the 
normal and pathological, arguing that such concepts are far from being objective 
scientific perceptions. The works of Lennard J. Davis, in particular, his book Enforcing 
Normalcy: Disability, Deafness, and the Body, took up these earlier writings to 
investigate the relationship between disability and culture. His critique challenges the 
humanist bias towards whatever, necessarily, therefore, normatively falls outside the 
definition of ‘normal’. Monster and disability studies seek, hence, to embrace all types of 
bodies as evidence of human physical diversity, which should not be regarded as 																																																								
28 In fact, the term queer theory was introduced in 1990 by the Italian feminist Teresa de Lauretis in a 
conference at the University of California, Santa Cruz, and a special issue of Differences: A Journal of 
Feminist Cultural Studies based on that conference. 
29 MacCormack notes that an aspect of queer theory was originally developed as a response to ‘the 
presumed masculinity in gay studies which remains binarised by suffixing the methodology with ‘and 
lesbian’, affirming woman as both outside of and less than human’ (111). 
30 Foucault and the Government of Disability (2005), edited by Shelley Tremain, provides a range of 
accounts that demonstrate the relevance of Foucault’s ideas in the fields of disability studies. 
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radically different from appreciating the biodiversity of the environment, as Rosemarie 
Garland Thomson sensibly argues (6). Disability studies develops similarly to examine 
the relationship between the human and the environment. As Carol Thomas notes, its 
practitioners maintain that a body becomes disabled through its interactions with an 
environment that refuses to recognise its needs. It is, therefore, a case of a ‘disabling’ 
environment rather than a ‘disabled’ body (571). 
Furthermore, environmental studies has also contributed to the critique of 
humanism by stressing the interconnectedness of the human and the environment, 
viewing the subject as an integral part of the ecological system. Environmental theorists 
have associated the centrality of the human with the increased exploitation and 
domination of nature in abuses of science and technology. These, as Braidotti notes, 
involve ‘epistemic and physical violence over the structural “others”’ and might be seen 
again as an extension of European Enlightenment ideal of instrumental rationality (48). In 
his books, Ecology Without Nature (2007) and The Ecological Thought (2010), however, 
Timothy Morton problematises classical environmentalist theory by arguing against the 
traditional view of nature as something that preserves and exists ‘outside’ culture, or that 
humans are ‘embedded’ in nature. Morton uses the word mesh to argue for the 
interconnectedness of all living and non-living organisms. Life forms do not live in the 
mesh; they are the mesh. The notion of the mesh, as Morton explains, cancels the idea of 
the centre and the assumed privilege of one being over others (Thought 38). 
Similarly, animal studies significantly contributed to the critique of humanism. 
Some of the recent works of animal theorists include Wolfe’s Zoontologies: the question 
of the animal (2003); Derrida’s The Animal That Therefore I Am (2008), Haraway’s 
When Species Meet (2008), and Harriet Ritvo’s Noble Cows and Hybrid Zebras: Essays 
on Animals and History (2010). These writers all note as their point of departure that the 
very word ‘human’ functions as a means of separating Homo sapiens from all other living 
creatures. Similarly, the word ‘animal’ serves to homogenise all nonhuman life forms 
into one single category (Nayar 111). The use of humanist criteria of autonomy, 
rationality, and language as indicators of personhood, Cavalieri argues, renders humans 
with intellectual and mental disabilities inhuman or animal-like (76). The human/animal 
separation, hence, serves not only to discriminate against animals but also as the basis for 
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discrimination against other humans. Species hierarchy becomes thus a basis for racial 
hierarchy (Wolfe, ‘Introduction’ xxi). As Etienne Balibar succinctly puts it, ‘every 
theoretical racism draws upon anthropological universals’ (56).  
However, despite valuable contributions to the deconstruction of the humanist 
tradition, antihumanism still largely resembles what it sought to deconstruct. One of the 
main contradictions is the dualistic nature of its discourse (much like that of humanism), 
which has made it nearly impossible to overcome those very pitfalls of which it accuses 
humanism. Otherness, in particular, is negatively reinforced in antihumanist traditions of 
thinking. As Braidotti puts it, antihumanist critical thought is maintained by ‘intrinsic 
humanist discursive values’ (Braidotti 29). Foucault, for instance, who is often described 
as an antihumanist, nonetheless endorses key humanist values, such as ‘freedom, 
individuality and reciprocity’ (Hooke 39). Critics, such as Nancy Fraser, have pointed out 
that what seem to be contradictions within Foucault’s rhetoric31 might more generally be 
regarded as inherent in antihumanism itself. Antihumanism, in short, is merely the other 
face of the coin of humanism: simply a reversal rather than a deconstruction of the 
binary. 
This brief overview of the antihumanist tradition within the minority studies 
foregrounds some of the historical and critical ground that eventually gave rise to critical 
posthumanism. However, many posthumanists reject this linear, historical view of 
posthumanism, namely that (post)humanism is a period that comes after humanism. 
Many posthumanist thinkers, such as Cary Wolfe, Neil Badmington, Judith Halberstam 
and Ira Livingston, refuse to locate a clear historical moment when posthumanism arose. 
For most posthumanists, the history of posthumanism is not linear and ‘has no obvious 
beginning, middle or end point in philosophical thought.’ (Miah 89). Wolfe, for instance, 
states that posthumanism ‘comes both before and after humanism’ (Posthumanism xv).  
In their book Posthuman Bodies (1995), Judith Halberstam and Ira Livingston define the 
posthuman condition as ‘the overlap between the now and the then, the here and the 
always: the annunciation of posthumanity is always both premature and old news’ (3). 
Similarly, for Badmington, posthumanism is not a historical period with a point of 
beginning and an end—it is rather an eternal state of becoming (Alien 11). Posthumanist 																																																								
31 For more on this, see Fraser’s ‘Foucault's Body-Language: A Post-Humanist Political Rhetoric?’. 
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thought, therefore, systematically rejects the linearity of history and instead stresses the 
irreducibility and complexity of origin(s), beginning with the term posthumanism itself. 
 
1.1.4. Posthumanism 
Posthumanist theory presents itself as ‘a move beyond these lethal binaries’ 
(Braidotti 37). As a critical approach and theoretical methodology, posthumanism largely 
benefits from the antihumanist tradition by examining the various discourses that have 
situated the human above life and involved, therefore, the exclusion/exploitation of the 
‘other’, human or nonhuman, as a result (Nayar 46). However, unlike antihumanism, 
which falls into the rhetoric of the crisis of Man and maintains an oppositional 
relationship with humanism, posthumanism recognises the need to move beyond and 
explore alternative means to re-conceptualise the human subject. Posthumanism extends 
the antihumanist critique by redefining and relocating the human through reworking 
fundamental notions such as the concept of subjectivity, agency, and the body, using key 
posthumanist ideas such as complexity, interconnection, entanglement, and emergence.32  
To put it differently, posthumanism is not antihumanist per se—it is, rather, ahumanist. 
In the posthumanist view, what was once thought of as clear boundaries of the 
body, sex, identity, origins, and organs, are now blurred as these limits are being 
constantly and increasingly challenged in the fields of science, medicine, and technology. 
Bodies become emergent configurations with flexible boundaries that are constantly 
becoming of the world, or as Karen Barad puts it, bodies become ‘material-discursive 
phenomena’.33 In this view, ‘human’ and ‘nonhuman bodies’ share characteristics 
(Meeting 823). Posthumanism celebrates ‘the collapse of ontological boundaries’ (Miah 
90). It also studies how such a collapse of boundaries affects the moral and political 																																																								
32 Hayles succinctly summarises the posthuman condition; she writes, ‘emergence replaces teleology; 
reflexive epistemology replaces objectivism; distributed cognition replaces autonomous will; embodiment 
replaces a body seen as a support system for the mind; and a dynamic partnership between humans and 
intelligent machines replaces the liberal humanist subject's manifest destiny to dominate and control nature’ 
(288). 
33 This view of entities as ongoing processes extends to the new scientific view of the genome. As John 
Dupré notes, ‘the genomes in cells are highly dynamic entities’ and not merely a ‘repository of biological 
form’ but rather an active participant in the biological processes (3), hence, the nature of the organism is 
not determined by its DNA but is rather constantly recreated (3) through the process of becoming. 
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landscape, and poses ethical and moral questions of responsibility towards other life 
forms and the planet, based on ideas of vulnerability and finitude (Wolfe, Zoontologies 
24) or on a new understanding of responsibility and accountability (Braidotti, Posthuman 
93).34 
The so-called new materialism is a movement within the posthumanist 
framework. It can be traced to the mid to late 1990s with roots in the corporeal feminism 
and its focus on the body of feminists such as Elizabeth Grosz in Volatile Bodies: Toward 
a Corporeal Feminism (1994), and more recent works such as Sara Ahmed’s  Queer 
Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others (2006) . Recent key publications in the 
field include New Materialism: Ontology, Agency, and Politics (2010), edited by Diana 
H. Coole and Samantha Frost and Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (2009) 
by Jane Bennett. The movement reconciles the materialism of science as the study of 
physical matter and its functions with critical theory in its engagement with language and 
textuality, by approaching matter as an ongoing ‘process of materialization’ (Butler, 
Bodies 9). Broadly, for this new materialism, there is no separation between language and 
matter as ‘biology is culturally mediated as much as culture is materialistically 
constructed’ (Ferrando 31).  
New materialism has been influential within posthumanist thought because of its 
opposition to the disembodied vision that transhumanists often seemed to advocate and 
also its opposition to the traditional view of knowledge as ‘an entity distinct from the 
substrates carrying it’ (Hayles, Posthuman xi). New materialism challenges the 
transhumanist view of the world as constituted fundamentally through and as 
information. In her book, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, 
Literature, and Informatics (1999), Hayles provides an historical account of when and 
how information ‘lost its body’ (2). She demonstrates how, since the cybernetic and 
molecular biologies of the 1950s and 1960s, both science and culture come to favour 
abstraction over materiality and take the virtual as the real. She warns against the 
increasingly prevalent cultural as well as scientific disembodied view of information. 
Instead, Hayles argues for the inseparability of information and the substrates carrying 																																																								
34 I discuss Wolfe and Braidotti’s stances in more detail later in the discussion. 
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data. The disembodiment view, results, as Hayles notes, in a hierarchal construction in 
which information is given ontological priority whereas materiality becomes secondary 
(12). New materialist theories challenge anthropocentric (trans)humanist beliefs by 
negating the possibility of the separation of the material body and information as 
disembodied code, thus obliterating the transcendental view of the human, which 
Western philosophy has for long maintained. 
By extension, in a posthumanist new materialist view, there is no separation 
between nature and culture. As Haraway explains, ‘[t]here is no border where evolution 
ends and history begins, where genes stop and environment takes up, where culture rules 
and nature submits, or vice versa.’ (Reader 2). Even technological developments and 
enhancements should not be considered a ‘break from the evolutionary processes’ (Miah 
87) but rather a continuation of them.35 Also, the role of the environment is not merely a 
‘trigger’ that requires the organism’s response. Rather, it is an active component in the 
process of becoming and the formation of the organism. Likewise, the organism also 
modifies and changes the environment, which also means that the organism is agentially 
inducing its own change. This reciprocity suggests that both the organism and the 
environment are open systems that are constantly influenced and altered by each other.36 																																																								
35 This nature-culture continuum is part of a new monist view that Braidotti advocates. This new monism, 
as Braidotti notes, builds on Spinoza’s monist view of the universe. The neo-Spinozist monism rejects 
dualism, particularly nature/culture and mind/body, and acknowledges the displacement of boundaries 
between them as a consequence of innovations in science, technology, and neuroscience. New monism 
offers a view of matter as an intelligent self-organising (autopoietic) force (35) (whereas Spinoza’s monism 
views the earth as ‘a single, sacred organism’). This holistic view of matter initially comes as a response to 
Descartes’ body/mind distinction. As Braidotti notes, while rich and inspiring, this monistic approach is 
problematic for it is essentially founded on a social constructivist dualistic attitude towards nature and 
technology; it views the ‘earth’ as opposed to ‘industrialisation’, ‘nature’ as opposed to ‘culture’ (despite 
its very goal to overcome this binary). This monism is evidently always on the side of ‘natural order’ and is 
more or less technophobic. Furthermore, this monist approach tends to humanise the earth, giving it the 
same ethical and political status as humans. This anthropomorphic stance is evidently problematic for 
posthumanism which seeks an alternative nonhumanistic view of the universe. On the other hand, the 
monism Braidotti advocates—which is more compatible with posthumanism—is one that is neither based 
on ‘naturalistic foundationalism’ (which implies that technology is not ‘natural’) nor social constructivism 
(which she sees as inherently dualistic) (82-6). It is vitally materialist in that it believes in intelligence and 
autopoiesis and is based on a nonhuman definition of Life as a dynamic force. 
36 This posthuman view of the mutual interaction between the organism and the environment and the 
agency of the latter is compatible with niche construction theory. The theory views the organism as active 
in the evolutionary process. It challenges the conventional assumption that ‘the selective events that shaped 
us were changes in the external environment, stemming from events beyond human control’ (Odling-Smee 
et al.137). Niche construction theory views the organism as a vital and interactive part of the environment, 
which it influences and by which it is influenced. Mainstream evolutionary thinking presumes, although 
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This view, which opens the flow of information and interaction between the organism, 
environment and also other organisms (living and non-living), challenges traditional 
views of the organism as closed and self-maintaining and emphasises the posthuman 
assumption that alterity is ‘constitutive of the human/system’ (Nayar 7).  
Andy Clark’s work on extended cognition further demonstrates such 
interconnection between the body and the world. In his hypothesis, Clark argues that the 
mind is not limited to the biological organism but rather extends to include the 
environment as part of cognitive processes. This view challenges the Cartesian centrality 
of the mind and the division between body/mind as well as the neo-Cartesian distinction 
between the brain/mind.37 Instead, it presents an alternative view of the mind as nonlocal 
ongoing configurations of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ objects, thus further destabilising 
notions of interiority/exteriority between body/environment; as Clark puts it,‘[c]ognition 
leaks out into body and world’ (Clark xxviii). Clark’s extended mind hypothesis in effect 
advocates a perspective compatible with the new materialist posthumanist premise of 
interconnection between the organism and its surrounding environment. According to this 
view, the interactive circuits and informational flow between the body and the world are 
what is generating subjectivity; as Nayar puts it, ‘[t]there is no subjectivity that predates 
the circuit[s] because there is no body that is not always techno-social’ (98). 
																																																																																																																																																																					
implicitly, an opposite view of the organism: a passive being set against, and almost a victim of, the 
internal and external factors that compose the organism and the environment that surrounds it. One of the 
most relevant conclusions of niche construction theory is the central role that culture plays in human 
evolution. For example, niche construction, encouraged by cultural processes, can alter selection of human 
genes (140). The traditional understanding of human evolution is challenged by anthropological findings 
that confirm that cultural practices have altered environmental conditions, which in turn have triggered 
changes in allele frequencies. The analyses of data also confirm that many changes to the human genome 
have occurred as a response to cultural practices. Moreover, anthropological and biological studies reveal 
that, with the exception of the Ice Age, all the critical events of human evolution over the past 50,000 years, 
such as exploitation of agriculture and the domestication of animals and plants, have been self-imposed 
(140). Furthermore, they demonstrate that human ancestors, migrating to higher latitudes, showed only 
little physical changes because they mostly responded culturally (141). Although the specifics of such 
processes are still unclear, scientists are increasingly acknowledging the vital role culture plays as the basis 
for the selection of humans (137). For more on niche construction theory, see F. John Odling-Smee, Kevin 
N. Laland and Marcus W. Feldman’s Niche construction: The neglected process in evolution  (2003). 
37 In his essay, ‘Our Neo-Cartesian Bodies in Parts’ (2007), Ian Hacking explains the neo-Cartesian 
presumptions inherent in some views of organ transplant, which presumes a distinction between the mind 
and the brain, the person and the body, among others. Hacking’s main premise is that all these distinctions 
originate from the intrinsic distance we create between our ‘bodies’ and ‘ourselves’.  
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It is worth noting that posthumanism does not wish to eradicate or merely replace 
the subject; rather, it attempts to redefine the very notion of subjectivity and agency. 
Halberstam and Livingston point out that the goal of posthumanism is not to promote the 
uselessness of the human but rather to help redistribute its identity and agency (10). 
Derrida poses a similar idea by stating that subjectivity is indispensable; the question, 
however, is ‘knowing where it comes from and how it functions’ (‘Structure’ 56). In his 
questioning, Derrida is concerned not so much with eliminating the subject but rather 
with rehabilitating, decentering, and repositioning it (Peters 60). Therefore, the 
posthumanist notion of subjectivity is more in harmony with Derrida’s deconstructive 
approach than with Foucault’s death of Man (Ferrando 32). 
In the posthumanist line of thought, another figure of the human (or what might 
be referred to as the posthuman) emerges. This figure is an embodiment of otherness, 
hybridity, multiplicity, and difference. Its origins, futures, body, and identity are hybrids, 
flexible, and multiple. The significance of this subject, as Teresa Heffernan explains, is 
that it ‘breaks the linear reproductive binary model that produces the same, allowing 
“difference” to proliferate’. It also ‘displaces emphasis on the original and challenges the 
traditional understanding of nature’ (118). The posthumanist view of multi-crossed, 
interactive, interconnected, relational, and impure origins of the subject characteristically 
problematises all the narratives of the single, distinguished and traceable origin of the 
human and the purity, singularity, and self-sufficiency of its species. This leads to 
‘species cosmopolitanism’, which, according to Nayar, is the apotheosis of 
posthumanism; it views all species as ‘always already nodes and intersections along a 
continuum, full of borrowed characteristics, genes and behaviour’. Not only the 
posthuman subject’s origins but also its evolutionary futures are ‘multiple, diverse and 
uncertain’ (205).  
This hybridity of origins, body, and identity implies political disobedience; the 
hybrid is suspicious of any political and social affiliations and homogenisations. Instead, 
it claims temporary alliances based on choice rather than blood or any other assumed 
relation (Prins 361). Nayar sums up two basic premises of the posthuman subject: it co-
evolves with other life forms; technology is not prosthetic but part of its identity (19). Co-
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evolution means that the posthuman has shared origins and intertwined histories not only 
with other life forms but also with the machine, as technological development is a largely 
neglected part of co-evolutionary processes. The self-contained, isolated, sovereign 
subject from the Enlightenment is thus replaced with a ‘congeries’ that emerges as a 
result of ‘co-evolution, symbiosis, feedback and responses’ (20). The subject thus 
emerges as a manifestation of dynamic entangled processes and interconnected relations 
between entities, human and nonhuman, animate and inanimate, and the environment.  
Hayles presents a more radical understanding of this interaction. She states that 
the posthuman’s inseparability from other organisms is so profound it is impossible to 
determine meaningfully the differences between the organism and the information circuit 
with which the organism is entangled (35). To Hayles, when it comes to the posthuman 
subject, there are no definite lines between ‘bodily existence and computer simulation, 
cybernetic mechanism and biological organism, robot teleology and human goals’ 
(Posthuman 3).38 However, the Homo sapiens body does not need to be physically altered 
to be called posthuman; the key characteristics of the posthuman, as Hayles notes, 
involve ‘the construction of subjectivity’ rather than the existence of ‘nonbiological 
components’ (4). What Hayles appears to suggest is the importance of theorising rather 
than merely embracing the technological and informational aspect of the modern era as 
the basis of posthumanism. The posthuman subject ideally benefits from the possibilities 
of technology and information while still embracing and celebrating finitude as a 
condition of human being, rather than falling for the illusions of full disembodiment, 
immortality and unlimited power (5). 
One of the key differences between the human and posthuman subject is the 																																																								
38 Hayles’ posthuman subject resembles the model of Heidegger’s self-absent Dasein; Heidegger writes, 
‘[a]s being, Dasein is something that has been thrown; it has been brought into its ‘there’, but not of its own 
accord.’ (Being 329). Onishi’s essay, ‘Information, Bodies, and Heidegger: Tracing Visions of the 
Posthuman’, compares both models. Onishi notes that, like Dasein, Hayles’ posthuman is thrown into a 
world that precedes it, without its ‘choice, will or consciousness’, yet it must ‘perpetually render itself in 
terms of its future possibilities.’ (110). Contrary to the self-asserting Cartesian subject, Hayles’ posthuman 
is constituted by ‘a fundamental nullity or absence-from-itself’ (108). Rather than the ego-centred 
autonomous humanist being, it is a ‘dispossessed, networked and perpetually self-creating […] subject’ 
(110) thrown into a network of interactive relations which it has no ability to master or control. This self-
absence creates a form of ineffability which renders Dasein/the posthuman irreducible to simple objects in 
the world (109). 
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understanding of will, power, and conscious agency. Free will, the core of the human 
subject, becomes hard to distinguish and position in the highly entangled view of the 
self/other/environment in posthumanism (4). Similarly, while the human has always been 
identified with a conscious agency, the posthuman subject does not fall into the illusion 
of being in singular control. Autonomous will and conscious agency, as Hayles argues, 
are no more than the story that consciousness constructs to make sense of the results that 
take place through ‘chaotic dynamics and emergent structures’ (288). A further important 
difference between the human and the posthuman is the understanding of embodiment. 
Hayles explains that the human subject is represented as a rational mind rather than as 
‘being a body’, which facilitates claims for its universality.39 
In forming the posthuman subject, Braidotti equally refuses both the humanistic 
unitary subject and the more radical forms of scientific posthumanism that disregard the 
need for a subject altogether (102). She argues for a new mode of subjectivity that is not 
grounded in traditional models of rationality, and challenges the conventional notions of 
objectivity and linearity. This new mode of subjectivity serves as a basis for ethical 
responsibility powered by an ‘eco-sophical sense of community’ (169).  The formation of 
a posthumanist subject, according to Braidotti, happens in the spaces that flow between 
binaries: ‘nature/technology; male/female; black/white; local/global; present/past’. These 
indeterminate states challenge all classical forms of representation, for they are complex 
and multifaceted rather than linear, driven by processes, not concepts (164).40 Invoking 
Félix Guattari’s argument in Chaosmosis, Braidotti stresses that the subject is 
‘ontologically polyvocal’; it belongs to both the real, actualised and the virtual, 
deterritorialised universes (93).41 
																																																								
39 Hayles cites William Gibson’s characterisation of the posthuman body as ‘data made flesh’ (4-5) while 
stressing the need to focus on ‘embodied actuality’ rather than ‘disembodied information’ (287), in order 
not to fall into the transhumanist trap of disembodiment. 
40 Braidotti proposes a non-unitary subject that is constructed by replacing the ‘self-centred individualism’ 
with a sense of interconnection between self and others, including nonhuman others (49-50). Also, the 
concept of recognition is replaced with codependence, and the philosophy of rights is replaced with the 
ethics of sustainability (93-4). 
41 The principle of not-oneness is constitutive of Braidotti’s non-unitary subject. The not-one principle 
dissolves the fantasies of unity and totality. It links the subject to alterity and accounts for a sense of 
responsibility towards multiple ‘others’ that constitute the subject through an unstoppable flow of 
encounters, interconnections, information and interactions, which the subject cannot control (100). 
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Haraway, on the other hand, argues for a world full of hybrids and subject/object 
mixes which blur the boundaries between them. The object in Haraway’s view has more 
autonomy and activity than is usually expected from an object, whereas the subject no 
longer enjoys its former assumed autonomy and privileged position. Haraway, 
nonetheless, maintains a form of subject responsibility toward the object, which the 
object, in turn, is not required to have (Prins 355-6). In her famous essay ‘A Cyborg 
Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century’, 
Haraway presents her views on the cyborg as a ‘cybernetic organism, a hybrid of 
machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction’ (191). 
Haraway’s idea of the cyborg is a creature between the human/animal, man/machine, 
male/female, and is simultaneously both and neither of them. The cyborg does not have a 
clear origin but rather has multiple origins, adding to its abnormality. To Haraway, all 
bodies are cyborged, for they have inevitably co-evolved with tools/instruments/machines 
(191). Consequently, Haraway’s destabilises the relations between the subject (human) 
and the object (device) by highlighting the interactive co-evolutionary relationship—
rather than the traditional subject-object relationship—that governs them. 
Wolfe argues for a posthumanist, shared ground between humans and other life 
forms based, not on ethical responsibility, but rather on a form of passivity. To theorise 
such passivity, Wolfe begins by deconstructing the primacy of language, the chief 
criterion that has been long used to justify the separation between humans and other life 
forms. Language, now considered an emergent property and a result of co-evolution and 
interaction between humans and with other life forms, was once believed to be a mystical 
and innate property that ontologically separates Homo sapiens from other living forms 
(Posthumanism 120-1). To Wolfe, the reason behind the limitations of humanism in 
animal studies and related fields is the inability to correctly locate the question of 
animality (62). Wolfe invokes Derrida’s attempt to modify the question (initially raised 
by Jeremy Bentham in response to Descartes): it is not a question of whether animals can 
talk but whether they suffer. As Derrida states, ‘the form of this question changes 
everything’ (‘Animal’ 396). While the old question of language suggests ability, the 
alternative question accentuates inability, vulnerability, and mortality (Wolfe, 
Zoontologies, ‘Shadow’ 24). This shared passivity, mortality, vulnerability, and finitude, 
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replaces the former construction of ethical responsibility towards the animal based on the 
human abilities to reason, respond, and treat animals with justice—which ultimately 
serves to accentuate the power and autonomy of the human and the divide between 
subject/object and human/animal. 
However, Braidotti refuses to base the shared ground between humans and other 
life forms on this type of passivity that Wolfe and Derrida advocate. In her version of 
posthumanism, she criticises this negative ‘reactive mutual interdependence of all living 
organisms’ as a basis for demonstrating interconnection between species. She argues that 
such negativity does not necessarily generate ‘peaceful coexistence’; on the contrary, it is 
capable of producing practices of ‘xenophobic rejection of otherness and increasing 
armed violence’, which are characteristic of modern times (40). Rather, Braidotti stresses 
an ‘affirmative bond’ (50) which serves as a basis for ethical and political accountability. 
To Braidotti, a posthuman subject is indispensable for this reason; it needs to bear some 
ethical and political responsibility in its relations with other living forms with which it 
shares this planet.  
However, I do not see Wolfe and Braidotti’s stances as necessarily irreconcilable; 
in fact, they might be considered complementary to each other. Acknowledging the 
vulnerability and mortality of all life forms and accepting a certain level of passivity does 
not necessarily eliminate the possibility of some form of responsibility. In fact, the sense 
of shared passivity proposes a new kind of responsibility; one that does not stem from the 
humanist sense of superiority over other life forms but rather recognises and defines its 
responsibility from within—from the very recognition of finitude. This corresponds to 
Braidotti’s proposition of a kind of ethical responsibility that results from the recognition 
of the co-presence of human and nonhuman others (Posthuman 169), rather than the 
adoption of ethical responsibility that is based on the superiority of the human, or the 
complete submission to the reactive, passive view of the universal suffering of the 
species. 
1.1.5. A Critique of Posthumanism 
According to Christopher Peterson, posthumanism’s promise to move beyond 
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anti/humanism is troubled by its own paradoxes and in his essay, ‘The Posthumanism to 
Come’, he challenges the very possibility of posthumanism. Presuming that humanism 
can be overcome, he argues, ‘subscribes to a basic humanist assumption with regard to 
volition and agency, as if the “end” of Humanism might be subjected to human control, 
as if we bear the capacity to erase the traces of Humanism from either the present or an 
imagined future’ (Peterson 128). Borrowing Derrida’s concept of the trace, Peterson 
argues that posthumanism claims the capacity to erase the traces of, and to disassociate 
itself from, humanism. Furthermore, and echoing Derrida’s deferred completion of the 
‘democracy to come’, Peterson concludes, ‘[t]here is, nor never [sic] will be, a politics 
and ethics that could legitimately call itself posthuman, only a politics and ethics that will 
have been more or (one hopes) less humanist, more or less violent in its treatment of both 
human and nonhuman others’ (138).  Peterson thus concludes his essay by announcing 
the impossibility of posthumanism.42 
However, surely the presence and persistence of humanism should not be seen as 
a translation of the impossibility of posthumanism? As Wolfe argues, a complete rupture 
with humanism is not what posthumanism seeks. To Wolfe, posthumanism is largely 
concerned with how humanism poses a challenge to what it claims to be its aims and 
morals (Posthumanism xvi). Similarly, Badmington indicates that some attempts are in 
too much of a hurry to announce a break from humanism and too disinclined to address 
the remains of humanism within the posthumanist landscape. It is true that some traces of 
humanism are unavoidable since ‘any claim to be writing the end of “Man” is bound to 
be written in the language of “Man”’ (‘Pod’ 13). However, such an engagement with 
humanism and acknowledgement of its unavoidable presence does not equal endorsing it 
(‘Theorizing’ 15), nor does it necessarily suggest the impossibility of posthumanism, as 
Peterson claims. On the contrary, not only is attending to humanism within the 																																																								
42 Peterson’s disavowal of posthumanism evokes the similar stance of Bruno Latour in his influential book 
We Have Never Been Modern, who argues that the state of modernity itself has never been fully realised, 
thus, consequently, he disavows its successor, postmodernism. According to Latour, ‘[m]odernity is often 
defined in terms of humanism, either as a way of saluting the birth of 'man' or as a way of announcing his 
death’ (13). Latour firmly refuses the distinction between nature/culture which humanism (a chief 
component of modernity) has intensified. He uses words such as ‘truly modern’ or ‘wholly modern’ (11) to 
argue for its impossibility. 
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posthumanist line of thought an intellectual necessity, it is arguably the only way to 
overcome humanism. As Derrida explains in his essay ‘The Ends of Man’, claiming a 
complete rupture with anthropocentrism can easily become a ‘false exit’ as tradition does 
not cease to effect the new, and hence humanism finds its way back through such claims 
(135). Instead, humanism must be deconstructed from within, attending to its 
inconsistencies and contradictions, enabling posthumanism to work its way through 
humanism. 
Following Derrida’s lead in his insistence on the impossibility of a complete 
break from tradition, and Jean-François Lyotard’s work on [post]modernity, Badmington 
suggests a thorough reexamination of the signifier in question. Informed by their 
methods, Badmington announces that the ‘post-’ in posthumanism is not to be understood 
as a mark of complete separation from the legacy of humanism but rather as means to 
speak to the ghosts of humanism, working it through from the inside (‘Theorizing’ 21-2). 
Badmington succinctly sums it up: ‘posthumanism is as much posthumanist as it is 
posthumanist’ (15). Miah shares a similar understanding of ‘post-’, writing: ‘the ‘post’ of 
posthumanism need not imply moving beyond humanness in some biological or 
evolutionary manner. Rather, the starting point should be an attempt to understand what 
has been omitted from an anthropocentric worldview’ (72). These definitions evidently 
negate Peterson’s objections to the impossibility of posthumanism, for what he refers to 
as the impossibility of posthumanism, posthumanist critics already acknowledge as the 
impossibility of a complete rupture with the humanist tradition. 
Furthermore, not only is a complete break with the humanist tradition impossible 
in posthumanist thought but even to suggest such a possibility reveals a profound 
humanist logic. Such a suggestion relies on a particular form of ‘humanist narrative of 
historical change’ as R. L. Rutsky argues and adds, ‘[i]f … the posthuman truly involves 
a fundamental change or mutation in the concept of the human, this would seem to imply 
that history and culture cannot continue to be figured in reference to this concept’ (110-
11). Therefore, any posthumanist attempt that claims or discusses the possibility of such a 
rupture is paradoxically humanist. By extension, Peterson’s logic in questioning 
posthumanism’s ability to overcome the human (even to demonstrate its impossibility) is 
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evidently humanistic.  
Furthermore, Badmington complicates the view of the relationship between 
humanism and posthumanism by reversing the relationship and stating that ‘[h]umanism 
is always becoming posthumanism’ (Alien 11). He explains that if traces of humanism 
continue to haunt posthumanism, it is perhaps time to trace how humanism has always 
been haunted by posthumanism.43 On another occasion, Badmington concludes that the 
task of posthumanism might be to expose those ‘uncanny moments’ that destabilise the 
core of humanism (‘Theorizing’ 19), where tradition seems to challenge and rewrite itself 
(‘Pod’ 13). This understanding of the dynamics of humanism/posthumanism confirms 
Badmington’s earlier statement that humanism is forever becoming posthumanism. More 
precisely than Hayles’ ‘we have always been posthuman’ (Posthuman 291), 
Badmington’s statement asserts a state of emergence that better characterises the 
posthuman condition. This nonlinearity is also present in Wolfe’s definition of 
posthumanism, which ‘comes both before and after humanism’ (Posthumanism xv). 
Similarly, Halberstam and Livingston define the posthuman condition as ‘the overlap 
between the now and the then, the here and the always: the annunciation of posthumanity 
is always both premature and old news’ (3); they further state, ‘[y]ou’re not human until 
you’re posthuman. You were never human.’ (Halberstam & Livingston 8). These 
statements emphasise the irreducibility of the posthuman condition into a simple, linear 
historical moment as Peterson’s argument seems to suggest. They also reject the 
complete separation between humanism and posthumanism, or the consecutive 
relationship between them.  
To demonstrate this post/humanist ‘entanglement’, in her introduction to The 
Posthuman, Braidotti admits that her interest in posthumanism emerges from her ‘all too 
human concern about the kind of knowledge and intellectual values we are producing as a 
society today’ (10-11). She continues, ‘[i]t is the dream of producing socially relevant 
knowledge that is attuned to basic principles of social justice, the respect for human 																																																								
43 Badmington uses Don Siegel’s film Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956) as an example of what 
appears to be an exemplary humanist work but with a posthumanist moment that reads the text quite 
differently (‘Pod’ 6). For more details, see ‘Pod Almighty!; or, Humanism, Posthumanism, and The Strange 
Case of Invasion of the Body Snatchers’ (2001). 
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decency and diversity, the rejection of false universalisms; the affirmation of the 
positivity of difference; the principles of academic freedom, anti-racism, openness to 
others and conviviality’ (11). Braidotti realises that her ideals, which originally led her to 
pursue the study of posthumanism, are undeniably humanist, arguably implying that 
humanist residues are inevitable in any current posthumanist endeavour. The critical task, 
however, is to recognise those moments either to deconstruct the tradition from within (as 
Derrida and Badmington suggest) or to simply appreciate and appropriate some of them 
as Braidotti does. 
Furthermore, such humanist residues are not always problematic for, or 
contradictory to, posthumanism. As Wolfe points out, posthumanism is not concerned 
with the rejection of humanism tout court, as the latter holds admirable values and 
ambitions. The significance of the posthuman project lies in scrutinising the theoretical 
framework used in conceptualising them. Wolfe demonstrates this with the example of 
cruelty towards animals; although discouraged by humanist values which stress proper 
treatment of animals, their very philosophical framework, nevertheless, regenerates the 
basis of discrimination against animals (xvi-xvii). This critical, yet not dismissive, 
posthumanist stance might just be the middle ground between two unfavourable types of 
posthumanism: one that intensifies humanism and its ideals and another that falls into the 
rhetoric of apocalyptic antihumanism. 
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1.2. Quantum Posthumanism 
From this point on, the thesis will introduce a specific strand of posthumanism, 
which I shall call quantum posthumanism [QP]. As the term suggests, QP is an 
interdisciplinary (entangled) critical term that is the product of the merging of the 
philosophical and ontological implications of quantum theory44 on the one hand, and 
critical posthumanism on the other. I contend that QP provides the ideal philosophical 
and ontological framework for posthumanism. The specifications and manifestations of 
the new term shall become clear in the discussions of the coming chapters. However, in 
this part, I shall briefly outline the main ideas of classical physics, quantum mechanics, 
and their comparability to many aspects of humanism and posthumanism respectively. 
 
1.2.1. Classical physics 
Newtonian physics is fundamentally based on notions of representationalism such 
as externalism and separation. The idea of externalism has been embedded in the 
scientific paradigm through the fundamental belief in the existence of an independent 
reality that is measurable by an outside observer. Furthermore, the scientific tradition has 
long been reliant on the notion of separation between the observer and the observed 
phenomenon. The scientist is a spectator of, rather than a participant in, scientific 
practices (Barad, Meeting 247). This view presumes that the object of observation and the 
subject observer occupy, ‘physically and conceptually’, different positions (106). As 
Vassilios Karakostas puts it, classical physics is grounded in ‘the Cartesian dualism of 
‘res cogitans’ (‘thinking substance’) and ‘res extensa’ (‘extended substance’)’, declaring 
a profound separation between the subject and the ‘external’ world, leaving no room for 
any intermediary (Karakostas 3).   
Furthermore, classical physics is dependent on the presumption of fixed, pre-
existing values of self-contained objects. As Karakostas explains, classical physics is 
																																																								
44 It is worth declaring that due to its mathematical nature, any linguistic-based approach to quantum theory 
is inherently interpretive and is not meant to be analogous to its scientific counterpart. Quantum theory, in 
the context of this thesis, will be used for brevity purposes to refer to the interpretative aspects of quantum 
theory. 
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fundamentally ‘atomistic in character’; it views the world as consisting of ‘analyzable, 
separately existing but interacting self-contained parts’. The world might be analysed, 
therefore, into individual components whose qualities determine the whole they comprise 
(3).  As a result, classical physics strictly follows the ‘definite value principle’, which 
presumes that the system is determined by the definite value of its components, whose 
values are intrinsic and prior to observation. Another property of classical physics is 
‘non-contextuality’ (4). The object of measurement is independent of the context of 
observation and the measuring apparatus. Not only is the process of measurement 
external but it is also transparent, reflecting the so-called ‘true nature’ of what is being 
observed. 
The outcomes of these two properties, as Karakostas notes, is a classical physical 
ontology characterised by notions such as classical realism, classical objectivity, a 
‘transcendent correspondence account of truth’, and ontological reductionism. Classical 
realism acknowledges the existence of an independent reality that is separated from our 
existence and observation. Classical objectivity presumes that the obtained knowledge of 
an object represents the true properties of the object. As a result of these two notions, 
propositions of classical physics are regarded as true or false according to the objective 
reality that possesses objective truth regardless of the means with which such ‘truth’ has 
been derived or is maintained. Finally, ontological reductionism is reflected in the belief 
that our fragmented knowledge about these independent objects and their representational 
properties determines the nature and behaviour of the universe (5). As Karakostas puts it, 
‘if … one is able to determine the intrinsic properties of atomic objects in space and time, 
then one can describe the world completely’ (6).  
Therefore, akin to humanism in the humanities, classical physics maintains the 
human subject/outside observer whose perspective is regarded as the measure of 
everything. It also presumes the epistemological and ontological separation between the 
subject and the object, and their fixed, inherent qualities. These classical views of physics 
retain the hierarchal relationship between entities, their fixed boundaries and their 
definitive qualities, thus justifying the superiority/inferiority, subject/object relations, and 
providing no satisfactory explanation of the hybridity, reciprocity, and entanglement of 
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the entities and phenomena we encounter within the world. 
1.2.2. Quantum mechanics 
Developed throughout the 20th century, quantum mechanics revolutionised the 
modern sciences by constituting a radical departure from classical physics and the 
Newtonian paradigm, which has governed not only mathematical equations but also 
assumptions about the ways in which we perceive the world.45 Quantum mechanics 
describes the behaviour of energy and matter at atomic and subatomic levels. It was first 
developed in the 1900s through the work of the physicist Max Planck on black-body 
radiation. Following Planck was Einstein who, in 1905, proposed that similar to energy, 
radiation itself is quantised46. In 1924, Louis de Broglie introduced what came to be 
known as the principle of wave-particle duality by proposing that at the subatomic level, 
entities can either behave as waves or as particles. Also, the behaviour of matter and 
energy is not fundamentally different.  
The most notable developments within modern quantum theory have come about 
through the pioneering work of Werner Heisenberg, Niels Bohr, as well as Max Born and 
Erwin Schrödinger. Schrödinger famously formulated the Schrödinger equation in 1926, 
which carried significant implications for quantum theory; indeed, its importance has 
been regarded as equivalent to Newton’s second law in classical physics. This 
mathematical equation describes the temporal evolution of physical systems concerning 
the wave function in quantum theory.47 Born’s48 advancements, based on Heisenberg’s 																																																								
45 Some of the basic principles of classical physics, which quantum physics conflicts with are, briefly, the 
space-time identity and the locality of physical objects; the fact that only one certain physical object can 
exist in one place at a given point of time; that two similar physical objects exist separately; and that 
objects are countable with separate properties and determinate values; it also challenges principles of 
causality, determination, continuity, and the conservation of energy (Faye & Zalta). 
 
46 In physics, to quantise is to limit possible values to discrete values according to quantum rules. 
47 The most general form of the equation is: 
  
For a thorough account of the mathematical applications of Schrödinger’s equation in physics, see F. A. 
Berezin and M. A. Shubin The Schrödinger Equation. Also, Schrödinger offers his views in series of 
lectures published in Expanding Universes (1956). 
48 Born’s prolific writings on mathematics and quantum mechanics have also largely contributed to modern 
physics today, such as Problems of Atomic Dynamics (1926), Mechanics of the Atom (1927), and Atomic 
Physics (1935). 
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work in 1925, specifically his statistical interpretations of Schrödinger’s equation of the 
wave function, has been instrumental in the development of quantum mechanics.49  
It was Bohr and Heisenberg, in particular, however, who led the quantum 
revolution that has so fundamentally shaped contemporary physics. Heisenberg50 
proposed the uncertainty principle51 in 1927, which suggests the impossibility of 
acquiring an accurate measurement of two complementary variables (or conjugate pairs) 
simultaneously, such as position and momentum, wave and particle, energy and duration, 
and entanglement and coherence. Heisenberg suggests that the more accurate a 
measurement of one variable is, the less accurate the measurement would be for the other 
variable and vice versa. This statement is not an acknowledgement of the lack of 
measuring precision but rather a demonstration of the nature of wave properties integral 
to the quantum understanding of the atomic world. 
Bohr’s52 most notable earlier works include the Bohr model of the atom, which he 
and Ernest Rutherford developed and introduced in 1913. His most influential 
contribution to modern quantum theory, however, is the development of the principle of 
complementarity 53 which proposes a deeper law underlying Heisenberg’s uncertainty 
principle. According to Bohr, objects have complementary properties that cannot be 																																																								
49 Born’s Nobel Prize lecture in 1954 ‘The Statistical Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics’ summarised 
his contribution to the theory for which he was awarded the prize.  
50 Heisenberg’s most innovative contribution is a 1925 paper which appeared in Zeitschrift für Physik titled 
(after translation) ‘A Quantum-theoretical reinterpretation of kinematic and mechanical relations’ which 
paved the way for matrix mechanics that was further developed through the works of Born and Pascual 
Jordan (Segrè 156). Heisenberg’s other notable works include The Physical Principles of the Quantum 
Theory originally published in 1930, Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science (1958), 
and Philosophical Problems of Quantum Physics (1979), which sum up Heisenberg’s views on quantum 
physics as well as the works of other physicists.  
 
51 The uncertainty principle formula is: 
 , where Δ refers to the uncertainty of the variable and ħ is Planck’s constant (h / (2π). The 
uncertainty of the variable (e.g. position) times the uncertainty of the other variable (e.g. momentum) is 
equal to, or greater than, Planck’s consonant divided by two. 
 
52 Bohr’s foundational insights on quantum theory are distributed across his philosophical and scientific 
essays and articles, which can be found in Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature: Four Essays with 
an Introductory Survey, which covers his essays in the 1920s, Philosophical Writings of Niels Bohr: Essays 
1933-1957 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge Volume II and Philosophical Writings of Niels Bohr: 
Essays 1933-1957 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge Volume III.  
 
53 Bohr published his thorough account of the complementarity principle in his article ‘Discussions with 
Einstein on Epistemological Problems in Atomic Physics’ (1949). 
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measured simultaneously. Bohr thus resolves the wave-particle paradox by explaining 
that the conjugate pairs are complementary aspects of the same quantum phenomenon 
observed. 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle and Bohr’s complementarity principle led to 
the formulation of the famous Copenhagen interpretation [CI] of quantum mechanics in 
1927. The CI involves the theoretical and philosophical implications of the mathematical 
aspects of the principles of the two physicists.54 Although there is no unified set of rules 
or a definitive definition as to what CI actually entails, there are, nonetheless, some 
widely accepted basic principles of the interpretation. These include the impossibility of 
measurement of two complementary variables simultaneously, the wave function as 
being the state that is responsible for wave-function duality, and the inevitable effects of 
the apparatus (process and devices of measurement) on the results of the measurement. 
In recent years, however, the CI has begun to lose its popularity in favour of other 
interpretations such as Bohm’s theory of the implicate order and the many-worlds 
interpretation. Bohm’s theory, or Bohmian mechanics, was developed based on Louis de 
Broglie’s pilot-wave theory in the 1920s and advanced by David Bohm in 1952; it is 
characterised by its explicit nonlocality55, which is one of the main reasons the theory 
was not widely originally accepted. It proposes that actual configurations do take place 
regardless of the act of measurement. Such configurations are deterministically 																																																								
54 It is worth noting that neither Bohr nor Heisenberg has ever used the term ‘Copenhagen Interpretation’ to 
express their shared ideas. It is a term given by critics who saw some common ground between Bohr and 
Heisenberg’s work, although it first appears in the writings of Heisenberg in 1955. In fact, many critics, 
such as Don Howard, argue that Bohr and Heisenberg’s views, although seemingly similar, are intrinsically 
divergent. Howard goes further to argue that the version of complementarity in the CI is, in fact, 
Heisenberg’s own description of Bohr’s principle, and that many critics of Bohr’s complementarity, such as 
Bohm, Hanson, Feyerabend, and Popper, are using Heisenberg’s orthodox interpretation (677). For more 
on the controversy surrounding the CI, see Howard’s ‘Who Invented the “Copenhagen Interpretation”? A 
Study in Mythology’ (2004), and Kristian Camilleri’s ‘Heisenberg and the Wave-Particle Duality’ (2006), 
and ‘Bohr, Heisenberg and the divergent views of complementarity’ (2007), where Camilleri explains how 
Heisenberg’s view of complementary significantly differs from Bohr’s. However, many re-assessments of 
the interpretation have taken place and the CI nowadays mainly refers to ‘indeterminism, Bohr's 
correspondence principle, Born's statistical interpretation of the wave function, and Bohr's complementarity 
interpretation of certain atomic phenomena’ (Faye & Zalta). 
55 The basic premise of the concept of quantum nonlocality is the apparent ability of quantum entities to 
know about one another’s states even when separated by large distances. It entails other notion in quantum 
theory, namely the notion of inseparability and entanglement. Quantum nonlocality violates the principle of 
local action in classical physics, which assumes that objects can only be affected by immediate 
surroundings. Although many quantum interpretations imply nonlocality, Bohm’s theory explicitly 
endorses it. 
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formulated through the motion of the wave function. In other words, Bohmian mechanics 
rejects the role of the observer, and the collapse of the wave function in the CI. 
The many-worlds interpretation [MWI] was first introduced by Hugh Everett in 
1957 as the ‘relative state formulation’. It was later popularised and renamed the MWI by 
Bryce Seligman DeWitt in the 1970s.56 It proposes that all possibilities are real, and each 
possibility exists in an actual/parallel universe. Accordingly, there is arguably a(n) 
(in)finite number of universes where all possible/alternative pasts and futures take place. 
Similar to Bohm’s interpretation, MWI rejects the actual collapse of the wave function 
and proposes the universality of wave function as being the quantum state for the entirety 
of existence. 
The differences between those interpretations can be better grasped through their 
understanding of the double-slit experiment57. While some observer-dependent 
interpretations, such as relational quantum mechanics (and in some versions of CI), 
suggest that the relation between the observer and the system determines through which 
slit the photon enters, other interpretations, such as Bohm’s, suggests that the original 
position of the photon in the wave function determines through which split it passes58; 
therefore, the observer has no effect on the results. 
 
1.2.3. The Philosophy of Physics 
The non-traditional properties of the quantum world have naturally led physicists 
to question the nature of reality and our preconceived ideas about the world. Despite their 
mathematical nature, quantum findings carry significant non-mathematical implications 
that are hard to avoid, even for scientists. For example, in his Combo lecture59, Bohr 																																																								
56 The Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (1973) edited by DeWitt and Neil Graham 
publishes Everett’s main papers on the interpretation and commentary papers by other physicists. 
57 The double-slit experiment originally performed in 1801 by Thomas Young long before the formulation 
of quantum mechanics. Since then, the experiment had many variations which all demonstrate that light can 
exhibit properties of both waves and particles. A basic version of the experiment involves a light source 
that is set to pass through a plate with two slits, where the slits are observed behind the plate. The 
paradoxical results of the experiment show that when being ‘observed’, the photons act like particles, 
whereas when they are not, they act like waves and form interference patterns. Other versions of the 
experiment confirm that photons do not form an interference pattern when they are detected passing 
through one of the slits. 
58 This is one of the reasons Bohm’s mechanics is considered deterministic. 
59 Bohr publically announces the complementary principle in a 1927 lecture at International Physics 
Congress in Combo, Italy. The lecture was published in English in Nature in 1928 under the title ‘The 
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explains how,  
the quantum postulate implies that any observation of atomic phenomena 
will involve an interaction with the agency of observation not to be 
neglected.  Accordingly, an independent reality in the ordinary physical 
sense can neither be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the agencies of 
observation. After all, the concept of observation is in so far arbitrary as it 
depends upon which objects are included in the system to be observed. 
(Bohr, Atomic 54).  
Evidently, the highly suggestive nature of Bohr’s language involves and invites various 
philosophical implications. In the statement above, Bohr refers to the impossibility of 
separation between the object of observation (atom) and the measuring instrument which 
inevitably interferes with and defines the conditions of the measurements within which 
the phenomenon takes place. In his explanation, Bohr touches, without going into the 
question in depth, on the realist/antirealist debate60.61  
Not only Bohr’s but also other, equally or less famous, interpretations of quantum 
theory have, intentionally or otherwise, entailed philosophical aspects in their approaches 
to quantum models.62 The proliferation of these quantum and philosophically laden 
interpretations, and the different realist/antirealist/deterministic/agnostic positions their 
proponents take63, demonstrate the profound power and entanglement of philosophy in 																																																																																																																																																																					
Quantum Postulate and the Recent Development of Atomic Theory’. The lecture can also be found in 
Bohr’s book Atomic theory and the description of nature (1934). 
60 I discuss the realist/antirealist debate, including Bohr’s implied stance, in the concluding chapter of the 
thesis. 
61 For their suggestiveness (and the suggestiveness of quantum theory in general) on the nature of agency, 
reality, and the world, Bohr’s writings have been taken up by Karen Barad, as I shall discuss later on, in an 
attempt to interpret the semantic and ontological aspects of his statements or philosophy-physics—as Barad 
describes it.  
62 Some of these interpretations are Max Born’s ensemble interpretation (1926), Louis de Broglie and 
David Bohm’s de Broglie-Bohm theory developed by Broglie in 1927 and rediscovered by Bohm in 1958, 
von Neumann–Wigner interpretation (also known as consciousness causes collapse) (1961), Garrett 
Birkhoff’s quantum logic (1936), Hugh Everett’s many worlds-interpretations (1957), Satoshi Watanabe’s 
time-symmetric theories (1955), Edward Nelson’s stochastic interpretation (1966), Heinz-Dieter Zeh’s 
many-minds interpretation (1970), Robert Griffiths’ consistent histories (1984), Objective collapse theory, 
which includes Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber theory (1985) and Penrose interpretation (1989), John G. Cramer’s 
‘transactional interpretation’ (1986), and Carlo Rovelli’s Relational interpretation of quantum mechanics 
(1994). 
63 For instance, deterministic interpretations include de Broglie-Bohm theory, MWI, Many-minds 
interpretations, time-symmetric theories, while non-deterministic interpretations include CI, Neumann–
Wigner’s, stochastics, Consistent histories, objective collapse theories, and transactional interpretation. 
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studying and interpreting quantum mechanics.  
However, this ‘openness’ to philosophy is not necessarily considered favourable 
by some scientists who still see philosophical language as a threat to the ‘precision’ of 
scientific practices. In his essay ‘Against Measurement’ (1990), John Bell argues against 
the ‘imprecise’ language used in the explanation of quantum theory in quantum textbooks 
and calls for a more ‘precise’ quantum mechanics. He provides some of what he 
describes as inadequate and ambiguous concepts that are consistently used in the 
presentations of the quantum theory. He writes, ‘[h]ere are some words which, however 
legitimate and necessary in application, have no place in a formulation with any 
pretension to physical precision: system, apparatus, environment, microscopic, 
macroscopic, reversible, irreversible, observable, information’ and, what he sees as the 
worst of all, ‘measurement.’ (3). Furthermore, Bell mentions how other words used in the 
quantum context are borrowed from everyday life, such as ‘“the strangeness”, “charm”, 
and “beauty” of elementary particle physics’ (4). 
However, the imprecision Bell refers to is an inherent property of language; one 
way to explain this ‘imprecision’, as Bell calls it, is through Derrida’s concept of 
différance and the apparently infinite deferral of meaning.64 Bell’s call to dismiss the use 
of ‘ambiguous’ language can thus only be understood as a call to refrain from using 
language altogether in interpreting mathematical models of quantum theory. Furthermore, 
paradoxically, while Bell insists on having a clear and definitive terminology in 
explaining quantum physics, the basic postulate of quantum theory itself suggests that, 
inherently, things do not have determinate, a priori boundaries and properties. By the 
same token, words do not have inherent and definitive meanings. Interestingly enough, 
the probabilistic nature of quantum theory is well reflected not only in the multitude of 
philosophical interpretations but also in the undecidability—to use Derrida’s term—of 
both the wave-particle nature of atoms and the meaning of its terminology.  
Other physicists went as far as declaring that this writ large the death of 
philosophy in assigning science philosophy’s former role, namely contemplating life, the 																																																																																																																																																																					
Other interoperations, which are considered agnostic, include ensemble interpretation, quantum logic, and 
relational interpretation. For a nontechnical overview of the various interpretations of quantum theory, see 
David Z. Albert’s Quantum Mechanics and Experience (1992). 
64 For a detailed explanation of Derrida’s différance see Derrida’s essay ‘Differance’ in his book Speech 
and Phenomena, and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs (1973). 
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nature of reality, and the universe. Accordingly, in their co-authored book, The Grand 
Design: New Answers to the Ultimate Questions of Life (2010), Stephan Hawking and 
Leonard Mlodinow acknowledge the ontological questions humans have about the 
universe and the nature of reality; however, they write, somewhat sensationally (not to 
say even arrogantly): ‘[t]raditionally these are questions for philosophy, but philosophy is 
dead. Philosophy has not kept up with modern developments in science, particularly 
physics. Scientists have become the bearers of the torch of discovery in our quest for 
knowledge’ (13).  
Ironically, the reader of The Grand Design will soon realise that Hawking and 
Mlodinow actually work within the philosophical tradition they tried to dismiss in their 
introduction. The two exemplify Carlo Rovelli’s argument that physicists who dismiss 
philosophy are unaware that they are using the philosophy of science in their 
methodologies which they take for granted (‘Science’).65 Hawking and Mlodinow’s use 
of logic, historical linearity, narrative structure, rhetorical and existential questions is 
considered philosophical in the general sense of the meaning of philosophy as posing 
fundamental existential questions about the world, initiating critical thinking, and using 
rational arguments and conceptual models and frameworks to tackle these questions. 
More specifically, Hawking and Mlodinow state that they adopt what they term as 
‘model-dependent realism’. They describe it as ‘the idea that a physical theory or world 
picture is a model (generally of a mathematical nature) and a set of rules that connect the 
elements of the model to observations’ (58). The physicist and philosopher Victor J. 
Stenger comments that Hawking and Mlodinows’ model is not radically different from 
instrumentalism and that they are ‘acting as philosophers’ in their attempt to answer the 
question of the ultimate nature of reality—even by demonstrating the impossibility of 
such an answer (‘Physicists’).  
Furthermore, commenting on Hawking and Mlodinow’s model which they 
believe also applies to ‘the conscious and the sub-conscious mental models we all create 																																																								
65 In the co-authored article ‘Physicists Are Philosophers, Too’ (2015), Victor Stenger goes further to 
demonstrate with examples that many of the physicists who publically opposed philosophy have in fact, at 
some point in their writings, made what can be seen as philosophical statements about reality. Stenger 
provides two statements by Weinberg and Tong, who both oppose the philosophy of science, to argue that 
they exhibit a platonic view of reality (classically adopted among physicists and mathematicians) as they 
uncritically treat scientific models as true reflections of a pre-existing reality.    
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in order to interpret and understand the everyday world’ (62), Murad Jurdak argues that 
Hawking and Mlodinow’s model resembles, in that way, the constructivist view of reality 
(5).  Indeed, without philosophical interpretations of scientific formulations, the 
discoveries of science will carry little meaning concerning life, the universe, and the 
nature of reality. What, arguably, Hawking and Mlodinow refer to in their claim is the 
death of philosophy as a discipline, which would make their allegations less radical, 
albeit not less problematic, given the ironical fact that their book, in which they declare 
the death of philosophy, is not philosophy-free. 
Indeed, many theoretical physicists, such as Stenger66 and Carlo Rovelli, 
recognise the vitality and inevitability of philosophy in/of physics. When physicists make 
statements about the universe, they are unavoidably engaged in a philosophical tradition. 
In fact, the break between philosophy and science is fairly recent, happening around the 
second half of the 20th century (Rovelli ‘Science’).67 Furthermore, in the history of the 
Western tradition, Thales of Miletus (circa 624–546 B.C.) is considered the first physicist 
and philosopher (Stenger ‘Physicists’). The evolution of physics has always occurred 
synchronically with philosophy. Stenger demonstrates the consistent presence of 																																																								
66 Stenger’s co-authored essay ‘Physicists are Philosophers, Too’ is a response to Lawrence M. Krauss’ 
interview with Ross Andersen for The Atlantic titled “Has Physics Made Philosophy and Religion 
Obsolete?” where Krauss’ makes sarcastic remarks on philosophy and the philosophy of science in 
particular. Stenger includes the following quote by Krauss from the interview: ‘Philosophy is a field that, 
unfortunately, reminds me of that old Woody Allen joke, “those that can't do, teach, and those that can't 
teach, teach gym.” And the worst part of philosophy is the philosophy of science; the only people, as far as 
I can tell, that read work by philosophers of science are other philosophers of science. It has no impact on 
physics whatsoever, and I doubt that other philosophers read it because it's fairly technical. And so it's 
really hard to understand what justifies it. And so I'd say that this tension occurs because people in 
philosophy feel threatened—and they have every right to feel threatened, because science progresses and 
philosophy doesn't’ (‘Physics’). 
Understandably, as Stenger mentions, Krauss’s interview caused a great deal of upset among philosophers. 
As a result, Krauss wrote a 2014 essay ‘The Consolation of Philosophy’, where he explains how 
philosophy has benefited him as a theoretical physicist; however, he does not significantly alter his original 
contention about the philosophy of science. Stenger also traces the history of this ‘disdain’ towards 
philosophy in statements and writings of other scientists, including Neil deGrasse Tyson’s interview on the 
Nerdist podcast, where he claims the irrelevance of philosophy. Also, and most notably, is the Nobel 
Laureate Steven Weinberg’s chapter ‘Against Philosophy’ in his 1992 book Dreams of a Final Theory, 
where Weinberg’s critique targets only the philosophy of science. 
67 This break is deeply rooted within the academic institutions. Tim Maudlin notes that many current 
leaders of the philosophy of physics were originally trained as physicists; however, they choose to associate 
with philosophy departments because physics departments often strongly discourage philosophical 
endeavours, favouring what N. David Mermin describes as a ‘shut up and calculate’ attitude, or as Maudlin 
puts it ‘putting computation ahead of conceptual clarity’ (‘What’s Wrong’). A few examples of current 
philosophers of physics with a background in physics include Stenger, David Albert, John Earman, and 
Barad, among others. 
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philosophy in the history of the breakthroughs in physics, including the works of Newton 
and Einstein, and also in the works of the principal founders of quantum mechanics, such 
as Bohr, Schrödinger, Heisenberg, and Born, who from the first contemplated the 
philosophical implications of their calculations.68 However, unlike the physicists of the 
first half of the century who introduced and advanced the conceptual work of relativity 
and quantum theory, physicists of the second half have concerned themselves more with 
the applications of the great ideas put forward by their predecessors in the early and mid-
1990s (Rovelli ‘Science’).69 
Commenting on Bell’s claim regarding the conceptual ambiguity of quantum 
language, Tim Maudlin explains that philosophy does not offer science mystical 
ambiguity but rather a rigorous method and a sceptical attitude with which flaws within 
the theoretical framework can be detected. Revisiting the scientific data, using 
philosophical methods of scepticism, critical and logical thinking, helps explore 
alternative explanations and illuminate new ways of thinking about scientific issues that 
are sometimes taken for granted. Maudlin refers to Einstein’s emphasis on the 
significance of epistemology for scientists. In his memorial notice for the philosopher 
Ernst Mach, Einstein had explained how concepts could be treated as a ‘priori givens’ 
granting them an unrestricted authority so that scientists often forget their ‘earthly 
origins’ (102).70 Philosophy is particularly essential for scientists because, as Stenger 
notes, numerous physicists ‘uncritically [adopt] platonic realism as their personal 
																																																								
68 In his essay, ‘Why Physics Need Philosophy’, Maudlin offers several instances from the history of 
science to prove that in many cases, while the calculations might be correct, the explanations are not. In 
fact, Einstein’s breakthrough in the theory of relativity is attributed to his reflections on conceptual, rather 
than empirical issues  (‘Physics’). 
69 Rovelli notes that, in the last few decades, successes in theoretical physics have been limited. He notes 
that in modern physics, what is often attempted is to try to solve a question whereas what is needed is 
‘questioning the question’. Rovelli further argues that the major leaps in the history of physics took place 
not because physicists changed the theory but rather because they changed the perspective from and 
through which they view the world (‘Science’). 
70 On another occasion, under the request of Robert Thornton’s request, Einstein wrote,‘I fully agree with 
you about the significance and educational value of methodology as well as history and philosophy of 
science. So many people today—and even professional scientists—seem to me like somebody who has 
seen thousands of trees but has never seen a forest. A knowledge of the historic and philosophical 
background gives that kind of independence from prejudices of his generation from which most scientists 
are suffering. This independence created by philosophical insight is—in my opinion—the mark of 
distinction between a mere artisan or specialist and a real seeker after truth’ (‘Thornton’). 
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interpretation of the meaning of physics’ (‘Physicists’).71 Philosophy hence proves 
indispensable in scrutinising linguistic habits of science and its preferred thinking 
models. It is, thus, perhaps time that the worlds of ‘instruments and experiments’72 fully 
realise the complementarity and entanglement of their existence.  
 
1.2.4. Quantum Posthumanism  
Based on the contention of the inevitability and the endorsement of philosophy-
physics (to use Barad’s term), I argue that the implications of quantum mechanics are 
posthumanist par excellence. For instance, in the same manner that posthumanism rejects 
dualism, Bohr’s principle of complementarity contests not only the dualism of 
complementary valuables such as wave-particle but also the dualism of other notions 
including the observer-observed, ‘object-subject, knower-known, nature-culture, and 
word-world’ (Barad Meeting 147). Bohr’s philosophy-physics and quantum 
interpretations in general challenge the foundational principles of Enlightenment and the 
Cartesian distinction between the observer and the observed. (121). They also reject the 
idea of the external observer (Cartesian subject), the separability of the measuring 
apparatus (classical objectivity), the correspondence between the outcomes of 
observation and what is observed (representationalism), the observer/observed distinction 
(traditional agency), and the existence of a world with objective pre-existing values that 
is accessible through measurement (classical realism).  
Instead, both quantum and posthumanist theories embrace notions of 
entanglement, inseparability, relationality, context-dependence, emergence, and a 
reworking of classical objectivity and agency. The entangled system in quantum theory is 
characterised by certain qualities that are ‘neither reducible to nor derived from any 
combination of local properties of its parts’ (7).73 Contrary to the classical physical 
paradigm, which presumes the possibility of a universal and Cartesian viewpoint or a 																																																								
71 Stenger uses platonic with a small ‘p’ to refer to the contention that objects within scientific models 
compose elements of reality; however, these models are not thought-based (as Platonic with a capital ‘P’ 
would suggest) but rather based on description and prediction of observations (‘Physicists’). 
72 The expression ‘instruments and experiments’ is borrowed from the editor’s note on Stenger’s article in 
Scientific American. 
73 For the detailed mathematical explanation behind this conclusion see Karakostas’s essay ‘Realism and 
Objectivism in Quantum Mechanics’ (7). 
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‘view from nowhere’, quantum mechanics is extremely context-dependent as it allows 
‘viewing the world from within’ (Karakostas 14).74 As I shall demonstrate in the 
following chapters, posthumanism vividly parallels and complements existing notions 
and ideas in quantum theory. I am suggesting therefore that in foregrounding these 
processes and concepts, the implications of quantum theory might be utilised to provide 
insights into the ontologies of fictional worlds, their characters, and the reader’s 
engagements that constitute the literary experience. 
A key and influential attempt to approach quantum mechanics from a critical 
feminist posthumanist perspective is Barad’s book, Meeting the Universe Halfway: 
Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning (2007). Barad reads 
Bohr’s momentous work on quantum theory in terms of its philosophical and ontological 
implications. She states that her book draws from many scientific and social theories, 
including ‘quantum physics, science studies, the philosophy of physics, feminist theory, 
critical race theory, postcolonial theory, (post-)Marxist theory, and poststructuralist 
theory.’ (25). Barad offers a reworking of many notions such as ‘matter, discourse, 
causality, agency, power, identity, embodiment, objectivity, space, and time’ (26). The 
significance of Barad’s project is that she takes Bohr’s work a step further, from its 
epistemic to its semantic and ontic implications (127). Barad’s work stems from the 
realisation of the significant ontological implications of Bohr’s writings. As Barad notes, 
‘[u]nfortunately Bohr does not explore the crucial ontological dimensions of his insights 
but rather focuses on their epistemological import’ (138). Throughout her book, Barad 
detects Bohr’s nuanced critical attitude of representationalism among other issues. As 
Barad demonstrates, Bohr’s philosophy-physics contests not only Newtonian physics but 
also classical forms of realism, representationalism, and social constructivism (134-5).  																																																								
74 Interestingly, just as in posthumanism where a full rupture with the humanist tradition is impossible, 
quantum mechanics could not claim complete departure from classical mechanics. Some of its key concepts 
are in fact borrowed from classical mechanics, such as wave and particle. Furthermore, the use of basic 
laws in classical mechanics is sometimes inevitable in the applications of quantum mechanics. For 
example, ‘the possibility of a quantitative description of the motion of an electron requires the presence 
also of physical objects which obey classical mechanics to a sufficient degree of accuracy’ (Landau & 
Lifshitz 2). The relationship between classical and quantum mechanics is in fact rather paradoxical. As 
Landau and Lifshitz put it, ‘quantum mechanics occupies a very unusual place among physical theories: it 
contains classical mechanics as a limiting case, yet at the same time it requires this limiting case for its own 
formulation’(3). Bohr’s later view on the complementarity principle explains that the experimental aspect 
of quantum theory is based on pre-scientific practices with established norms from classical mechanics, 
which are often unavoidable in the experimental context of quantum physics (Faye & Zalta). 
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At the centre of Barad’s theoretical endeavour is the development of a new 
ontology she calls agential realism. Agential realism might be viewed as a posthumanist 
performative approach designed to understand the technoscientific and other 
naturalcultural practices. In other words, it focuses on the role of human/nonhuman, 
natural/cultural, material/discursive practices, taking into account matter’s dynamism. 
(32/135). Agential realism offers, therefore, an epistemological and ontological 
reworking of the notion of agency. As Barad notes, while performative social and 
political theories emphasise the social practices in constituting human bodies, agential 
realism stresses that the practices that produce the body ‘are not only social’ and the 
bodies they construct ‘are not all human’ (33-4).75  
A key element of Barad’s agential realism is the notion of intra-action. Barad 
proposes intra-action as an alternative to the traditional idea of ‘interaction’, which 
assumes the separation of individual agencies prior to any ‘interaction’ (139). Intra-
action, on the other hand, ‘signifies the mutual constitution of entangled agencies’. 
Hence, any distinctions made between agencies are temporal and relational, and never 
absolute (33). The term also constitutes a radical reworking of the notion of causality76 
and this new ontology entails the reconceptualisation of other concepts including ‘space, 
time, matter, agency, structure, subjectivity, objectivity, knowing, intentionality, 
discursivity, performativity, entanglement, and ethical engagement’ (33).  
The phenomenon of diffraction is central to Barad’s study of entanglement as a 
way to understand ‘the nature of nature’ (29). This describes the way ‘waves combine 
when they overlap and the apparent bending and spreading out of waves when they 
encounter an obstruction’ (28). Following Haraway’s proposal77, Barad emphasises the 																																																								
75 Barad provides an example of Butler’s theory of performativity, which she sees as limited to the 
production of human bodies and the human social practices that generate them (34/145/146), which 
ultimately regards matter as a passive, rather than an active, agent in the process of materialisation (151).  
76 Barad’s idea of causality is not about a relationship forming between two separate entities, as no 
definitive entities exist prior to intra-action. Instead, casual relations, as Barad see them, emerge within the 
same phenomenon. As Barad explains, this understanding of causality constitutes a departure from absolute 
exteriority and absolute interiority and of determinism and free will.’ (176). For a detailed explanation of 
the new understanding of causality as intra-action, see Barad (Meeting 175-9).  
77 Haraway introduces the metaphor of ‘diffraction’ in her 1992 essay ‘The Promises of Monsters: A 
Regenerative Politics for Inappropriate/d Others’, as a way to rethink difference beyond the existing 
binaries, shifting our perspective from being oppositional to differential, static to productive. 
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role of diffraction, which indicates patterns of difference, as an alternative to the notion 
of reflection, which implies sameness. Barad explains how she builds her approach based 
on the diffraction method. She writes: 
[o]ne way to begin to build the needed apparatus is to use the following 
approach: to rethink the nature of nature based on our best scientific 
theories, while rethinking the nature of scientific practices in terms of our 
best understanding of the nature of nature and our best social theories, 
while rethinking our best social theories in terms of our best understanding 
of the nature of nature and the nature of scientific theories. A diffractive 
methodology provides a way of attending to entanglements in reading 
important insights and approaches through one another (30).  
Evidently, Barad’s diffraction approach benefits from the dynamism of entanglement. It 
presupposes the lack of boundaries between naturalcultural theories and attempts to 
understand them through patterns of difference, overlap, and emergence.  
Based on Barad’s diffractive approach, I propose QP as an effort to create a 
simple diffractive pattern through the use of entangled ideas from quantum and 
posthumanist theory. In developing this framework, I borrow other terms from Barad 
such as agential cut—a flexible emergent distinction between the subject/object which 
replaces the intrinsic and fixed divide between subject and object in classical 
physics/humanism. I use the agential cut in Chapter Two to refer to the distinction 
between what I call agencies of meaning (the reader, the author, and the text). A close 
analogy to this agential cut is the Heisenberg cut in quantum theory that temporarily 
separates what is otherwise a coherent quantum world based on wave function. This cut 
does not pre-exist the phenomenon but rather emerges through it. 
Another significant term I borrow from Barad is phenomenon which, in Barad’s 
definition, does not simply mark the epistemological continuity between observer-
observed or the outcomes of the measurement—but rather the ontological entanglement 
of its intra-acting components that are determined by emergent relations-relations without 
prior, intrinsic relata (39). Phenomena thus (rather than things) are what constitute the 
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‘primary ontological units’ (141). This understanding of quantum phenomenon as a set of 
intra-actions implies that there are no well-defined or self-contained entities that exist 
‘behind’ or cause the phenomenon (128). As Barad explains, reality is constituted ‘not of 
things-in-themselves or things-behind-phenomena but of things-in-phenomena’ ([my 
emphasis] 140). Through these intra-actions, phenomena ‘come to matter—in both senses 
of the word’ (140). This understanding is central to the new view of matter as it shifts the 
traditional focus of representationalism and essentialism to relations, dynamism, and 
emergence.  
QP is the new literary framework I propose to accommodate the quantum ideas of 
entanglement, inseparability, and emergence, while also positioning itself within the 
literary tradition as an extension of the many cultural theories overviewed in the previous 
section, including antihumanism, feminist theory, animal and disabilities studies, and so 
on. However, QP differs from critical posthumanism in that it is cosmic-oriented. 
Although a significant part of the rise of critical posthumanism is indebted to animal and 
ecological studies, QP is not primarily focused on the struggle of the species—albeit that 
its ramifications perfectly align with critical posthumanism and animal studies. Rather, 
QP is largely fascinated with the ontological aspects of the becoming of the universe and 
the comparable totality and entanglement of the literary phenomenon.  
The problems of classical physics put forward by the Enlightenment—including 
representationalism, Cartesian subjectivity, and separation—equally and similarly apply 
to literary criticism. The literary event is thought to consist of analysable and separate, 
self-contained, interacting parts—such as the reader, the author, and the text, within the 
major tradition of positivism, of which formalism is a literary equivalent as in the new 
criticism or as in classic modes of historicism that seek to ‘explain’ and offer a definitive 
account of the text either inherent in language or by appealing to historical foundations of 
production and reception. In these modes, the reader/critic is mostly believed to exist as 
an independent spectator of the literary event. Furthermore, the divide is fundamental and 
intrinsic between the subject (reader/author/critic) and the object (text). Also, the text is 
thought to possess intrinsic and fixed meaning prior to reading. QP will, therefore, 
introduce the quantum and posthumanist reworking the notion of agency, subjectivity, 
and objectivity, among others, within the literary context.  
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I introduce what I call the phenomenon of meaning78 to refer to the inseparability 
and non-externalism between the agencies of meaning (reader/author/text). The 
phenomenon of meaning is characterised by the lack of an external subject 
(author/reader/critic). What happens in reading the text is the temporary location of 
agency using Barad’s agential cut or the Heisenberg cut. Although this theoretical, 
flexible, and emergent cut sufficiently distinguishes between the agencies of meaning, it, 
nevertheless, does not exhibit true exteriority (as the traditional Cartesian subject/object 
cut) but rather ‘exteriority within’ (Barad 135). 
Throughout the thesis, I employ quantum-related notions such as entanglement79, 
complementarity, uncertainty, nonseparability, emergence, and parallelism, while 
deconstructing others, particularly externalism, separation, linearity, and temporal 
certainty. I use the pivotal term becoming as an ontological alternative to being, which 
stresses the dynamism of living of the world, being entangled within the environment and 
open to all the possibilities of relations and configurations. Becoming is thus necessarily 
entangled, dynamic, emergent, relational, and contingent. Becoming as a perpetual 
process of the universe and its entities does not take place in ‘space and time’ but instead 
‘happens in the making of spacetime itself’ (Barad 140). As I shall demonstrate in the 
coming chapters, the notion of time, historicity, and linearity are dismantled in the 
quantum posthumanist [QPist] process of becoming. 
It is worth noting that in developing the framework of QP, I intentionally use 
different, and not necessarily homogenous, interpretations of quantum theory, without 
attempting to validate any one particular account over others. For instance, Chapter Two 
and Three are (mainly) based on Bohr and Barad’s philosophy, emphasising the 
impossibility of exteriority in the literary phenomenon, and downplaying the role of the 																																																								
78 I choose the term phenomenon of meaning instead of literary phenomenon for three main reasons: (a) the 
phenomenon in question is and can be entangled with non-literary components; (b), in the quantum 
posthumanist context, as shall be later explained in Chapter Four, the distinction is blurred between 
consciousness and literary input (c) the phenomenon’s dynamics are not intrinsically different from other 
non-literary, meaning-based phenomena. 
79 As Karakostas explains, quantum entanglement ‘casts severe doubts on the existence of isolated 
(sub)systems and the applicability of the notion of atomism, in the sense that the parts of a quantum whole 
no longer exist as self-autonomous, intrinsically defined individual entities. The non-separable character of 
the behavior of an entangled quantum system precludes in a novel way the possibility of describing its 
component subsystems in terms of pure states. … For, whenever a compound system is in an entangled 
state … there are, in general, no pure states of the component subsystems on the basis of which the 
compound state of the whole system could be completely determined.’ (8-9). 
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external observer/reader. On the other hand, Chapter Four is based on Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty principle and the more subjective observer-dependent views of quantum 
theory, which stress the role of the consciousness/observer/reader within the 
phenomenon. The goal of this diversity is to demonstrate the flexibility of the framework, 
celebrate the parallelism of what might be seen otherwise as the contradiction between 
these interpretations, and to imply the experimental, rather than the truth-oriented, nature 
of this endeavour. 
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1.3. Towards Post/humanities80 
QP, as a variation on posthumanism, has the capacity to tackle three main issues 
within the humanities; it can (a) challenge the humanities’ ‘identity crisis’ by 
demonstrating its relevance in our techno-scientific world, (b) express and advance the 
already hybrid identity of the field, and (c) bridge the gap between the humanities and the 
sciences and move beyond the science wars and the divided/dividing view of human 
knowledge. 
Throughout its history, the humanities has suffered from existential crises every 
decade or so, which often appear to coincide with economic crises (Waugh ‘Future’) but   
more recent academic and institutional crises, building since the 1970s, have seemed 
more threatening to its foundations (Braidotti 151).81 Questions about its epistemological 
foundations, current state, issues around the relevance and state of its disciplines and their 
future (if any, some have argued) have been continually posed in the last twenty five 
years, and the possibility of the ‘death of the discipline’ has also been considered (145). 
While some believe this particular crisis might potentially be ‘terminal to the Humanities’ 
(Barnett 47), others are less alarmed (Waugh ‘Future’). Barnett approaches this crisis by 
succinctly posing the question of dispensability: ‘what would it to be for an advanced 
society to exist in which the humanities were more or less absent?’ (42). Regardless of 
the answer, the mere fact that such questions are posed serves as an indication of the 																																																								
80 According to Edward L. Ayers, the concept of the humanities gradually developed in the 1930s and was 
founded by elite American institutions, and from there it found its ways across other institutions. The 
humanities became especially relevant after World War II, where a need for a ‘humane understanding in a 
world descending into chaos’ emerged. Although the term bears the implications of ‘an ancient Western 
tradition’, the associated disciplines are mostly only a hundred years old or so (25). For this discussion, by 
the humanities I specifically mean a group of academic disciplines that are devoted to studying human 
culture. These include literature, philosophy, theology, music, art, and languages, and the social sciences, 
including history, anthropology, archaeology, and linguistics. These disciplines share the same outlook and 
general definition of, and assumptions concerning, the human and culture, and are mainly concerned with 
understanding ‘how people are active creators of culture, not just passive recipients of tradition’ (Behling 
‘Studying’). The term humanities is also a term used to separate these fields of knowledge from the 
homogeneity that is regarded as the field of the natural sciences. 
81 On 24 February 2009, Patricia Choen wrote an article in The New York Times entitled, ‘In Tough Times, 
the Humanities Must Justify Their Worth’.81 While the utility question is not new for the Humanities, given 
the current crisis, however, observers believe that the humanities is increasingly losing public support in the 
contemporary world. In the introduction to his book, Literature, Science, and a New Humanities, Jonathan 
Gottschall notes that the humanities in the United States has been suffering from declining trends in 
enrolment, funding, graduates, and scholarship. He further notes that the cultural prestige of the humanities 
has also been unprecedentedly shrinking (2). 
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presence and depth of the current crisis. Reasons for the current crisis are not simply 
economic. The historical scientific changes and the latest discoveries in biology and 
technology have, as Plumb puts it, ‘shattered the confidence of humanists in their 
capacities to lead or to construct’ (24). Furthermore, some cultural critics, such as 
Braidotti, have argued that the rise of posthumanism might be responsible for the current 
crisis. As the world becomes increasingly inhuman(e), the humanities is seen to become 
increasingly irrelevant. The humanities’ crisis is, therefore, seen to stem from the fact that 
the traditional human, on which the humanities is originally centred, is under attack, and, 
consequently, the field itself and all that it represents, is equally under attack as a 
consequence of the posthumanist undermining of humanist assumptions (Braidotti 2). 
Indeed, one of the intrinsic paradoxes of the humanities is that while it is expected 
to sustain an anthropocentric stance through its pre-assigned ‘cultural and social’ roles 
concerning many of the critical issues in the world, it is nonetheless criticised for that 
very limitation (Braidotti 172). This paradox is summarised by Whimster: ‘a science of 
the human would seem either to have the capacity to be inhuman or, alternatively, to be 
humanistic but hardly scientific’ (174). This paradox of becoming ‘inhuman humanities’ 
or ‘humanist posthumanities’ has certainly contributed to the depth of the humanities’ 
existential crisis. 
However, despite the pressure of its crisis, many trans-disciplinary fields have 
emerged ‘around the edges’ of established disciplines, including evolutionary, 
environmental, biogenetic, and other perspectives. The post-anthropocentric humanities, 
as Braidotti calls them, are already apparent in the proliferation of scholarship in 
interdisciplinary fields, most notably in animal and disability studies and eco-criticism 
(146). Clearly, the multiplying interdisciplinary fields of feminist, gender, postcolonial, 
monster, and disability studies demonstrate a clear ‘institutional response’ to the 
inhuman(e) predicament of our age (148), in contrast to the classical humanities which 
appears, particularly in the eyes of the public, to suffer from increasing irrelevance 
compared to those hybrid fields. It is worth noting that this abundance of interdisciplinary 
knowledge is highly characteristic of our posthumanist age which everywhere exhibits 
complexity, interconnectedness, and entanglement. As Stefan Herbrechter notes, the 
humanities have no choice but to become interdisciplinary for ‘new hybrid life forms [are 
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emerging] with their own political and ethical questions and imperatives’ (173). Other 
signs of new forms of interdisciplinarity include ‘courses on medicine and the 
humanities, […] the deployment of arts as therapy for forms of mental disability, […] 
ethics for business, and […] the conversations between philosophy and computer science’ 
(Barnett 48). 
On the other hand, the science wars, which erupted in the 1990s as a series of 
academic confrontations between scientific realists and postmodern relativists, took its 
toll on both sides.82 Postmodernists claimed that scientific paradigms are simply social 
and political constructs, while scientists accused postmodernists of social constructivism, 
antifoundationalism, and political ideology.83 In his essay, ‘Why Has Critique Run out of 
Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern’ (2004), Latour expresses his 
concerns regarding critique’s constant attack on, and corrosive scepticism towards, the 
sciences. The problem with critique, according to Latour, is that while it argues against 
the ideology of excessive trust in ‘scientific facts’, it nevertheless expresses what can be 
seen as an ideological and excessive distrust in the sciences; this includes the absolute 
contention of ‘the lack of scientific certainty’ intrinsic to any formulation of facts. Latour 
notes that while critical science studies largely focus on the prejudices behind what is 
described as objective knowledge, they should equally reveal the objective facts that lay 
behind ‘the illusion of prejudices’ (227). Evidently, Latour’s essay attempts to 
reconstruct a more productive relationship between critique and science. His call for the 
end of the science wars is accompanied with an appeal to return to materiality, and for the 
humanities to renew its critical tools and catch up with the scientific and technological 
																																																								
82 In 1996, the physicist Alan Sokal published a controversial essay titled ‘Transgressing the Boundaries: 
Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity’ in Social Text, an academic journal of 
postmodern cultural studies. He proposed that quantum gravity is a linguistic and social construct. Later, 
Sokal revealed in Lingua Franca that his essay was a hoax intended to test the intellectual rigour of 
postmodern thinking. The long-term ramifications of the Sokal affair seemed to have contained the hostility 
between the sciences and the humanities. Years later, the science wars may have subsided, as Waugh notes, 
but it put an end to postmodernism and considerably damaged cultural theory (‘Emergence’). 
83 Goodheart further expands on this issue on his books The Failure of Criticism (1978), The Skeptic 
Disposition: Deconstruction, Ideology, and Other Matters (1991), and Does Literary Studies Have a 
Future? (1999). So do others such as Paul Gross in Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and its 
Quarrels with Science (1988), and Mary Poovey in ‘Beyond the Current Impasse in Literary Studies’ 
(1999), and Marry Murrell in ‘Is Literary Studies Becoming Unpublishable?’ (2001)—to name but a few. 
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realities of modern times.84 
Latour’s call for the renewal of the humanities, the return to materiality, and the 
end of wars between the fields of human knowledge is clearly envisioned within the 
posthumanist framework. The novelty of posthumanist thought and its applications 
within the humanities, however, certainly leaves many questions unanswered or in need 
of further revision and investigation. On the other hand, the practices of posthumanism in 
other disciplines are also in need of a cultural critique of some sort. As Hayles notes, the 
future of posthumanism is open to question and negotiation. Now, Hayles remarks (and 
this is particularly the case for the humanities) is the best time to challenge the issue of 
the posthuman before it is too late, as ‘the trains of thought it embodies have been laid 
down so firmly that it would take dynamite to change them’ (291). 
However, in its way to becoming-posthumanities, the humanities need to be 
assigned a clearer, contributive role in its relationship with the sciences. Otherwise, it 
might risk the potential of finding itself in the usual one-way relationship, where it is at 
the receptive end of the interaction. Many scholars, including Braidotti, express 
legitimate fears of the humanities having to conform to the rules of the sciences without 																																																								
84 One of the literary movements that attempted to take the consilient line to overcome the science wars in 
the English studies is literary Darwinism. Pioneered by Joseph Carroll with the publication of his 1995 
book Evolution and Literary Theory and was later joined by other American critics including Brian Boyd 
and Gottschall, the movement constituted a radical response to postmodernism. As the name suggests, 
literary Darwinism attempted to introduce Darwinian theory into literary criticism and to apply the laws of 
evolution to literary texts. According to its pioneers, literary Darwinism aimed at ‘fundamentally altering 
the paradigm within which literary study is now conducted’. It also aimed at ‘subsum[ing] all other possible 
approaches’ (Crews 155). Not only literary critics, but scientists too joined in and supported the movement. 
In his 1998 book Consilience, the biologist Edward O. Wilson popularised the term consilience, to refer to 
the unity of knowledge, primarily aiming at redeeming the gap between the humanities and the sciences. 
This term was later adopted and Wilson’s book has been extensively quoted by many literary Darwinists in 
the hope of achieving the dream of consilience and thus ‘saving’ the sinking ship of the humanities. 
However, literary Darwinism failed in its mission, not so much owing to the ‘postmodern’ political 
ideology that ‘contaminated’ the field, as Carroll and others have argued [see Carroll’s ‘Poststructuralism, 
Cultural Conservatism and Evolutionary Biology’ (1996)], but rather due to serious and fundamental issues 
within the literary Darwinian theory. The main issues with literary Darwinism, critics hold, is its 
reductionism and radical stance from the literary tradition manifested in their complete disregard of the 
literary theory and their hostile stance towards postmodernism in particular; another issue is its associations 
with evolutionary psychology, a controversial school of evolutionary theory that has been discredited in the 
sciences. See Jonathan Kramnick ‘Against Literary Darwinism’, Eugene Goodheart ‘Do We Need Literary 
Darwinism’, and Fredric Crews ‘Apriorism for Empiricists’. Despite its honourable intentions to build a 
relationship with the sciences, their consilient project turned out to be, like similar attempts in the field, no 
more than  ‘a weasel word for scientism’ (Waugh ‘Emergence’). 
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contributing or setting its own rules in such a relationship (Braidotti 157). Similarly, 
Barnett believes that the new project of the humanities should ensure that it occupies a 
central critical position among other disciplines and should resist being forced into the 
handmaiden role ‘following in the wake of all other disciplines to disinter their ‘human’ 
implications’ (48).85 
The specific task of the ‘new’ humanities, in Barnett’s view, involves the 
deployment of imagination: imagining the future scenarios of this planet and those living 
in it (49). This fictional task, Barnett argues, is as significant as the factual task of the 
sciences; as Herbrechter puts it, ‘in the age of virtualization [...] factual-constative and 
performative-fictional forms of knowledge can no longer clearly be distinguished’ (176). 
Furthermore, a characteristic of posthumanist thought is the celebration of possibility 
rather than factuality. The virtual and fictional aspects of our technological world are in 
fact a distinctive feature of the posthuman age; hence, the assigned role of the humanities 
gains even greater significance. 
This task of imagination, however, is not an unstructured one. Barnett sets ‘six 
conditions of adequacy’ that would need to be met for the ‘imagination’ to be sufficient. 
First, it would need to be willing to, and capable of, work(ing) with ‘fundamentally 
different epistemologies’, which is a necessary condition of its complexity and 
interdisciplinarity. Second, it would need to have both a realist stance, acknowledging the 
real world and its laws, and the ability to explore novel spaces that are not yet part of it. 																																																								
85 To achieve Barnett’s view, the humanities would need to employ the concept of ideology as a means not 
only to investigate technological and scientific advances, but also to investigate the scientific disciplines 
themselves; Barnett suggests using ‘[c]oncepts, metaphors, discursive formations, practices and the 
methodologies of disciplines’ as part of this posthuman humanities (50). There are many examples of 
interdisciplinary work which comply with such a view. For instance, many literary scholars have examined 
Darwin’s writings within the cultural context and as literary texts, analysing its concepts, images, and 
metaphors. Some of these scholars are Gillian Beer in her leading book Darwin’s Plots, George Levine in 
Darwin and the Novelists: Patterns of Science in Victorian Fiction, Robert Richards in The Meaning of 
Evolution: the Morphological Construction and Ideological Reconstruction of Darwin's Theory, Darwinian 
Heretics (edited), and the final chapter ‘Darwin’s Romantic Biology’ in The Romantic Conception of Life: 
Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe; Gowan Dawson in Darwin, Literature and Victorian 
Respectability; Phillip Prodger in Darwin's Camera: Art and Photography in the Theory of Evolution, and 
Jonathan Smith in Charles Darwin and Victorian Visual Culture. Such works do not attempt to verify or 
deny scientific findings, as Levine notes, but rather to appreciate the sophisticated relations that science has 
with the rest of human culture (‘Reflection’ 236). Such works are representative of a rich dialectical 
relationship between the humanities and the Sciences without one part overshadowing the other. 
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Third, it would need to work efficiently both in theory and practice. Fourth, it would need 
to possess the quality of emergence, that is, ‘being susceptible […] to unfolding 
interpretations over time’. Fifth, it should be characterised by its unconditional openness 
to other fields and disciplines and their views and insights regarding its topic of inquiry; 
this should provide raw materials for the imagination to synthesise its possibilities. 
Finally, instead of being devoted to Man, imagination should strive to serve the purpose 
of global wellbeing, which determines its effectiveness and vitality (49). 
The question, however, remains: is posthumanism the answer to the humanities’ 
perpetual crisis? The answer is, surprisingly, that this is unlikely. The crisis of the 
humanities is inevitable: it is an integral part of its becoming. As Edward Ayers argues, 
by its very nature, the humanities will always be, to some extent, in crisis. Ayers writes 
that 
the humanities, whatever their objective situation, will always feel ill at 
ease in the world, always in some degree of crisis. By their very nature, 
the humanities are revisionists, unsettled. They have no choice but to 
challenge the knowledge, even wisdom, they inherit. No interpretation, 
however brilliant or apparently authoritative, can be the last word or the 
humanities die. This constant revolution means that the humanities can 
never rest. It means, too, that the humanities cannot provide what many 
people outside the academy crave: conclusive answers to complex 
questions, fixed lists of approved knowledge (30). 
Interestingly, this view of the humanities, I believe, is strikingly posthumanist. It 
demonstrates that the humanities is and has always been posthumanist or, at least, 
exhibits posthumanist qualities. This ongoing fluctuation and inherent instability of its 
identity are characteristic of the posthumanist becoming. 
In her book, Death of the PostHuman: Essays on Extinction (2014), Claire 
Colebrook argues that ‘[i]f the human is assumed to be nothing more than an interface, 
already at one with a world that is one living system, then posthumanism is nothing more 
than the negation of a humanism that never was’ (Colebrook 163). However, what 
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Colebrook fails to see is that posthumanism is not merely a negation of humanism, as the 
previous discussion has sought to demonstrate. Posthumanism is, most importantly, a 
negation of itself. To put it differently, for posthumanism to become itself, it needs to be 
able to refuse all boundaries and exist beyond all definitions and identities including, and 
particularly, its own. Its affirmation is simultaneously a constant negation; in other words, 
posthumanism is in a perpetual state of becoming.  
Hence, in contrast to Colebrook’s suggestion, posthumanism is here viewed not as 
a new framework that replaces humanism but rather as a realisation of the perpetual 
dynamism of theory and a recognition of what humanism was, is, and will be—
posthumanism. It is precisely the case, as Badmington states, that willingly or not, 
‘[h]umanism is always becoming posthumanism’ (Alien 11); and by extension, the 
humanities has been and will always be, to some extent, posthumanities. It is the job of 
the post/humanities, hence, to become conscious of and to seek its posthuman potentials. 
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1.4. Stories Beyond History: An Ahistorical Approach to Coetzee 
One of the frontiers this thesis has to defend is its apparently ahistorical approach 
to Coetzee’s fiction. Coetzee is often viewed as a postmodernist author. He is often 
studied within separate political, postcolonial, and feminist contexts and in relation to 
animal and ecological studies.86 To many of Coetzee’s critics, the consideration and 
foregrounding of the political and historical context of post-apartheid South Africa is 
indispensable in any attempt to interpret his narratives. In fact, some go as far as to 
suggest that ahistorical readings of his narratives are radically incomplete. David Attwell, 
the most notable critic and scholar of Coetzee, writes, ‘[d]espite all the self-reflexivity, all 
the representational mirrors, to pretend that we can measure Coetzee's achievements 
without considering the effects of biography and place is to ignore the elephant in the 
room’. Attwell further claims that ‘[e]ach gesture of fictive displacement, each act of 
imaginative relocation, speaks of a struggle both to speak at all and to keep the country at 
arm's length.’ (‘Estrangement’ 233). To Attwell, Coetzee’s fiction is impossible to read 
adequately, from any perspective, without situating the text within the contemporary 
reality of South African politics. 
However, despite Coetzee’s refusal to locate his narratives in any ‘real’ setting in 
most of his fiction, this has not prevented many of his notable critics, such as Teresa 
Dovey, Dominic Head, and Attwell himself87, from attributing ‘allegorical status’ to his 
narratives (Wright 15). Even those who read Coetzee’s work as evading historical reality, 
still interpret his evasiveness in political terms. Nadine Gordimer, for example, describes 
it as ‘a revulsion against all political and revolutionary solutions’ (‘Gardening’). Another 
example is Laura Wright, who argues that Coetzee’s work is ‘implicitly political by the 
virtue of its resistance’ (10). 
Indeed, Coetzee’s narratives can be read as possible or potential allegories that 
align with the political and historical reality of South Africa. However, his references to 
the South African history by no means entail that that these texts revolve around, or need 
to be necessarily interpreted, as Attwell suggests, strictly within a particularised historical 																																																								
86 Examples of these studies are mentioned in the footnotes (p.10). 
87 See Dovey’s The Novels of J.M. Coetzee: Lacanian Allegories, Head’s  J. M. Coetzee, and Attwell’s 
writings on Coetzee, such as his 2011 essay ‘Coetzee's Postcolonial Diaspora’. 
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context for a meaningful hermeneutic framework to be developed. Michela Canepari-
Labib argues that although Coetzee sets many of his novels in South Africa, his fiction, 
as a whole, ‘represent[s] an attempt to formulate more general propositions about human 
reality which transcend their South African settings’ (110)—a humanist perspective but a 
comment that might equally be developed within the frame of QP. Coetzee uses South 
Africa as a point of departure and a local, contextual perspective. As Braidotti argues, 
borrowing from Haraway in the context of nomadism, ‘you must be located somewhere 
in order to make statements of general value. Nomadism […] is not fluidity without 
borders but rather an acute awareness of the nonfixity of boundaries. It is the intense 
desire to go on trespassing, transgressing.’ (Nomadic 36). Furthermore, according to 
quantum logic, any observation is necessarily context-dependent, always in relation to 
and with the particularities of the conditions of its measurement. This acknowledgement 
highlights the limitations of observation rather than the significance of these limitations. 
In the case of Coetzee’s writings, I contend that historical and political readings are 
acknowledgements of the restraints under which resides a profound ontological quest for, 
and endorsement of, a philosophy of becoming.  
Moreover, in his fiction, Coetzee employs history to deconstruct history, 
following the Derridean approach of deconstructing history from within. Wright notes 
that Coetzee’s narratives are located outside the classical understanding ‘of not only 
postcolonial and postmodern writing, but are also located outside of any consistent notion 
of historical or personal truth’ (21). The historical and political references can be seen, 
therefore, as deconstructive techniques rather than constituting the core of Coetzee’s 
fiction. As I shall demonstrate in Chapter Four, throughout Foe, Coetzee deconstructs the 
very idea of history, origin, linearity, and causality. Nevertheless, his critics, insisting on 
limiting his texts to their political and historical context, seem to reconstruct the very 
notions that Coetzee systematically deconstructs in his writings.88 
Attwell claims that ‘[n]early all of Coetzee's fiction deals in one way or another 
with subjects who reluctantly find themselves forced to engage with a particular historical 
situation’ (‘Estrangement’ 232). Nevertheless, beneath the political and historical 																																																								
88 I discuss this paradox of Coetzee and his critics in more detail with regards to Friday’s silence and its 
metaphorical interpretations in Chapter Four, part ‘2.2.1. Silence and Language’ (113). 
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constructs in Coetzee’s fiction resides an ongoing dream of freedom. It is not a political 
freedom but an ontological one: to be beyond history, time, and language—the freedom 
to become. Most of Coetzee’s protagonists, as I shall demonstrate in Chapter Two, 
express a deep ontological and existential angst that disturbs their social and political 
identities and leaves them longing for the unknown. This existential crisis applies to 
Elizabeth Costello, Elizabeth Curren, David Lurie, Fyodor Dostoevsky, the magistrate, 
and Michael K, and represents a total disdain for all social, political, and historical 
structures, and a profound desire to move beyond these realities. In his portrayal of K, in 
particular, Coetzee fantasises about this ontological nomadism through the doctor’s 
description of K. The doctor writes, 
[Michael is] a human soul above and beneath classification, a soul 
blessedly untouched by doctrine, untouched by history, a soul stirring its 
wings within that stiff sarcophagus, murmuring behind that clownish mask 
. . . evading the peace and the war, skulking in the open where no one 
dreamed of looking, have managed to live in the old way, drifting through 
time, observing the seasons, no more trying to change the course of history 
than a grain of sand does’ (151-2).  
Indeed, this nomadism could be translated into Coetzee’s own fantasy of escaping the 
political burden with which his writing is associated in favour of more universal, 
ahistorical, and even posthumanist perspectives. Coetzee declares, through the 
magistrate: ‘I wanted to live outside history’ (169). Attwell argues that K’s attempts to 
maintain his freedom outside the social and political space is suggestive of ‘a general 
condition affecting Coetzee's authorship’ (‘Estrangement’ 233). However, another way to 
read this is that K’s attempt is representative of the general condition of Coetzee’s 
scholarship and of the restriction of his texts to the historical and political allegories they 
might be claimed to induce. 
In the interview with Tony Morphet, and talking about his novel, Life and Times 
of Michael K, Morphet asks whether Coetzee feels that the novel was a ‘task’ he needs in 
order to fulfil the history of South Africa, to which Coetzee answers: ‘[p]erhaps that is 
my fate. On the other hand, I sometimes wonder whether it isn’t simply that vast and 
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wholly ideological superstructure constituted by publishing, reviewing and criticism that 
is forcing on me the fate of being a South African novelist’ (‘Interviews’ 460). In his 
response, Coetzee provides the reasons, as he sees it, that have helped to shape or even 
constitute his image as a South African novelist. Regardless of whether or not being a 
South African author is his inevitable fate, it is evident that scholarship on Coetzee has 
contributed to this perception to a great extent. In his novel, Elizabeth Costello, Costello 
(Coetzee’s alter ego) is not content with the limitation imposed on her status as an 
author—as a female Australian author—as her son John reveals. Talking to the convenor 
of the jury, Gordon Wheatley, John remarks, 
if she learns that the Stowe Award is hers only because 1995 has been 
decreed to be the year of Australasia’. 
‘What does she want it to be?’ shouts Wheatley back. 
‘That she is the best,’ he replies. ‘In your jury's honest opinion. Not the 
best Australian, not the best Australian woman, just the best.’ (8) 
There are many reasons to believe that this is how Coetzee himself feels about limiting 
his work and status to the reality and history of South Africa.  
Therefore, and through the framework of QP, the reading I propose for Coetzee’s 
writing imagines an author without a definition, a text without borders, and a reader 
without distance; a reading that is ‘out of all the camps at the same time’ (K 182). I 
contend that an ahistorical reading of Coetzee is not ‘ignoring the elephant in the room’, 
as Attwell puts it, but rather leaving the room altogether—and opening up to the universe.  
The next chapter deals with the idea of becoming in relation to Coetzee’s 
protagonists in Disgrace, Age of Iron, The Master if Petersburg, Waiting for the 
Barbarians, and Elizabeth Costello. It draws from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s 
ideas on becoming animal, and Barad’s work on agency and entanglement. In the first 
part, it analyses the structure of several of Coetzee’s protagonists and documents the 
gradual deconstruction of their egos, self, language, time, and meaning, followed by a 
posthumanist realisation of becoming. In the second part, it investigates another set of 
Coetzee’s protagonists, the posthumanists that, contrary to the first, exhibit a strikingly 
different set of characteristics. In the third part, I reverse the idea of becoming by 
investigating becoming-human through the figure of Kafka’s ape in Elizabeth Costello. In 
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the fourth part, I extend the idea of becoming to include the reader, the writer, and the 
text, which, I contend, are inseparable in studying the phenomenon of meaning—which, I 
argue, has no ‘observer’ outside itself.  
Chapter Three analyses Coetzee’s novel Slow Man and the protagonist’s accident 
and subsequent disability. Drawing from Andy Clark’s work on extended cognition, I 
introduce the term extended becoming to argue for a more comprehensive idea of 
embodiment, embeddedness, and extendedness of the (in)animate entity within/of the 
environment. I also draw from Bill Brown’s thing theory by exploring how inanimate and 
animate bodies behave in the perpetual process of becoming.  
Chapter Four offers an overview of the historical figure of Robinson Crusoe, its 
textual manifestations and intertextuality/entanglement with Coetzee’ Foe. The chapter 
contests ideas of origin, linearity, temporality, and historicity. It draws on Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty principle and the notion of observer-effect (which I refer to as reader-effect) 
within the process of measurement (or meaning making). It also explores several 
narrative techniques Coetzee uses, which I argue help constitute the quantum 
posthumanist narrative, particularly in the last chapter of Foe. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
I am Nothing Therefore I am Everything: The Crisis of ‘Being’ and the Longing for 
Becoming in Coetzee’s Fiction 
‘Man, I thought: the only creature with a part of his existence in the unknown, in 
the future, like a shadow cast before him. Trying continually to catch up with that 
moving shadow, to inhabit: the image of his hope. But I, I cannot afford to be man. 
Must be something smaller, blinder, closer to the ground.’ –E. Curren (Age 170). 
 
This chapter centres on the idea of becoming as a fundamental ontological notion 
in the framework of QP. It effectively replaces the traditional concept of being. Becoming 
is an ongoing, constant, contingent, and entangled event within the present, and through 
which the universe and all entities manifest themselves. The idea of becoming bears out 
the simple premises of QP: becoming necessarily presupposes no prior or future values 
beyond the existing/everlasting moment of becoming. Furthermore, becoming entails the 
impossibility of inherent/exterior boundaries between entities. As a result, the idea of a 
fixed, inherent, definitive, or separate self becomes highly debatable. The specifications 
of becoming should gradually build up throughout the discussion. 
If we were to make a rough, convenient, yet helpful, generalisation, we could find 
two major types of characters in Coetzee’s work: the disembodied, superior, and 
intellectual figures, on the one hand, and the embodied, inferior, and illiterate figures on 
the other. In general, these types can be described, more or less, as the humanist and the 
posthumanist figures, respectively.89 The ‘humanist’ figures include Eugene Dawn and 
Jacobus Coetzee, in Dusklands, Magda in In the Heart of the Country, the Magistrate in 
Waiting for the Barbarians, David Lurie in Disgrace, Susan Barton in Foe, Elizabeth 
Curren in Age of Iron, Elizabeth Costello in Elizabeth Costello, and Fyodor Dostoevsky 
in The Master of Petersburg. The ‘posthumanist’ characters include the barbarian girl in 																																																								
89 It is important to emphasise that the humanist/posthumanist distinction is only an approximation. As we 
shall come to see, humanist characters are not humanist per se; they are stuck in their own ideals but, 
nonetheless, evolve toward their becomings. The posthumanist characters, on the other hand, are 
posthumanist in the sense that they express high levels of nomadism and liminality—not in the sense that 
they replace the subject position left by the annihilation of Man, which I come to discuss in the conclusion 
of this chapter. 
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Waiting for the Barbarians, Friday in Foe, Michael K in Life and Times of Michael K 
(and, to a lesser extent, Mr Vercueil in Age of Iron, and, in some aspects, Lucy in 
Disgrace). These two types represent opposing yet complementary forces in Coetzee’s 
fiction, the forces of being and becoming, that characterises the characters’ ontological 
struggles.  
This chapter is broken down into four main sections. The first and the second 
sections, ‘The First Paradigm: Humanist Figures’ and ‘The Second Paradigm: 
Posthumanist figures’, deal with the two underlying paradigms that constitute the 
anatomy of Coetzee’s humanist and posthumanist figures. For this discussion, however, I 
am limiting the analysis to David, Curren, and Dostoevsky from the humanist, and 
Friday, the girl, and K from the posthumanist figures.90 I begin by thoroughly tracing the 
deconstruction of identity, the dissolving of ego, destruction of language, and temporal 
structures of Coetzee’s humanist protagonists as they seek their journeys towards 
becoming. I explore, on the other hand, Coetzee’s posthumanist figures, which, through 
their non-identity, and non-distinguishability, along with their a-linguistic presence, 
exemplify a particular becoming. In the third part of the chapter ‘Thoughts on Becoming(-
with)-Animal and Becoming-Human’, and using Costello’s speech ‘The Lives of 
Animals’, I further my discussion on becoming for animals and humans. In the fourth and 
final section of this chapter, I extend this idea of becoming to include Coetzee and the 
reader, and how they also become part of this dynamic entangled phenomenon of 
meaning. 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
90 These paradigms are equally applicable to the rest of Coetzee’s characters, and, with slight adjustments, 
even include minor ones. 
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2.1. The First Paradigm: Humanist Characters91 
Coetzee’s humanist protagonists follow an interestingly systematic and cohesive 
paradigm: they are intellectuals who maintain assertive views of how the world should 
be. Absorbed in their own worlds, they lose touch with the reality of the world and the 
people around them. Their journeys begin as they all face a personal (physical and 
mental) crisis that separates them from their old lives. They then refuse to perform social 
rituals as means to deal with their crises in order to be reassimilated into their 
communities. As a result, they find themselves stuck in a state of separation and 
liminality. They go through different stages of ontological struggle, including conscious 
thoughts of death, a deep longing for immortality, and an aching desire for leaving 
something behind. Each character is presented with a chance of becoming, part of which 
involves letting go of themselves and facing the potential death of their ego. The endings 
of their struggles are in a state of suspension—not fully resolved yet not entirely 
unsuccessful either.  
At the early stages of each narrative, three protagonists face different crises that 
forever change their lives. David Lurie, a 53-year-old college professor of English at 
Cape Town University, and an author of several books, witnesses his entire life shattering 
after the affair with his student, Melanie Isaac, is exposed. When the affair becomes a 
public matter, David loses his job, friends, social status, and reputation. He subsequently 
flees from social disgrace and temporarily moves to the country to live with his daughter, 
Lucy. During his stay, he and Lucy undergo an intensely traumatic experience: three men 
attack them, rob them of their belongings, try to kill David, and rape and impregnate 
Lucy. The second protagonist, Fyodor Dostoevsky, Coetzee’s fictionalised character of 
the real author is, like the actual Dostoevsky, a very successful, reputable author and a 																																																								
91 Coetzee’s critique of Enlightenment and rationality has been explored by other scholars, including, 
notably, Martin Woessner in ‘Coetzee’s Critique of Reason’, Alice Crary in ‘Coetzee the Moral Thinker’ 
and others in the collection of essays published as J. M. Coetzee and Ethics: Philosophical Perspectives on 
Literature (2010). This chapter will, therefore, avoid repetition of what these earlier critics have explored 
as Coetzee’s antihumanist stance, his attack on Western philosophy and the mistrust in reason, which is 
seen as evident in the majority of his novels. Instead, the focus here will be on how Coetzee explores the 
aftermath of his deconstruction of humanist values, the crisis of the self and the dissolving of the ego that is 
the consequence of such destruction. 
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Russian public figure. His life is no longer the same after he learns about the death of his 
stepson, Pavel. Dostoevsky becomes obsessed with every detail that he can gather about 
his son and his life at Petersburg. Alongside the anguish at Pavel’s death, Dostoevsky 
also suffers from seizures that take a toll on his life. The third protagonist, Elizabeth 
Curren, is a retired professor of English. Curren discovers she is dying of cancer; during 
the last stages of her illness, Curren writes a lengthy letter of longing to her daughter who 
lives in the United States. Clearly, the crises that these protagonists go through seem to 
have dual effects; they take a toll both on their physical and mental health.  
Following the crises that temporarily separate them from their communities, each 
protagonist is given a chance to be reassimilated into society by following certain 
established social rituals. As he is brought before a disciplinary committee to answer for 
his affair, David pleads guilty to the charges pressed against him by Melanie. However, 
the university committee does not think David’s ‘secular plea’ is enough; they want him 
to make a ‘confession’ using his own words (Disgrace 51).  They also ask him to issue a 
public apology, which does not concern David’s sincerity but his willingness to admit his 
fault publicly (58). The committee also makes the provision that David might have access 
to a consultation with a priest or a counsellor (49); however, David firmly refuses to 
follow any of the protocols they suggest. Failing to perform these rituals, David winds up 
losing his job and the respect of his colleagues and the community. 
Like David, who fails the social rituals of repentance, Dostoevsky fails the 
socially accepted rituals that should direct the mourning of his stepson. He initially plans 
to stay in Petersburg for a short period to visit Pavel’s grave, collect his personal 
belongings, and return to his wife. However, he winds up staying for much longer, and 
despite Anna Sergeyevna’s several attempts to help Dostoevsky to move on (and move 
out), Dostoevsky insists on staying and reaching out to Pavel. Instead of following the 
conventional stages of mourning, ‘call[ing] upon God or his wife to save him’, 
Dostoevsky chooses to wait for the uncanny moment where Pavel reveals himself 
(Master 234). 
Despite her deteriorating condition and her inability to take care of herself, and in 
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spite of her doctor’s advice to go to the hospital and get ‘proper attention’ (Age 183), 
Curren refuses to submit to the hospital and insists on struggling and living/dying alone. 
She firmly refuses to go through the rituals of death at the hospital which involve feeding 
her the drug mandragora until she gets drowsy (179), as this means surrendering to what 
is expected of her as a dying patient. Instead, Curren chooses to join David and 
Dostoevsky in their isolation and liminality.  
In his anthropological work, Les Rites de Passage [The Rights of Passage] (1909), 
Arnold Van Gennep notes that rites of passage, from one social state to another, follow a 
three-step structure: separation (séparation), a liminal period (marge), and reassimilation 
(agrégation) (vii). Following their separation and refusal to submit to, and follow, the 
social rituals, the three protagonists remain stuck in the liminal period: David’s career is 
suspended; he is neither inside nor outside his community. Curren is suspended between 
life and death, unable to accept her dying body and simultaneously unable to join the 
living as her body continues to fail her. Dostoevsky’s life is suspended in a state of 
mourning in the last moments of Pavel’s life. Curren describes her state of liminality, in 
which she finds herself ‘not properly born: a liminal creature, unable to breathe in water, 
that lacks the courage to leave the sea behind and become a dweller on land’ (Age 139). 
However, instead of being in harmony with their liminality (as the posthumanist figures 
are92), the protagonists’ struggles turn inward, thus further isolating themselves from the 
world. 
The protagonists’ disembodiment and idealistic thinking are evident as they 
attempt to deal with their struggles. 93 When asked about his relationship with Melanie, 
David claims that he was not himself; his actions were a manifestation of Eros, to which 																																																								
92 I expand on the notion of liminality and posthumanism later on in second part of the discussion on the 
posthumanist figures. 
93 The conversation between David and Lucy demonstrates this further; David is baffled by Lucy’s decision 
to keep silent about the rape; he asks her whether, by doing this, she hopes she can ‘expiate the crimes of 
the past by suffering in the present?’ to which she answers: 'No. You keep misreading me. Guilt and 
salvation are abstractions. I don't act in terms of abstractions'’ (Disgrace 112). Lucy accuses David of 
misunderstanding her by presuming that she is acting based on ‘abstractions’. Indeed, throughout the 
narrative, David is thinking and reasoning through such abstractions. His troubled relationship with Lucy is 
but a reflection of his troubled relationship with the real world that is excessively filtered through David’s 
idealistic thinking. 
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he is merely obedient (Disgrace 52). He describes his desire as coming ‘from the quiver 
of Aphrodite, goddess of the foaming waves’ (25). Furthermore, at Bev’s clinic, David 
takes charge of disposing of the bodies of the dead dogs. However, instead of disposing 
of the remains in the dump with the rest of the scourings for the incinerator crew to come 
and collect, David chooses instead to drive the kombi to the incinerator, loaded with the 
bodies wrapped in black bags, in the mornings after the killing sessions. David does this 
because ‘he is not prepared to inflict such dishonour upon them’ (144). However, he 
quickly sees through his action; he is doing this not for the dogs but rather for ‘his idea of 
the world, a world in which men do not use shovels to beat corpses into a more 
convenient shape for processing’ (146).  
Curren too exhibits the same type of thinking in abstractions. She is concerned not 
about death but the degradation that accompanies it, especially concerning the idea she 
maintains of herself: ‘There is something degrading about the way it all ends – degrading 
not only to us but to the idea we have of ourselves, of humankind. People lying in dark 
bedrooms, in their own mess, helpless’ (Age 140). Similar to David’s reaction to the 
dishonour that he feels is inflicted on the dead dogs, Curren finds the humiliation and 
shame that comes with the sickness and the helplessness more horrifying than death 
itself. Dostoevsky also shares a similar moment to David and Curren. He finds the horror 
that Pavel must have felt during his fall more unsettling than the latter’s death. The 
narrator describes, from Dostoevsky’s perspective, this realisation of the inevitable death 
as being ‘more terrible than annihilation itself’ (Master 20).  
Furthermore, Coetzee’s protagonists share a similar preoccupation with their 
posthumous legacy and the idea of leaving something behind. David declares, as he talks 
to his divorced wife about Byron’s opera on which he is working excessively, that the 
project stems from his desire ‘to leave something behind’ (Disgrace 63). Furthermore, 
unconsciously troubled by the thoughts of his after-death, David contemplates what he is 
leaving behind on three different occasions. The first is when he thinks about Lucy as 
they take a walk together: ‘[i]f this is to be what he leaves behind – this daughter, this 
woman – then he does not have to be ashamed’ (62). On another occasion, David 
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imagines how Lucy’s life, ‘his line of existence’94, goes on, or should go on, long after 
his death: 
[w]ith luck she will last a long time, long beyond him. When he is dead 
she will, with luck, still be here doing her ordinary tasks among the 
flowerbeds. And from within her will have issued another existence, that 
with luck will be just as solid, just as long-lasting. So it will go on, a line 
of existences in which his share, his gift, will grow inexorably less and 
less, till it may as well be forgotten (217). 
The third occasion is when David learns about Lucy’s pregnancy from one of the rapists: 
‘is this how it is all going to end, is this how his line is going to run out, like water 
dribbling into the earth?’ (199). David’s line of existence, represented in the opera 
project, his daughter, and his grandchild, does not seem to go anywhere for him: the 
opera does not succeed, his relationship with Lucy suffers, and he rejects his grandchild 
and asks Lucy to abort it. 
Like David, Curren wishes to leave a trace of her existence after she dies. When 
she discovers she is dying, she starts writing to her daughter on and about the last days of 
her life. Curren’s words become an assertion of her existence as she progressively comes 
closer to her end. Furthermore, Curren’s clinging to her daughter is a manifestation of her 
clinging to life. She reflects on the past when she used to wake her daughter up with a 
hug, whose secret meaning is ‘that Mommy should not be sad, for she would not die but 
live on in [her].’ Curren declares: ‘[t]o live! You are my life; I love you as I love life 
itself’ (Age 6). Curren experiences a similar, short moment of contentment, to that of 
David, when she contemplates bringing a child into the world, a solid proof of existence, 
which shall continue her line of existence. She addresses Vercueil: ‘we do not really die: 
we simply pass on our life, the life that was for a while in us, and are left behind. I am 																																																								
94 The idea of ‘line of existence’ runs through Coetzee’s other novels. In Slow Man, for instance, and after 
his near-death experience and the ego facing its potential death, Paul was contemplating his childlessness: 
‘dying childless, terminating the line, subtracting oneself from the great work of generation’ (20). Just like 
David’s, Paul’s desire is to continue to live through his offspring: “But it is not a baby he wants. What he 
wants is a son, a proper son, a son and heir, a younger, stronger, better version of himself’ (45). 
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just a shell, as you can see, the shell my child has left behind’ (76). To Curren, dying 
without succession is ‘unnatural’; she explains, ‘[f]or peace of mind, for peace of soul, 
we need to know who comes after us, whose presence fills the rooms we were once at 
home in’ (25). Just like David, Curren tries to control who ‘comes after’ her; the 
knowledge itself gives her ego a sense of control over life after death. The protagonists 
find comfort in knowing that they shall continue to live after their bodies are gone.  
Not only does the idea of ‘leaving behind’ translate into the Cartesian ego’s quest 
for immortality, but it also short-circuits the Cartesian ego’s inability to imagine its own 
death. While the death of the body is imaginable, the Cartesian ego is at work even, and 
especially, through imagining one’s own death as confined simply to the body. An 
example of this is when David imagines his death: 
[h]e has a vision of himself stretched out on an operating table. A scalpel 
flashes; from throat to groin he is laid open; he sees it all yet feels no pain. 
A surgeon, bearded, bends over him, frowning. What is all this stuff? 
growls the surgeon. He pokes at the gall bladder. What is this? He cuts it 
out, tosses it aside. He pokes at the heart. What is this? (Disgrace 171).  
Although having no trouble imagining the death of his body, David’s consciousness, 
nonetheless, remains at work and therefore lives on; it can see the body and hear the 
surgeon’s growling as he is dissecting the body. Similarly, Curren has a vision of the 
house after she dies: ‘a vision overtakes me of this house, empty, with sunlight pouring 
through the windows on to an empty bed, or of False Bay under Hue skies, pristine, 
deserted – when the world I have passed my life in manifests itself to me and I am not of 
it’ (Age 26). Curren’s ego contemplates the possibility of life without ‘her’ in it. The ego 
is, nonetheless, present, witnessing the house and observing life resuming sans the body. 
The protagonists’ inability to imagine their own deaths arises from the inability of 
the mind to comprehend nothingness and conceptualise inexistence; the mind simply 
cannot stop itself from existing, for imagining death entails the necessary presence of the 
mind to be able to imagine. Elizabeth Costello calls this a ‘collapse of imagination’, 
which happens to the imagination before death, and is exclusive to the human mind: ‘that 
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collapse of the imagination . . . is the basis of our fear of death. … To an insect, death is 
the breakdown of systems that keep the physical organism functioning, and nothing more. 
'To animals, death is continuous with life. It is only among certain very imaginative 
human beings that one encounters a horror of dying'’ (Costello 109). Jesse Bering 
interestingly notes that, when tested, even people with ‘extinctivist beliefs’ (who believe 
mind/soul/consciousness ceases to exist once the body dies) gave responses that indicated 
an unconscious belief in a psychological continuity after death. Furthermore, Bering 
explains what he calls ‘simulation constraint hypothesis’, that is, to imagine our death—
like any experience—we resort to our previous experiences; however, the death of 
consciousness has no similar experience to which it is comparable (‘Never’). The Spanish 
philosopher, Miguel de Unamuno, in Tragic Sense of Life expresses the same idea. He 
writes, ‘[i]t is impossible for us . . . to conceive of ourselves as not existing, and no effort 
is capable of enabling consciousness to realize absolute unconsciousness, its own 
annihilation. . . . The effort to comprehend it causes the most tormenting dizziness. We 
cannot conceive of ourselves not existing’ (38). Coetzee writes a parallel passage in 
Boyhood, about a child that tries to imagine his own death: ‘he tries to imagine his death. 
But he cannot. Always there is something left behind. … He can imagine himself dying 
but he cannot imagine himself disappearing. Try as he will, he cannot annihilate the last 
residue of himself’ (112). 
Moreover, it is also impossible for consciousness to grasp the fact that when it 
dies, it will never know it is dead. The consciousness believes that, at least for a fraction 
of an instant that precedes the inevitable death, it is capable of recognising its own death. 
Curren contemplates the conscious realisation of one’s own death: ‘[m]ust one die in full 
knowledge, fully oneself? Must one give birth to one's death without anesthetic?’ (Age 
141). It is this realisation of one’s own death that troubles Dostoevsky regarding the 
death of Pavel; it is the fraction of the second where the ego faces the unimaginable—its 
own death. Matryosha articulates this moment of realisation in her questions to 
Dostoevsky: 
‘Does it hurt – you know – when a person dies?’ 
Now he knows she is serious. ‘At the moment?’ 
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‘Yes. Not when you are completely dead, but just before that.’ 
‘When you know you are dead?’ 
‘Yes’ (Master 208). 
Realising one’s own death at the time of death is another form of consciousness 
continuity; the Cartesian ego presumes that it can grasp the realisation of its own 
annihilation in the last instant that separates life and death.  
David, Curren, and Dostoevsky experience physical trauma that helps to 
deconstruct their sense of ego. The situations vary from the physical attack on David and 
the attempted murder, Curren’s cancer and physical deterioration, to Dostoevsky’s 
epilepsy and mental struggle. As their bodies betray them, their ego steps in again: the 
protagonists experience the mind/body divide and begin to imagine a separation between 
themselves as pure consciousness on the one hand, and as bodies on the other. David’s 
previous vision of his body stretched out on a table being dissected is a good example of 
the illusion of the separation between consciousness and the body. Consciousness stands 
‘outside’ the experience of living, observing the body at a distance. ‘David’ claims that 
he felt no pain as he was calmly listening as the surgeon growls, pokes, and tosses his 
internal organs (Disgrace 171).  
As her health progressively deteriorates and her body gets weaker, Curren 
becomes more alienated from her body than she ever was: 
[w]ho cares?  When I am in a mood like this I am capable of putting a 
hand on the breadboard and chopping it off without a second thought. 
What do I care for this body that has betrayed me? I look at my hand and 
see only a tool, a hook, a thing for gripping other things. And these legs, 
these clumsy, ugly stilts: why should I have to carry them with me 
everywhere? Why should I take them to bed with me night after night and 
pack them in under the sheets, and pack the arms in too, higher up near the 
face, and lie there sleepless amid the clutter? The abdomen too, with its 
dead gurglings, and the heart beating, beating: why? What have they to do 
with me? (Age 12-3). 
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Curren’s body becomes a burden on her consciousness; her love for life is constantly 
challenged by the deterioration of her body. As a result, Curren’s ego creates an illusory 
space between ‘herself’ and her body to protect itself against the horrifying truth of its 
own annihilation. Becoming spectator of her own body, Curren sees it in a new light: a 
bag of unnecessary junk she has to carry around.  
The space the ego creates between the body and the ‘self’ takes a more direct 
manifestation in Dostoevsky’s situation. During one of his attacks, Dostoevsky 
experiences a moment of separation from his body: ‘[a] body falls vertically through 
space inside him. He is that body. There is a rush of air: he is the one who feels the rush. 
There is a throat choked with terror: it is his throat.’ (Master 69). In Dostoevsky’s case, 
there seems to be a temporal gap between experiencing the body and recognising its 
ownership; consciousness realises the event before it realises its physical connection to it. 
However, this illusory separation between the imagined self and the body quickly 
collapses under extreme physical pain, where existence is reduced to the singular, 
grounding experience of the body.95 Martin Woessner explains96 how pain reduces the 
‘Cartesian cogito into pure body’ that even embodied phenomenology, represented in 
Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty, which attempts to relocate existence outside the Cartesian 
ego, are incapable of offering the ‘corporeal facticity of our embodiment’ that pain seems 
capable of enforcing (‘Reason’ 234). As Woessner notes, pain is not ‘yours or mine’ 
because pain destroys the very boundaries that shape and maintain ‘what is yours and 
what is mine’ (234). This pure embodiment leaves only pain, with no ability to reflect on 
it: ‘[p]ain is truth; all else is subject to doubt’ (Coetzee, Waiting 5). Through those 
extreme conditions, the ego eventually breaks down, giving way to the experience of 
embodiment. Curren experiences such embodiment in her most intense moments of pain, 
																																																								
95 Coetzee systematically uses torture as the quickest way for his characters to experience pure 
embodiment. Through the magistrate’s words, Coetzee shows how torture breaks down the human cogito, 
language, and reason, and opens the gate to pure embodiment: ‘[M]y torturers were not interested in 
degrees of pain. They were interested only in demonstrating to me what it meant to live in a body, as a 
body, a body which can entertain notions of justice only as long as it is whole and well, which very soon 
forgets them when its head is gripped and a pipe is pushed down its gullet and pints of salt water are poured 
into it till it coughs and retches and flails and voids itself’ (Waiting 126). 
96 Although Woessner argues for the fragmentation of the victims’ subjectivity, drawing from Joseph 
Slaughter’s arguments in reference to French policies in Algeria, all forms of physical trauma impacts the 
Cartesian ego. Bodily pain, including sickness, triggers the direct experience embodiment. 
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where the distance between body and mind collapses97: ‘[b]ut now, during these spasms 
of coughing, I cannot keep any distance from myself. There is no mind, there is no body, 
there is just I, a creature thrashing about, struggling for air, drowning’ (132). As Bruns 
points out, at this level of singular and irreducible experience, it is difficult to make 
distinctions of any sort (703). 
Since Coetzee systematically makes his protagonists go through physical pain to 
emphasise their embodiment, many critics argue for the primacy of the body and of 
physical experience in Coetzee’s work.98 Contemplating his own work, Coetzee himself 
admits, ‘If I look back over my own fiction, I see a simple (simple-minded?) standard 
erected. That standard is the body. Whatever else, the body is not "that which is not," and 
the proof that it is the pain that it feels . . . Not grace, then, but at least the body.’ 
(Doubling 248).  
However, more so than the body, a QPist, post-materialist view rejects the very 
distinction of mind versus body. In such a view, the physical and nonphysical are 
inseparable and entangled to the point where it is impossible to establish a definitive 
distinction between the two. As Barad notes, ‘[m]atter and meaning are not separate 
elements. They are inextricably fused together, and no event, no matter how energetic, 
can tear them asunder.’ (Meeting 3). The new wider understanding of matter as both 
physical/nonphysical is exemplified in the physical particles which are thought to be the 
basic building block of the universe. These particles do not always behave as physical 
entities; they also behave as waves, which does not subscribe to the traditional idea of 
matter as occupying a definitive space in the universe (Dupré 22). 
This collapse of physical/nonphysical and the new perspective on matter is 
nonetheless evident in Coetzee’s language. The language used to describe the aftershock 
David experiences demonstrates the indistinction between the physical/psychological and 
																																																								
97 In a sense, this loss of the ability for the ego to reflect upon itself is a move from what Antonio Damasio 
calls a core consciousness to a protoself, a basic level of awareness shared among all organisms (154) 
without the presence of a consciousness that can reflect upon itself. Damasio develops a three-layered 
theory of consciousness. The first is protoself, which is a basic level of awareness shared among all 
organisms; the second is core consciousness (ego), which allows the self to reflect upon itself; the third is 
extended consciousness, which ‘goes beyond the here and now, both backward and forward’ and involves 
the use of higher thought (195). 
98 An example of those critics who argue for the primacy of bodily experience is Alena Dvorakova in her 
essay, ‘Coetzee’s Hidden Polemic with Nietzsche’. 
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body/mind: ‘[h]e has a sense that, inside him, a vital organ has been bruised, abused - 
perhaps even his heart’; and ‘he feels his interest in the world draining from him drop by 
drop’ (Disgrace 107). This body/mind blurring is more clearly expressed in the depiction 
of David’s feelings: ‘[t]he blood of life is leaving his body and despair is taking its place, 
despair that is like a gas, odourless, tasteless, without nourishment’ (108). The 
interchangeability of the physical ‘blood’ and emotional ‘despair’ emphasises the 
linguistic indistinguishability between body/mind.  
A similar collapse of the physical/nonphysical is evident in Curren’s belief that 
her cancer is caused by the accumulation of ‘shame’ she has undergone throughout her 
life, which further stresses the lack of division between body/consciousness: ‘I have 
cancer from the accumulation of shame I have endured in my life. That is how cancer 
comes about: from self-loathing the body turns malignant and begins to eat away at itself’ 
(Age 145). Another example of such a collapse can be found in Curren’s insistence on the 
materiality of her words as she addresses her daughter; ‘[y]ou think only blows are real, 
blows and bullets. But listen to me: can't you hear that the words I speak are real? Listen! 
They may only be air but they come from my heart, from my womb’ (145). To Curren, 
writing is a process not less physical than giving birth to a child. She also describes the 
taste in her throat, of bile and sulphur, as the taste of madness (182). In a similar 
depiction, Dostoevsky thinks betrayal tastes like gall (Master 250). These different 
examples evidently demonstrate the linguistic and ontological indistinguishability 
between the physical/nonphysical, matter/meaning, and body/mind. 
The distinction is destroyed not only between body/mind but also between 
body/environment and interiority/exteriority. The loss of bodily boundaries is evident in 
the intimate moments that pass between Dostoevsky and Anna, where Dostoevsky 
becomes unable to distinguish between himself and his lover: ‘[t]here are moments when 
he cannot say which of them is which, which the man, which the woman, when they are 
like skeletons, assemblages of bone and ligament pressed one into the other, mouth to 
mouth, eye to eye, ribs interlocked, leg-bones intertwined’ (225). From a quantum 
perspective, and as Barad explains, the object and its surroundings are not inherently 
separate (Meeting 118). One of the implications of Bohr’s interpretations of quantum 
theory, as Barad contends, is that the human body is not taken for granted; it does not 
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‘preexist as such’. Bodies are neither ‘products’ nor ‘ends’ but, on a molecular and 
quantum level, they are intertwined with the world and tightly woven in its ongoing 
becoming (150). Dostoevsky and Anna’s bodies, in such a moment, become a new body, 
irreducible to either of them. 
As the physical/nonphysical, body/mind, and inside/outside boundaries collapse, 
the protagonists’ egos are slowly undone. After the trauma, David ‘is losing himself day 
by day’ (Disgrace 121). His confidence in his intellect and rationality slowly diminish 
and his ego is seriously weakened; Descartes’ cogito ergo sum ‘je pense donc je suis’ 
becomes I don’t think, therefore I am nothing: ‘[h]e does not understand what is 
happening to him. … [H]e cannot tell whether by nature he is cruel or kind. He is simply 
nothing’ (143). Furthermore, David’s rational and egocentric monologues in the early 
stages of the narrative are gradually replaced by his impulsive visions and nightmares. As 
Alyda Faber notes, David ‘drifts, without agency’ (311). Similarly, Dostoevsky’s sense 
of selfhood is lost between seizures: ‘[w]hen he comes back he has again lost all sense of 
who he is. He knows the word I, but as he stares at it, it becomes as enigmatic as a rock in 
the middle of a desert’ (Master 71). 
The destruction of ‘I’ marks the deconstruction of agency and the loss of 
boundaries between subject/object. In his critique of Beckett’s ‘Unnamable’, Coetzee 
notes that the name ‘unnamable’ is a demonstration of the lack of separation between 
creator/creature and namer/named ‘with which the act of creating, naming, begins’. It 
expresses the inability to distinguish consciousness from its objects (Doubling 37). This 
moment of indistinction between consciousness and the objects of consciousness is 
demonstrated in one of Dostoevsky’s seizures: ‘[h]e has no idea where he is, no idea who 
he is. He is a wakefulness, a consciousness, that is all’ (Master 69). Dostoevsky loses his 
sense of self and consequently, becomes simultaneously consciousness and the object of 
that consciousness: ‘Be calm, says this consciousness, addressing itself, trying to quell its 
own panic’. (69). What Dostoevsky experiences is a moment of fluidity where the 
boundaries between his mind/body are removed and thus he finds it difficult to 
distinguish between himself as ‘consciousness’, what he experiences as ‘body’, and 
where he exists as ‘space-time’. 
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The destruction of ‘I’ is essentially one of the outcomes of the deconstruction of 
language. Conversely, deconstructing language is essential for the destruction of ‘I’. If 
we examine this in the light of Lacanian structuralist theory99, (with which Coetzee is 
most likely familiar100), it is the ‘symbolic order’ of language that establishes the 
distinctive sense of selfhood and individuality that allows the biological being to become 
a social human being to begin with. Prior to language, the infant subject is trapped in the 
mirror stage, during which it identifies with the other in an immediate relationship 
without the ability to distance itself from what it observes (Lacan 1-7). ِExtreme physical 
pain, therefore, works to reverse this process by breaking down language and dismantling 
the sense of self and, subsequently, restoring such immediacy.  
The deconstruction of the self through language is a central theme not only in 
Coetzee’s fiction but also in his essays. In ‘Achterberg’s “Ballade van de gasfitter”: The 
Mystery of I and You’ (1977), Coetzee argues that the pure state of I and You can never 
exist within language. He explains, ‘I and You exist and have their relations in ways still 
prior to the ways of true names, with their firm significations, or true identities, and the 
poem therefore works at, and sometimes absurdly beyond, the borders of language’ 
(Doubling 75). Therefore, to stress the lack of boundaries between self/other, Coetzee 
deconstructs the ‘I’ through deconstructing the language of the characters and, 
conversely, deconstructs their language through deconstructing their sense of self. This 
notion of otherness being an invention of language is clearly reflected in Judith Butler’s 
declaration: ‘my own language must break up and yield if I am to know you’ (Precarious 
49). Only beyond language (and the limits of the words ‘I’ and ‘you’) can one find the 
true understanding of otherness as an extension, rather than a break, from the self. 
Consequently, as their sense of ‘I’ deteriorates, the protagonists’ language breaks 
down. Tom Herron observes, after the attack, David conceives his language and identity 
as ‘sharing the same fate’ (479); David’s language is ‘tired, friable, eaten from the inside 
as if by termites’ (Disgrace 129), whereas he himself became ‘like a fly-casing in a 
spiderweb, brittle to the touch, lighter than rice-chaff, ready to float away’ (156). Curren 																																																								
99 For the full argument see Jacques Lacan’s ‘The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I’ in 
Écrits: a Selection (1977). 
100 For the Lacanian allusions in Coetzee’s work see Teresa Dovey’s The Novels of J. M. Coetzee: 
Lacanian Allegories (1998). 
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expresses the desire for a world without words, namely a world without selfhood, where 
the boundaries collapse between her daughter and herself: ‘[i]n another world I would not 
need words. I would appear on your doorstep. 'I have come for a visit,' I would say, and 
that would be the end of words: I would embrace you and be embraced’ (Age 9).  
Furthermore, Curren expresses the need for a new word that does not exist in 
language—yes-no: ‘is that the truth? Yes. No. Yes-no. There is such a word, but it has 
never been allowed into the dictionaries’ (116). Such a word creates a parallel state where 
both opposites can co-exist without contradiction. It defies the fundamental laws of 
language, where a word and its opposite refer to essentially the same thing at the same 
time. Yes-no, instead, exhibits quantum logic; it expresses the superposition state where 
none of the possibilities is actualised, and thus, in a sense, both of them are. In particular, 
the yes-no state invokes Schrödinger's cat thought experiment, where the only viable 
answer to whether the cat is alive or dead would be yes-no.101 We detect the superposition 
state in the possibility of the letter that Curren writes actually reaching her daughter. To 
Curren at least, the letter reaching her daughter is forever in the realm of unactualised 
possibilities; it is forever in the yes-no state. Curren wonders: ‘[t]hese papers, these words 
that either you read now or else will never read. Will they reach you? Have they reached 
you? Two ways of asking the same question, a question to which I will never know the 
answer, never. To me this letter will forever be words committed to the waves’ (32). 
Interestingly enough, Curren uses the word waves to express her perpetual uncertainty. 
As an epistolary novel, the entire text is thus in a state of superposition, hanging in the 
yes-no position, forever waiting to arrive.102  
Time, being essentially a linguistic structure, is also deconstructed as language 
breaks down. Time’s arrow (past, present, future) shatters for an alternative, 
nonlinguistic, immediate experience/expression of time: the Now, or the everlasting 
present. In his essay ‘Time, Tense, and Aspect in Kafka’s “The Burrow” (1981), Coetzee 
quotes Dorrit Cohn, who compares two types of awareness of time, one, which she calls 																																																								
101 Schrödinger's cat experiment (1935) demonstrates the paradox of the idea of superposition in quantum 
mechanics when applied in the everyday context. The experiment involves a cat placed in a box with a 
monitor and a jar of poison. If the monitor detects the decaying of an atom, it destroys the jar, which in turn 
releases the poison that kills the cat. After a certain period, and according to the CI, the cat is both dead and 
alive. However, when the experimenter opens the box and sees the cat, it will be either dead or alive.  
102 Nevertheless, ironically, at the metadiegetic level at least, the letter has reached the reader and s/he is 
realising only one of its many potential shapes and embodiments. 
	 84	
‘historical awareness’, follows on the idea of the linearity of time. The second type of 
awareness, which she calls ‘eschatological’, does not recognise the continuity of time but 
rather sees it as ‘only the present, which is always present’ and everlasting (Transparent 
197). In Coetzee’s comment on Chon, he states, ‘there is only what is happening now, 
and this is always crucial’ (Doubling 231). This non-structural understanding of time is 
well reflected on the quantum level, where it is thought that, fundamentally, time has no 
structure at all (Arntzenius 6).103 
Coetzee’s protagonists begin with a typical linear awareness of time. However, as 
the narratives progress, they experience a shift in temporal awareness, albeit as short 
glimpses. After the attack on David and Lucy, temporal concepts under this extreme 
present trauma become irrelevant. The immediacy of the present experience undoes all 
temporal structures: ‘Lucy's future, his future, the future of the land as a whole – it is all a 
matter of indifference’ (Disgrace 107). Shortly following the attack, David’s perception 
of time changes. At the hospital, he experiences time at a different pace: ‘[t]he clock on 
the wall says 5.45. He closes his good eye and slips into a swoon in which the two sisters 
continue to whisper together, chuchotantes. When he opens his eye the clock still says 
5.45. Is it broken? No: the minute hand jerks and comes to rest on 5.46’ (101).  
We find the same inability to accurately estimate time in Curren’s own perception 
of time as she becomes progressively ill: ‘[i]n an instant I am gone and in another instant 
I am back, still staring at my hand. Between these instants an hour may have passed or 
the blink of an eye’ (Age 182). The shock of witnessing the accident of Bheki and his 
friend leaves Curren with a new sense of time, where it suddenly collapses but resumes in 
its ‘normal structure’ shortly after: ‘[t]ime seemed to stop and then resume, leaving a gap: 
in one instant the boy put out a hand to save himself, in the next he was part of a tangle in 
the gutter’ (60). Curren’s perception of time changes to the extent where her 
unconsciousness seems to reach beyond time; she describes a vision she had of Florence 
as coming from ‘outside time’ (178).  
With a similar shift in perception, and as he was looking down at where Pavel had 
fallen, Dostoevsky feels the eternity/stillness of time: ‘[h]e grips the railing, stares down 																																																								
103 I discuss the notion of time as a mental structure from a quantum perspective in more detail in Chapter 
Four (187). 
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there into the plummeting darkness. Between here and there an eternity of time, so much 
time that it is impossible for the mind to grasp it’ (Master 121). In the context of global 
marketing strategies, David M. Boje & Tonya L. Henderson summarise five different 
aspects of time, demonstrating its consciousness-based nature: ‘its nature (real or 
epiphenomenal), experience (clock or social time), flow (novel, cyclical, or punctuated), 
structure (discrete, continuous, or epochal), and temporal referent point (past, present, or 
future)’ (3). Evidently, the characters experience many of these aspects of time, revealing 
the flexibility, subjectivity, and non-fundamentality of time. To experience this changing 
awareness of time, the protagonists’ language and sense of self breaks down, revealing a 
deep shift in awareness that is impossible to grasp by their ordinary conscious state or 
describe by their ordinary language. 
 
2.1.1. Becoming 
As their egos become weakened, the protagonists experience their different 
journeys to becoming-other. Simply put, becoming-other happens when the protagonist 
loses the boundaries between his/her identity and another. The protagonists experience 
different becomings in the narrative; however, I limit the discussion to one of their 
becomings: David becoming-woman, Dostoevsky becoming-Pavel, and Curren 
becoming-dead. 
David’s becoming can be read in many ways104, but there is one that particularly 
stands out throughout the narrative—David’s becoming-woman. The narrative deals with 
David’s disturbed/disturbing relationships with women. It begins with his relationship 
with a prostitute, Soraya; then, it introduces his morally questionable affair with his 
young student, Melanie. David’s relationship with his daughter, Lucy, is also 
complicated. He develops another complicated relationship with Bev, to whom he makes 
love despite finding her unattractive (149-50).  
Moreover, David’s preoccupation with the idea of leaving something behind goes 
beyond his ego’s longing for immortality. He is longing for the intimate experience of 
motherhood, of ‘producing something with a life of its own’ (Disgrace 63), and of 																																																								
104 Tom Herron, for instance, discusses David becoming-animal in his essay: ‘The Dog Man: Becoming 
Animal in Coetzee's "Disgrace"’. 
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becoming-woman. In his conversation with his divorced wife, David talks about his plans 
for writing an opera on the last years of Byron: 
‘[o]ne wants to leave something behind. Or at least a man wants to leave 
something behind. It's easier for a woman.’ 
‘Why is it easier for a woman?’ 
‘Easier, I mean, to produce something with a life of its own.’  
‘Doesn't being a father count?’ 
‘Being a father . . . I can't help feeling that, by comparison with being a 
mother, being a father is a rather abstract business’ (63). 
Being a father is not enough for David as he wishes to cross the boundaries between 
fatherhood and motherhood and experience both. His music becomes his means of 
transitioning, of becoming. To become-mother, David has to produce a life that shall 
continue to live after he is gone. The process of writing his opera thus becomes an 
experience of giving birth, of becoming-woman. Furthermore, David’s quest to become-
woman translates subconsciously in his music. While his project was originally meant to 
revolve around Byron, it instead, as the narrative progresses, gravitates towards Byron’s 
mistress—Teresa. In the new version of his project, Byron is dead and Teresa becomes 
the new heroine: ‘[i]s this the heroine he has been seeking all the time? Will an older 
Teresa engage his heart as his heart is now?’ (181). Finally, after Lucy’s rape, David is 
completely shut off. Despite his many attempts, Lucy refuses to open up to him as, being 
who he is, he cannot possibly understand. David wonders if he can indeed understand if it 
is within his ability to become-woman: ‘he can, if he concentrates, if he loses himself, be 
there, be the men, inhabit them, fill them with the ghost of himself. The question is, does 
he have it in him to be the woman?’ (160).  
After his son’s death, Dostoevsky becomes obsessed with every detail of Pavel’s 
life. He goes to Petersburg, rents Pavel’s room, wears his suit, reads and writes in his 
diaries, and talks to the people whom Pavel knew. Dostoevsky’s epilepsies, which 
dislocate Dostoevsky’s sense of self, also help bring him and Pavel closer: ‘[a]t moments 
like this he cannot distinguish Pavel from himself. They are the same person; and that 
person is no more or less than a thought, Pavel thinking it in him, he thinking it in Pavel’ 
(Master 21). Dostoevsky declares, ‘Because I am he [Pavel]. Because he is I’ (53). 
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However, as he becomes-Pavel, Dostoevsky’s becoming extends to something ‘beyond 
man’. As he takes Pavel’s diary, opens a new page and starts writing, Dostoevsky is no 
longer himself. He is young, youthful, and unstoppable: ‘[h]e is, in some sense, beyond 
the human, beyond man. There is nothing he is not capable of’ ([my emphasis] 242). 
Dostoevsky experiences a moment of profound self-annihilation that he becomes far 
more than just Pavel as he crosses the very boundaries of humanity. 
Curren tries to accept her destiny and embrace her dying body. She realises that 
she has one task and that is to become-dead: ‘[t]he first task laid on me, from today: to 
resist the craving to share my death. […] and take my leave without bitterness. To 
embrace death as my own, mine alone’ (Age 6). This task includes, according to Curren, 
‘[l]etting go of myself, letting go of you, letting go of a house still alive with memories’ 
(130). This task of becoming proves difficult for Curren, as it requires her to transcend 
her ego, the very thing that maintains her sense of self/life: ‘[y]ou have to become 
someone other than yourself. But who? Who is it that waits for me to step into his 
shadow? Where do I find him?’ (119). In her becoming-dead, Curren’s vulnerable ego 
becomes what she does not expect—Vercueil, the homeless, drunk man she welcomed 
into her life. As they are both listening to the television, Curren reflects, ‘[a]t this 
moment, I thought, I know how he feels as surely as if he and I were making love’ (30); 
the physical act of love suggests the loss of boundaries between Vercueil and herself.105 
However, as they go through their different becomings, the protagonists’ egos 
experience moments of anxiety. As he becomes-woman, David’s ego panics. From his 
egoist perspective, David’s whole existence is shaken and threatened, so he seeks to 
reinforce his identity and remember who he is. David thus resorts to another sexual 
encounter in order to restore his manhood and to re-establish the boundaries within 
between man/woman. David picks up a drunk prostitute on the street, and when they are 
done, the trembling that had been overtaking him stops; ‘He feels drowsy, contented; also 
strangely protective. So this is all it takes!, he thinks. How could I ever have forgotten 																																																								
105 On another occasion, Curren describes her and Mr Vercueil’s entanglement: ‘Across the courtyard he 
squatted, smoking, listening. Two souls, his and mine, twined together, ravished. Like insects mating tail to 
tail, facing away from each other, still except for a pulsing of the thorax that might be mistaken for mere 
breathing. Stillness and ecstasy’ (30). 
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it?’ (194). As she slowly becomes-dead, Curren also experiences a similar panic. She 
expresses her irritation when she learns that Bheki and his friend have slept in her car 
without her permission. She then reflects: ‘[w]hy was I behaving in this ridiculous 
fashion? Because I was irritated. Because I was tired of being used. Because it was my 
car they were sleeping in. My car, my house: mine; I was not yet gone.” ([my emphasis] 
58). The process of becoming, as evident in David and Curren, although dynamic, is not 
linear or progressive: multiple forces are at play and, consequently, the protagonists are 
always becoming. As Deleuze puts it, referring to the past and future, ‘the essence of 
becoming to move and to pull in both directions at once’ (Logic 1). However, QPist 
becoming is pulling in various directions not only temporal, as Deleuze’s statement 
suggests, but also involving different modes of becoming. Being essentially an emergent 
event, becoming fluctuates, collapses, and relapses. 
To become fully undone, the characters need to obtain ‘an uncommitted non-
position’ (Marais 82) or multiple and seemingly contradictory positions simultaneously. 
In other words, the characters need to exhibit nonlocality. Although the basic premise of 
quantum nonlocality is the ability of quantum entities to know about one another’s states 
even when separated by vast distances; in the context of becoming, however, to be 
nonlocal is to become necessarily and unwillingly entangled with what the character does 
not want to become. In other words, the characters need to demonstrate their 
entanglement even (and particularly) with what they refuse, reject, or disdain. Coetzee 
thus puts his protagonists through a demanding task; they ought to love what cannot be 
loved, sympathise with whom they cannot sympathise, and help those whom they do not 
believe deserve help. It is the ultimate lesson of entanglement—denying the self the 
ability to be separated even (and especially) from what it deems repulsive. 
David, Dostoevsky, and Curren all find themselves at such a critical point. While 
Lucy finds it effortless to sympathise with Pollux, one of their attackers, David cannot do 
the same (Disgrace 209). He finds it impossible to forgive Pollux and his family and to 
continue to live with them in the same farm after what happened. David finds an even 
more difficult task ahead of him; not only is he required to accept Pollux and Petrous, but 
he is also expected to love the product of the assault—Lucy’s coming child, his 
grandchild. However, David finds it repulsive even to call it a ‘child’: ‘the child! Already 
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he is calling it the child when it is no more than a worm in his daughter's womb’ (199). 
However, despite Lucy’s decision to ask David to move out, David eventually returns to 
the country, rents a room in boarding-house to stay close to Lucy while helping Bev at 
the clinic until the baby is born: ‘[u]ntil the child is born, this will be his life’ (212). 
David’s decision suggests an undeclared acceptance of Lucy’s child as his own. 
Eventually, David calls it, on a different occasion, ‘a child of this earth’ (216), thus 
acknowledging a wider connection that goes beyond his ego, and, willingly or not, 
connects him, the child, his daughter, and the attacker together—as earth. David is able 
for the first time to let go of his ideals and accept reality as it is despite not fitting with his 
ideas of Lucy, himself, and what he is leaving behind.  
Dostoevsky faces a similar task. As he hears a chained dog wailing at night, he 
believes this is a call, a step closer to Pavel; it is precisely because ‘it is not his son he 
must not go back to bed but must get dressed and answer the call’. The only way to 
become Pavel is by ‘answer[ing] […] what he does not expect’ (Master 80). Furthermore, 
going with Sergei Nechaev to the same place where Pavel has died, Dostoevsky repeats 
the words to himself: ‘I should not have come. But the nots are beginning to collapse, just 
as happened with Ivanov. I should not be here therefore I should be here. I will see 
nothing else therefore I will see all.’ (118). Dostoevsky finds himself in an even more 
critical situation, in which, to love Pavel, he must first love Nechaev, the suspected killer 
of his son, whom Dostoevsky describes as ‘that unloved and unlovely young man’ (61). 
Dostoevsky, nonetheless and therefore, becomes-Nechaev: ‘he feels something stir in 
himself too: the beginnings of a fury that answers Pavel, answers Nechaev, answers all of 
them’ (239). Letting go of his ego, Dostoevsky becomes both his son and his suspected 
murderer. He sees Pavel in Nechaev and Nechaev in Pavel, and he also sees them as 
intertwined parts of himself. 
The same task lies ahead of Curren, as she ought to do precisely what she does 
not want to do. Curren is required to trust Vercueil, despite not giving her any reason to 
do so. Curren realises this; she writes: ‘I trust Vercueil because I do not trust Vercueil. I 
love him because I do not love him. Because he is the weak reed I lean upon him’ (Age 
131). Furthermore, although she finds it easy to sympathise with Bheki, it is Bheki’s 
friend to whom Curren needs to show sympathy. She describes him as ‘not lovable’ (136) 
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and, compared to the ‘bright’ Bekhi, he is he ‘was unthinking, inarticulate, 
unimaginative’ (134). She admits she finds it challenging to bring herself to love him. 
Curren is aware of the task ahead of her: ‘I must love, first of all, the unlovable. I must 
love, for instance, this child. Not bright little Bheki, but this one’ (136). While hiding in 
his room, Bheki’s friend is found and shot by the police. Curren mourns him and, through 
her mourning, suddenly becomes-Bheki’s friend in one of her visions: ‘[w]ithin this 
interval there is no time, though his heart beats time. I am here in my room in the night 
but I am also with him, all the time’ (176). 
 
2.1.2. The True Nature of Becoming 
While all the protagonists seem to have successfully experienced the loss of ‘I’ 
and achieved a certain degree of becoming-other, they, nonetheless, failed to grasp the 
essence of becoming. David, Curren, and Dostoevsky believe they ought to follow certain 
signs to reach what they call salvation or the ultimate goal of their existence. David 
wonders ‘[i]f he is being led’ (Disgrace 192) and believes he is judged by ‘the universe 
and its all-seeing eye’ (195). Dostoevsky, similarly, wonders if this is what he is 
‘required’ to do or whether he ‘misunderstood from the beginning’ (Master 240). The 
quest they are involved in is evidently temporal, linear, and progressive, leading to what 
they expect to be a moment of revelation that ends their ontological struggles.  
True Becoming, on the other hand, is anything but salvation. It is a tenseless, a-
linguistic, emergent, and entangled event within the everlasting moment of the present.106 
As Deleuze and Guattari explain, becoming has no defined points where it begins or 
ends; it is always in the middle ‘a line of becoming has neither beginning nor end, 
departure nor arrival, origin nor destination’ (Thousand 293). Becoming, thus, is not a 																																																								
106 Deleuze (and following his critique, Bruns (604)) argues that becoming eludes the present. Deleuze 
writes, ‘[i]nsofar as it eludes the present, becoming does not tolerate the separation or the distinction of 
before and after, or of past and future. It pertains to the essence of becoming to move and to pull in both 
directions at once’ (Logic 3). However, I argue here, instead of becoming eluding the present, for becoming 
within the present—within the everlasting, continuous moment of the Now. Although both arguments may 
seem contradictory, I believe they are more or less the same—only proposed in different ways. However, I 
believe that arguing for an everlasting present is simpler and more direct than Deleuze’s argument for a 
more abstract, distant understanding of the non-temporality of becoming.   
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mission to be accomplished, a journey to be taken, or a goal to be achieved; it is a 
persistent event continuously happening in the Now regardless of the characters’ 
(in)ability to recognise it. Becoming is devoid of judgments or morals; it is the bare 
nature of reality as it manifests itself in the present. The protagonists’ seeking is doomed 
to failure because becoming is not a goal to be sought but an existing continuous event to 
be realised, for all beings, aware or not, are becoming at every point of their existence. 
As Bruns points out, the nomadic nature without determination (or, I shall add, 
destination) is essential to this event (704). Therefore, the loss of ego and the experience 
of becoming-other undergone by the protagonists is in fact not a new state to which they 
progress but an underlying reality that is being revealed to them.  
David’s longing to become-woman, Dostoevsky’s longing to become-Pavel, and 
Curren’s longing to become-dead, can thus only be read as metaphorical becomings. 
They are narrativistic manifestations of the intrinsic, ongoing state of becoming. 
Furthermore, becoming-other expresses an existential longing for a deep state of 
becoming, rather than a concern for the outcome of becoming something/someone. As 
Deleuze and Guattari put it, ‘[w]hat is real is the becoming itself, the block of becoming, 
not the supposedly fixed terms through which that which becomes passes’ (Thousand 
238). This becoming is not a specific longing to become-something but rather to become. 
It is a longing to go beyond all restricting identities, by letting go of ego to become 
nothing, anything, and everything. This understanding corresponds to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s definition of becoming as taking place in ‘a world of intensities’ (Kafka 13). 
Bruns explains this definition, ‘[a]n intensity is something like a moving line without 
boundaries or points along the way, a pure difference without structure or definition—
whence "all forms come undone."’ (705).107 As Alain Beaulieu puts it, the important 
aspect of becoming-animal is ‘to unlearn physical and emotional habits in order to 
expand the world's experience’ and discover new ways to look at ourselves, our bodies, 																																																								
107 It is worth noting that the humanist protagonists’ becomings do not correspond to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s idea of becoming. To Deleuze and Guattari, becoming is ‘perfectly real’ (Thousand 238); it has 
nothing to do with imagination. It is not an existential quest but rather an unexpected event: ‘We can be 
thrown into a becoming by anything at all, by the most unexpected, most insignificant of things’ (292). The 
humanist protagonists’ endeavours to become-other, which sometimes take the form of vision or a dream, 
are not literal (as is the case with the becomings of the posthumanist figures demonstrated later in the 
discussion). 
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and the environment (86). 
The totality of becoming is one of the foundational ideas in QP. Barad states, 
‘[p]osthumanism doesn’t presume the separateness of any-"thing," let alone the alleged 
spatial, ontological, and epistemological distinction that sets humans apart’ (Meeting 
136). This view explains why the protagonists’ logic, sense of time, and language slowly 
collapse as they gradually lose their distinctive sense of self and open up to becoming. 
Evidently, these qualities of becoming are expressed in the quantum world, such as 
interconnection, fluidity, entanglement, dynamism, and tenseless-ness. The state of 
becoming, therefore, is akin to the quantum state: intra-active, relational, contingent, and 
unfixed in one state/identity, thus encompassing all possibilities and simultaneously none. 
Becoming, therefore, is the intrinsic state of uncertainty characterised by worlds of 
unactualised possibilities that underlies all becoming-something/someone in the same 
manner the wave function underlies the actualised possibilities in quantum measurement. 
In the essays, ‘The Dog Man: Becoming Animal in Coetzee's "Disgrace"’ and 
‘"Like a Dog... like a Lamb": Becoming Sacrificial Animal in Kafka and Coetzee’, Tom 
Herron and Chris Danta, respectively, suggest that humans, being stripped of power and 
privilege and reduced to bare life, lose their humanity and become-animals. However, I 
argue that there is a significant difference between becoming-animal ‘antihumanist’ and 
becoming-animal ‘posthumanist’. While the former is concerned with denying Man by 
stressing its animality, the latter focuses on the state of the transition rather than the state 
of arrival. In his essay, Herron argues that David, throughout the narrative, is slowly 
becoming-animal. I contend differently; David’s becoming-animal is only one type of 
becoming, which leads to the conclusion that David is simply becoming—experiencing a 
continuing liminal state of nonidentity. As Deleuze and Guattari put it, ‘[b]ecoming 
produces nothing other than itself. We fall into a false alternative if we say that you either 
imitate or you are. What is real is the becoming itself’ (Thousand 238). The narrative 
does not present a ‘new’ David. The ending of the narrative, on the contrary, leaves 
David in a liminal state: the baby is not born, the opera is not finished, and nothing in 
David’s life seems to have resolved, leaving his identity in a continuous state of pending 
and non-arrival. 
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Similarly, in his essay, ‘J.M. Coetzee's "Disgrace" and the Task of the 
Imagination’, Mike Marais analyses David’s transformation and argues that David has 
completed the task of imagination assigned to him by the author (77). However, if David 
were to complete his becoming, then his becoming necessarily ends/fails, because 
completion/ending inherently contradicts the true nature of becoming as an ongoing state 
of existence. Not only David, but all of Coetzee’s protagonists never reach a revelation or 
resolution: they are trapped in a liminal state, forever stuck in the threshold and, in a 
sense, becoming the threshold.  
In his book, Wholeness and the Implicate Order (1980), Bohm introduces the 
concept of holomovement (190), which combines two of his central concepts on the world 
as ‘Undivided Wholeness in Flowing Movement’ (14), and what he calls ‘the universal 
flux’ (12), which essentially translates into the view of the universe as a dynamic 
entangled becoming. Curren imagines this holomovement, the totality of becoming, 
entanglement of existence, absurdity of boundaries, and impossibility of separation: 
‘blood is one: a pool of life dispersed among us in separate existences, but belonging by 
nature together: lent, not given: held in common, in trust, to be preserved: seeming to live 
in us, but only seeming, for in truth we live in it. A sea of blood, come back together’ 
(Age 64). The image Curren provides of the underlying nature of existence, ‘sea of 
blood’, denotes being in a constant state of movement, (sea), and sharing the quality of 
life that underlies all living entities on the planet, (blood). However, similarly, only 
deeper and more encompassing than blood is the quantum view of energy and 
wavefunction, of which living entities are only a fraction. Instead of perceiving the world 
from the limited viewpoint of human experience or an equally limited viewpoint of the 
‘living being’ experience as Curren does, QP offers a more encompassing view which not 
only humans and animals share but also non-living entities, including the universe. This 
ontological view re-situates the human subject, not as being-in-the-world but rather 
being-of-the-world (Barad, Meeting 160).  
Entanglement is crucial to becoming. Curren realises this deep entanglement as 
she states that her love for her daughter is entangled with her love for the unlovable—
Bheki’s friend: ‘[w]hen one loves, one loves more. The more I love you, the more I ought 
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to love him. The less I love him, the less, perhaps, I love you’ (Age 137). Also, while 
David was sitting among the audience watching Melanie perform her play, he had an 
abrupt vision characterised by intense feelings of entanglement with all the women with 
whom he had crossed paths: 
[i]n a sudden and soundless eruption, as if he has fallen into a waking 
dream, a stream of images pours down, images of women he has known on 
two continents, some from so far away in time that he barely recognizes 
them. Like leaves blown on the wind, pell-mell, they pass before him. A 
fair field full of folk: hundreds of lives all tangled with his. He holds his 
breath, willing the vision to continue. 
What has happened to them, all those women, all those lives? Are there 
moments when they too, or some of them, are plunged without warning 
into the ocean of memory? The German girl: is it possible that at this very 
instant she is remembering the man who picked her up on the roadside in 
Africa and spent the night with her? 
Enriched: that was the word the newspapers picked on to jeer at. A stupid 
word to let slip, under the circumstances, yet now, at this moment, he 
would stand by it. By Melanie, by the girl in Touws River; by Rosalind, 
Bev Shaw, Soraya: by each of them he was enriched, and by the others too, 
even the least of them, even the failures. Like a flower blooming in his 
breast, his heart floods with thankfulness (Disgrace 192). 
David’s vision of the women who became or are part of his life imagines the extent of 
entanglement between his life and theirs. Every woman who has been part of David’s life 
has contributed to his becoming. David carries these women not only as memories but 
also as possibilities that help determine the nature and direction of his becoming. He 
realises the impossibility of distancing himself from all the women he knew and knows; 
their lives are so entangled it is impossible to view one without the rest. He has been 
impacted as much as he impacted the lives of women he encountered. He is thus both the 
subject and object of all of these intra-actions. 
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Deleuze and Guattari’s insights into becoming-woman on a molecular level 
illuminate an important aspect of David’s becoming. They propose that ‘[b]ecoming-
woman is not imitating this entity or even transforming oneself into it’ (Thousand 275). 
On the contrary, they argue, ‘the woman as a molar entity has to become-woman in order 
that the man also becomes- or can become-woman.’ (275-6). In other words, David 
becoming-woman, if we consider it as a molecular rather than a molar identity, is not 
different from, for example, Lucy, Bev, or Melanie’s becoming-woman, for they are 
constantly becoming that with which they identify. This understanding is more expressive 
of becoming: the entity is always becoming whatever it is. This view of becoming is 
inherently anti-essentialist. Braidotti puts this idea of anti-essentialist becoming 
differently as she writes, ‘[t]he body, or the embodiment, of the subject is to be 
understood as neither a biological nor a sociological category but rather as a point of 
overlapping between the physical, the symbolic, and the sociological’ (Nomadic 4). This 
anti-essentialist becoming further emphasises the quantum impossibility of pre-existing 
independent values prior to measurement or, in the posthumanist context, pre-existing 
identities prior to becoming. 
To Coetzee, the goal of becoming is ultimately ethical: to realise the universality 
of pain and vulnerability that is shared among species, and consequently, to become more 
sympathetic towards108 others. This goal is particularly evident in Coetzee/Costello’s 
speech, ‘The Lives of Animals’. As Costello argues, the horror of the death camps arises 
from the inability of the torturers to imagine themselves as the victims—or to become-
their-victims:  
[t]hey said, "It is they in those cattle cars rattling past." They did not say, 
"How would it be if it were I in that cattle car?" They did not say, "It is I 
who am in that cattle car." They said, "It must be the dead who are being 
burned today, making the air stink and falling in ash on my cabbages." 
They did not say, "How would it be if I were burning?" They did not say, 																																																								
108 The words are sous rature. Before the erasure, the phrase refers to the traditional postcolonial, feminist, 
ecological, and animal critique of Coetzee’s work in its approach otherness; however, the phrase sous 
rature extends this critique by offering a posthumanist stance on otherness through becoming-others rather 
than merely becoming (sympathetic towards) others.  
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"I am burning, I am falling in ash.”’ (Costello 79) 
To sum up the discussion so far, Coetzee’s humanist protagonists go through four 
main stages: (1) they start with a crisis that causes them to break from society, entering a 
state of liminality. (2) They fail to perform rituals of acceptance, being, therefore, stuck 
in liminality. (3) They experience extreme physical pain that undoes the ego and paths 
their way to becoming-other. (4) Their becoming is metaphorical, expressing a profound 
ontological longing for true becoming. 
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2.2. The Second Paradigm: Posthumanist Figures 
 
As I proposed at the beginning of this chapter, Coetzee’s characters (can be seen 
to) fall into two categories: the humanist and the posthumanist. The posthumanist 
characters are composed differently, and arguably oppositionally to the humanist ones. I 
will be focussing on three of these figures: Friday in Foe, K in Life and Times of Michael 
K, and the barbarian girl in Waiting for the Barbarians.109 These characters share many 
similarities; first, they are not presented with their actual names. Friday is presented as 
being not the real name of the character but a name that has been given to him by Cruso. 
When arriving at the camp, Michael’s name is consistently misspelt (Michaels) despite 
his attempt to correct them (131). The letter K, although apparently alluding to Kafka’s 
protagonist, K, in his novel The Trial, is, nevertheless, never definitively established as 
such. The barbarian girl is not given a name; she is only referred to as ‘the girl’.  
Also, these characters share some form of physical deformity; Friday’s tongue is 
mutilated; K is born with a harelip; the girl is tortured and has her ankles broken and her 
eyes partially blinded. Furthermore, these figures are from the first liminal beings living 
on the edge of society; they seem to come from nowhere: with no clear origins or history. 
Also, they appear to be a-linguistic; language represents a challenge to them, in varying 
degrees. Silence, instead, is their main mode of becoming. They are the embodiment of 
becoming of the world.110 They also have minimal awareness of time, the past, and 
future; instead, they engage fully in the present moment. Remarkably, they all go through 
the same plot: they meet the benevolent, white, powerful humanist figure who attempts to 
‘help’ them by insisting on decoding/writing their story and paving their way into society. 
However, and despite the terrible situation they find themselves in, they refuse to give up 
their liminality. In fact, protecting their liminal status seems to be their ultimate goal—
and the rewarding ending of the narratives. 																																																								
109 The analysis will seemingly tend to focus on K, not because he is more ‘posthumanist’ than the others, 
but because out of the three characters, he is the only character whose inner thoughts and consciousness are 
narrated. 
110 Tremaine interestingly notes that these figures seem ‘susceptible to suffering but not to shame’ (608), 
which further emphasises their embodiment as opposed to the humanist characters who, as the earlier 
discussion demonstrates, become anxious not about the pain they go through but the shame that 
accompanies it. 
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Contrary to the humanist’s, the posthumanist body has different configurations. It 
is not a manifestation of normality and perfection but an embodiment of difference and 
abnormality. All the three protagonists suffer from physical injuries and/or deformed 
bodies. Friday seemingly has his tongue mutilated; it is never confirmed whether it was 
slave traders, Cruso, or his own people, that caused his mutilation. K was born with a 
harelip; his mouth never completely healed. Also, towards the end of the narrative, K’s 
body becomes incredibly thin and ill. The girl’s ankles, after getting broken and not 
properly treated, take on an odd shape; she is also partially blinded from being tortured 
during the police investigations on the barbarians. Because of these deformities, the 
characters elicit a great deal of repulsion in those around them. After Cruso tells her 
about Friday’s mutilation, Susan becomes revolted by Friday; she flinches and holds her 
breath whenever he is near and wipes the utensils Friday uses (Foe 24). K’s harelip, 
which ‘curled like a snail's foot’ (K 3), made his mother shiver as she saw it after his 
birth, and seems to cause discomfort to those who meet him for the first time. Similarly, 
and on several occasions, the magistrate expresses deep revulsion towards the girl, calling 
her ‘ugly ugly’ (Waiting 64), describing her body as ‘incomplete’ (50/58). 
Furthermore, the sexuality of these characters is undetermined. Susan implies that 
Friday is sexually mutilated. She suggests that his tongue mutilation stands for ‘a more 
atrocious mutilation’ (Foe 119). She presumes that he is ‘very likely a virgin’ and 
possibly ‘unacquainted with the parts of generation’ (80). Just like Friday, K is sexually 
inactive; he briefly describes himself as being ‘never a great one for the girls’ (K 130). In 
his description of K, the doctor mentions that K’s sexuality is ‘omitted’ (161). On the 
other hand, the barbarian girl has had several sexual experiences; she was raped by 
soldiers, and she has sex with the magistrate. However, the magistrate feels uneasiness 
about her womanhood, a strange and an indefinable desire that he cannot pin down. The 
magistrate cannot decide whether or not he is sexually attracted to the girl; ‘of this one 
[the girl] there is nothing I can say with certainty. There is no link I can define between 
her womanhood and my desire’ (Waiting 46). The magistrate’s conflicted feelings 
towards the girl range from fascination to revulsion: ‘I cannot imagine what ever drew 
me to that alien body’ (45). It appears that Susan, the doctor, and the magistrate are 
uncertain about, or incapable of determining, the sexuality of these characters. Friday, K, 
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and the girl are ‘cyborged’111 in the sense that they do not clearly fit any sexual or gender 
stereotype, making it impossible for the other characters to easily identify with, and 
respond to, their sexuality.  
Moreover, these characters are characterised by a certain degree of obscurity and 
indistinguishability. Turner notes that the liminal being (or liminal becoming)112 is 
‘structurally, if not physically, ‘invisible’’ (‘Betwixt’ 6). Since they exist outside the 
social structure, with no social status, identity, or significance to the system, the liminal 
becomings lose their distinguishability and become invisible. This applies to the 
characters who are portrayed as hazy, indistinct, and obscure. Other characters seem to 
remember little about the subject’ faces and tend to forget about their physical presence. 
Susan’s describes her first impression of Friday: ‘I had found Friday a shadowy creature’ 
(Foe 24). She even unconsciously denies Friday’s existence altogether when she states, 'I 
am alone, with Friday' (113). The doctor describes K not as a human but a creature in the 
shape of an indistinguishable man: ‘it always seemed to me that someone had scuffled 
together a handful of dust, spat on it, and patted it into the shape of a rudimentary man’ 
(K 161).  
Not only are the characters indistinguishable but also featureless; they seem to 
have no distinguishable facial features. The magistrate struggles to remember the face of 
the girl whom he has lived with closely for an extended period: ‘I realize that if I took a 
pencil to sketch her face I would not know where to start. Is she truly so featureless? 
With an effort I concentrate my mind on her. I see a figure in a cap and heavy shapeless 
coat standing unsteadily, bent forward, straddle-legged, supporting itself on sticks’ (50). 
The posthuman discards the face as a product of humanity exclusive to humans. The 
production of the face, according to Deleuze and Guattari, takes place when the head is 																																																								
111 It is important to distinguish between Coetzee’s characters and Haraway’s cyborg in terms of their 
sexuality. While Coetzee blurs gender boundaries of his posthumanist characters by denying them sexual 
experiences/preferences/inclinations, thus rendering them, more or less, asexual, Haraway’s cyborg, on the 
other hand, is a post-gender body that ‘has no truck with bisexuality, pre-oedipal symbiosis, unalienated 
labour, or other seductions to organic wholeness through a final appropriation of all the powers of the parts 
into a higher unity’ (‘Manifesto’ 150). In other words, Haraway’s cyborg is capable of different forms of 
sexual gratification and open to sexual experimentation.  
112 I shall use the term liminal becoming from this point forward as a replacement for Turner’s liminal 
subject or liminal being, to emphasise the QP features of their liminality, such as anti-essentialism, 
entanglement, and dynamism. 
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disassociated from the body. They explain,  
‘[t]he face is produced only when the head ceases to be a part of the body, 
when it ceases to be coded by the body, when it ceases to have a 
multidimensional, polyvocal corporeal code—when the body, head 
included, has been decoded and has to be overcoded by something we 
shall call the Face’ (Thousand 170). 
The idea of the face, hence, is humanist par excellence. Posthuman Subjects have no 
faces but heads. Deleuze and Guattari argue against the universality of the face and 
demonstrate its deep association with the White Man: ‘[t]he face is not a universal. It is 
not even that of the white man; it is White Man himself, with his broad white cheeks and 
the black hole of his eyes. The face is Christ. The face is the typical European, what Ezra 
Pound called the average sensual man, in short, the ordinary everyday Erotomaniac’ 
(176). The featurelessness and invisibility of the subjects negate the subjectivity and 
individuality of the human face. To become posthuman, dismantling the face is 
inevitable; as Deleuze and Guattari put it, ‘if human beings have a destiny, it is rather to 
escape the face, to dismantle the face and facializations’ (171). The objectivity and non-
individuality of the head are what characterises the posthuman body. In the case of 
Coetzee’s subjects, their indistinguishability, shadowiness, and invisibility translate into 
the loss of their humanist faces. 
Along with their physical deformity, a-sexuality, and facelessness, a significant 
characteristic of the posthuman is its corelessness or its anti-essentialism. As Hayles 
describes it, the posthuman entity is subjected to continuous ‘construction and 
reconstruction’ to the point where there is no ‘natural self’ (Posthuman 3). Due to the 
lack of core self, everything becomes contingent, emergent, relevant, and possible; it is 
impossible to definitively determine the fluid nature of the posthuman subject. The doctor 
mentions that he is unable to pin K down as he continuously slips away from all 
definitions (166). This absence of essence/self, or, to put it in quantum terms, the 
impossibility of pre-existing, inherent values of objects, is reflected in K’s thoughts: ‘[d]o 
I believe in helping people? he wondered. He might help people, he might not help them, 
he did not know beforehand, anything was possible. He did not seem to have a belief, or 
did not seem to have a belief regarding help’ (K 48). The doctor attempts to convince 
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Noël, the official in charge of the camp, that K has no core self, no essence to be found: 
‘[t]here is nothing there, I'm telling you, and if you handed him over to the police they 
would come to the same conclusion: there is nothing there’ (142). In a similar manner, 
neither Friday nor the girl exhibits any prejudices, beliefs, or views on the world; to the 
reader, they seem to think nothing. When the magistrate asks the girl how she felt about 
those who raped her, she lies silent for a long time, after which she says ‘I am tired of 
talking’ (44). Throughout the narrative, she did not seem to have or want to have any 
thought or judgments about what happened. 
Moreover, the characters show no development or change over the course of the 
narrative. Unlike Coetzee’s humanist subject, the posthumanist characters remain 
consistent throughout the narrative.  They experience no progression, regression, 
revelation, redemption, or enlightenment. In his commentary on Turner’s ideas of 
liminality in art, Charles La Shure explains that liminal characters’ personalities never 
change, develop, or correspond to the progression of the narrative. While modern 
narrative often deals with how the outside forces affect the characters and incite their 
development, the liminal figures, on the other hand, propose a different narrative that 
demonstrates the ways in which they interact with the world (La Shure)—or, to use a 
QPist expression, intra-act within and of the world. The lack of progression and 
development of the characters might also be viewed in terms of the absence of linearity 
and temporality from their becomings. The characters exist in a world of everlasting 
becoming to the point of what it appears to be one of eternal stillness. 
Clearly, Coetzee’s posthumanist ‘heroes’ are, therefore, anything but heroes—and 
they do not try to be so. Characterised by their simplicity, idleness, and deformed/injured 
bodies, these ‘heroic’ subjects are the embodiment of the mockery of the idea of heroism. 
They represent the polar opposite of the ideas of singularity, heroism, and exceptionalism 
of the human subject put forward by Enlightenment. Injured, deformed, naïve, and 
repulsive, they are the perfect posthumanist creatures. As Myra J. Seaman explains, 
posthumanism intrinsically refuses universalism and expresses itself through ‘mutation, 
variation, and becoming’ (247). Fascinated by K, the doctor declares that he should be 
made a hero: ‘[w]e ought to value you and celebrate you, we ought to put your clothes on 
a maquette in a museum, your clothes and your packet of pumpkin seeds too’ (K 152). 
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However, the doctor eventually realises that K cannot be made a hero: he does not 
represent or stand for anything. The doctor says, addressing K: ‘[y]ou were not a hero 
and did not pretend to be, not even a hero of fasting. In fact you did not resist at all’ 
(163). The doctor finally realises that K’s ‘hunger strike’ was not a protest, a statement, 
or an expression of an ideal, but rather a genuine loss of appetite due to his physical 
longing for his freedom (164). K, Friday, and the girl all practice their becomings without 
thought or resistance. There is no idealism, moralism, or heroism that they ‘stand for’. 
They refuse to be made anything, despite the other characters’ as well as the readers’ 
continuous attempts to make them so.113 
2.2.1. Liminality and Nomadism 
The definition or the conditions of liminality and the liminal entities, as Turner 
notes, are ‘necessarily ambiguous’ because they define the state or the beings that slip 
through all the definitions (‘Liminality’ 59). However, liminality is a fundamental 
characteristic of the posthuman. Liminal becomings are defined as in-between creatures, 
crossing all the boundaries and conventions and living in a state of uncertainty/non-
arrival. Turner defines the liminal being (becoming) as ‘neither one thing nor another, or 
maybe both; or neither here nor there; or may even be nowhere (in terms of any 
recognized cultural typography), and are at the very least “betwixt and between” all the 
recognized fixed points in space-time of structural classification (‘Betwixt’ 7).114 Liminal 
becomings have no social status, rank, identity, or any other social identification. They 
can be ‘disguised as monsters, wear only a strip of clothing, or even go naked’ to 
demonstrate their liminal status, or no-status in society (59).  
In Turner’s view of liminality, the human subject is stripped of any cultural or 
social indicators that connect it with other humans. However, in the QPist liminality I 
																																																								
113 As I shall come to argue, despite the subjects’ consistent refusal to be turned into heroes, signs, and 
figures of speech, most critics inflict on these characters as many metaphors as they can, turning their 
bodies into metaphors of colonialism, sexism, South African history, and apartheid, stripping their bodies 
from the only thing that makes them what they are—their non-dual, non-metaphorical embodiments. 
114 Turner’s view of the liminal subject is similar to Braidotti’s earlier description of the formation of a 
posthumanist subject which happens in the spaces that flow between binaries: ‘nature/technology; 
male/female; black/white; local/global; present/past’ (164). 
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propose here115, the entity is stripped of anything that links it not only to humans but also 
to all other culturally-classified beings, including animals. The three characters are 
creatures in-between—neither animals nor humans, lacking the qualities that can make 
them fully either. Friday is repeatedly called a cannibal—a creature that transgresses the 
boundaries between the human and the animal. Susan confesses that she regards Friday 
less than she would regard a dog or a dumb beast (Foe 32). Similarly, the girl is 
considered a barbarian—another word that exists in the blurry space between humanity 
and animality.  
As Turner puts it, liminality is ‘a realm of pure possibility’; it is the ideal space 
where new configurations and relations can occur (‘Betwixt’ 7). This view of liminality 
resonates with the quantum notion of wave function as a realm of pure unactualised 
possibilities where any pattern or configuration can emerge. As Turner notes, this realm 
of pure possibility is the negation to all positive structures, and in a sense, it is 
paradoxically the source of them. By the same token, the posthuman is the source of all 
that it is not, including humans, animals, and things, and all the hybrids that arise from 
their entanglement.  
Turner notes that the liminal becomings are considered polluting and dangerous to 
those within the structure (‘Betwixt’ 7). Accordingly, in Coetzee’s narratives, the three 
characters are hunted, tracked down, and constrained, to bring them back into the system. 
With the help of the sailors, Friday is forced to leave the island against his will and is 
taken with Susan to England. K is captured more than once and is led to the camp where 
the homeless, the poor, and the ill are confined. The girl, her father, and others are 
captivated, investigated, and tortured for the purpose of tracking and eliminating ‘the 
barbarians’. Despite their evident harmlessness and defenselessness, the figures are, 
nevertheless, treated as a threat to the structure, which needs to be either reassimilated or 
eliminated. 
It is important, however, as Turner advises, to distinguish between liminality and 																																																								
115 My view of liminality is different from Turner’s. Turner introduces liminality in an anthropological 
context as a term deeply rooted in ritual societies as part of Arnold van Gennep’s model of the rites of 
passage mentioned earlier in the chapter. Turner, for example, mentions that the liminal beings are 
characterised by their submissiveness and silence (‘Liminality’ 103). However, my understanding of 
posthumanist liminality does not entail submissiveness but rather a freedom from the hierarchal structure 
and its connotations. 
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marginality.116 One of the most significant differences, I contend, between the two terms 
is that while liminality is a choice based on an ontological recognition of the freedom of 
becoming, marginality is a forced cultural state of helpless confinement and degradation. 
The residents in the camp to which K was taken did not choose to be outcasts; they, 
nonetheless, accepted their marginality and their new function within the social structure. 
On the other hand, K firmly refuses the life of the camp and continues to fight 
marginality while seeking to restore his liminality. He refuses to be identified as part of 
any social structure, even as an outcast in an antisocial, parallel structure: he ‘was not a 
prisoner or a castaway’ (K 115). Similarly, Friday’s refusal to leave the island and his 
inability to cope in England, and the girl’s refusal to stay under the magistrate’s care 
(despite his good treatment), prove that these characters choose to become liminal, rather 
than the system choosing them to be marginal. 
Furthermore, Turner notes that what distinguishes liminality from marginality is 
that while marginality does not promise resolution, liminality does.117 If liminality no 
longer becomes ‘a midpoint of transition’ (Dramas 261), then it could easily be 
considered a type of marginality. To put it differently, and more relevantly to the 
posthumanist context, while marginality is a fixed state of arrival, marked on the edge of 
the social structure, liminality, on the other hand, is a perpetual dynamic state of non-
arrival, crossing the boundaries, continuously transitioning, and forever becoming 
beyond any possible structure.  
Turner distinguishes between three social anti-structures (communitas) in spatial 
terms: marginality as a space on the edge of the structure, and inferiority, a space beneath 
the structure, and liminality as a state of in-between structures (‘Liminality’ 128). While 
Turner considers liminality as an anti-structure or communitas, I contend that liminality is 
a non-structure. The difference between anti-structure and non-structure is closely related 
to the difference between antihuman and posthuman. While the term anti-structure entails 
opposition, negation, and antagonism to structure, non-structure, on the other hand, 																																																								
116 I offer a somewhat different comparison between liminality and marginality than Turner’s. In Turner’s 
anthropological context, the ultimate difference between the two is the presence/absence of ritual 
obligation.  
117 Although Turner argues that liminality is a temporary status, the transitional phase can nevertheless be 
permanent. Turner provides an example of Christians as liminal figures because they believe their residence 
in this world is temporary (‘Liminality’ 107). 
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entails an absence of structure, and hence a move beyond all oppositional binaries. 
The camp that K is sent to, which embraces all the unwanted, the poor, and the 
homeless, takes place at the edge of the town. As an anti-structure, it is carefully planned 
and placed by the Empire ‘out of sight of the town on a road that led nowhere else’ (K 
94).118 The camp thus functions as a place of marginality—not liminality. It is for this 
reason that K, despite the temptations offered at the camp compared to what awaits him 
outside, refuses to stay: ‘[w]hy do you want to run away? You've got a home here, you've 
got food, you've got a bed. You've got a job’ (85). Whether being inside the camp or the 
town, K feels his freedom is equally jeopardised. As he contemplates the life in the town 
and the life in the camp, K could no longer tell ‘which was host and which parasite, camp 
or town’ (116), as both spaces represent two opposites of the same social system he tries 
hard to avoid.  
On the other hand, a liminal space is an unidentified space, without clear borders 
or edges. K’s doctor describes the possible existence of these liminal spaces: ‘there are 
areas that lie between the camps and belong to no camp, not even to the catchment areas 
of the camps—certain mountaintops, for example, certain islands in the middle of 
swamps, certain arid strips where human beings may not find it worth their while to live’ 
(162). This liminal space the doctor describes is characterised by its borderlessness, 
unidentifiability, fluidity, and universality. It is any space, and all spaces, sans the social 
and political structures. The liminal space K chooses is a deserted farm, where he plants 
and consumes the food he grows. Friday’s liminal space is the island that is beyond the 
reach of humans. Between the mountains is the liminal space to which the barbarian girl 
and her folks choose to flee. 
In their liminality, the characters exist beyond not only the social but also the 
temporal structures. When the temporal structure is deconstructed, time is experienced in 
its perpetual form. On the island, where Friday lives, time seems cyclical; Susan notes 
that they never lacked time (Foe 17), and that the ‘drab bushes’ that live on the island 
‘never flowered and never shed their leaves’ (7). None of the characters on the island 
know what time, month, or year it is. Similarly, K exhibits the same indifference about 																																																								
118 It is evident that Coetzee had Foucault’s idea on disciplinary institutions in mind (Discipline and Punish 
1975). However, the concern in the discussion is not the structure or anti-structure but rather the absence of 
structure in the liminal space.   
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time. Time on the farm becomes less relevant than it ever was. The narrator explains this 
in different occasions; he states that K exists ‘in a pocket outside time’ (K 60), ‘living 
beyond the reach of calendar and clock’ (116); [h]e had kept no tally of the days nor 
recorded the changes of the moon’ (115); ‘[s]ometimes he would emerge into 
wakefulness unsure whether he had slept a day or a week or a month’ (119). To Friday 
and K who manage to live in uninhabited and deserted spaces, with no or minimum signs 
of progression and linearity, time structures seem to collapse, revealing a more unified 
sense of time—an everlasting and perpetual present. 
Closely related to liminality is the term nomadism. Nomadism entails movement, 
mobility, and the lack of origin and permanent abode. In the posthumanist context, 
nomadism is a state of constant becoming, non-arrival, and a refusal of any fixed 
state/identity.119 Coetzee’s characters are the ultimate nomads: no home, story, history, 
origin, trace, or legacy with which they identify. The doctor comments on K’s situation: 
‘[n]o papers, no money; no family, no friends, no sense of who you are. The obscurest of 
the obscure, so obscure as to be a prodigy’ (K 142). The doctor’s description equally 
applies to Friday and the girl who have no proof of their identity or what might indicate 
their origins. As nomads, the three experience life in the immediacy of the present with 
no regard to the past or future.  
However, these characters share one value they never compromise—maintaining 
their freedom. It is not a political or a specific type of freedom they are after but rather 
the most instinctive type of freedom—physical freedom that is shared by all living 
entities. This intrinsic, nomadic longing is translated into the characters’ actions. When 
the rescue ship arrives at the island, Susan pleads that the sailors ‘rescue’ Friday against 
his will, for, as Susan tells the ship-master, nothing will persuade him to yield himself up 																																																								
119 Braidotti’s description of the nomad shares many characteristics with the posthuman subject proposed 
here as well as Haraway’s cyborg. She defines it as:  
[A] postmetaphysical, intensive, multiple entity, functioning in a net of interconnections. S/he cannot be 
reduced to a linear, teleological form of subjectivity but is rather the site of multiple connections. S/he is 
embodied, and therefore cultural; as an artifact, s/he is a technological compound of human and post-
human; s/he is complex, endowed with multiple capacities for interconnectedness in the impersonal mode. 
S/he is a cyborg, but equipped also with an unconscious. She is Irigaray's "mucous," or "divine," but 
endowed with a multicultural perspective. S/he is abstract and perfectly, operationally real (Nomadic 36). 
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(Foe 39). Friday frequently falls into what Cruso describes as ‘mopes’, where he leaves 
his tools and disappears into the island, only to come back the day after as if nothing had 
happened. In England, Susan mentions that Friday stands at the door ‘longing to escape’, 
ignoring her calls to him (78). Despite the temptations and warnings, K’s desire to escape 
seems to be the only thing that preoccupies his mind. He jeopardises everything, 
including his life and well being, to escape the camp and the hospital. Despite the good 
treatment she receives under the magistrate’s care, when he asks her to stay with him, the 
girl firmly refuses to go back to ‘that place’ (78). The characters refuse all attempts of 
domestication and, despite the long periods in confinements, never give up trying to 
restore their freedom. 
To further stress their posthumanist nomadism, Coetzee blurs the origin(s) of his 
characters, replacing historicity with contingency and emergence. All the characters seem 
to have no clear origins or a definitive history with which their story begins. Friday’s 
story is a mystery: Cruso, who claims to have ‘found’ Friday, recounts two versions of 
Friday’s story; the first is that he was a savage among cannibals; the second is that Friday 
was a slave whom Cruso managed to save/capture/steal from some slave traders. Despite 
her attempts, Susan never discovers the real history of Friday. Once they arrive in 
England, Susan puts in a great effort to send Friday back to his ‘homeland’ (Foe 107) 
despite not knowing what or where that is. Susan’s continuous attempts to take Friday 
back to his alleged homeland is one of her means to force a beginning or a historical 
point from which the story of Friday begins. The girl, who ‘belongs’ to the barbarians, 
does not have clear origins either; the barbarians become more of a legend among the 
soldiers and the town’s people, who have many stories to tell of them despite not actually 
having seen them. The girl remains a mystery to the magistrate and to the reader who 
fails to learn anything about her history. Although as readers we get the privilege of 
tracing his story before he meets the camp doctor, K remains an enigmatic being to the 
baffled doctor who seeks every means but nonetheless fails to know K’s story. 
Furthermore, not only do these characters lack history and origin but they also 
lack any legacy, as if they wish to be forgotten. As previously demonstrated earlier in this 
chapter, the humanist characters are preoccupied with the idea of leaving behind, as a 
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way for their ego to continue when their ‘bodies’ die. On the contrary, the posthumanist 
characters realise the futility of such an idea within the cosmic context. K’s insights on 
the dynamics of the universe demonstrate not only the futility but also the impossibility 
of leaving behind: ‘[e]very grain of this earth will be washed clean by the rain, he told 
himself, and dried by the sun and scoured by the wind, before the seasons turn again. 
There will be not a grain left bearing my marks’ (K 124). Friday, K, and the girl seem to 
leave no trace behind them. Even more so, they deliberately attempt to be trackless. For 
instance, K thinks that ‘[t]he worst mistake … would be to try to found a new house, a 
rival line, on his small beginnings out at the dam. Even his tools should be of wood and 
leather and gut, materials the insects would eat when one day he no longer needed them’ 
(104). Unlike the human subject, whose solid existence leaves marks everywhere, the 
posthuman, on the other hand, is lighter being, almost without a trace. The posthuman is 
merely a speck: ‘[h]e thought of himself not as something heavy that left tracks behind it, 
but if anything as a speck upon the surface of an earth’ (97).  
Moreover, for Coetzee’s humanist protagonists, parenthood exemplifies their 
ultimate idea of leaving behind. While David, Curren, and Dostoevsky contemplate their 
parenthood with contentment, K, on the other hand, is thankful for his childlessness: 
‘[h]ow fortunate that I have no children, he thought: how fortunate that I have no desire 
to father’ (104). None of the three characters expresses any desire to leave a legacy, a 
story, an offspring, or anything that might extend their presence beyond their bodies; in 
fact, their bodies constitute their only presence/story/legacy.  
Moreover, and unlike the humanist protagonists who seem concerned with the 
continuation of their egos, the posthumanist figures are interested in another type of 
continuity after death—one that views death as a renewal of material form: ‘dying does 
not settle the matter but is the essential, preliminary step toward renewal, albeit in a 
changed form’ (Grobler et al. 3). This view of death as a way for the material to continue 
to exist in a ‘different form’ requires a rather egoless and objective understanding of the 
materiality of life and death. We can sense this deep realisation of the posthumanist 
continuity in K’s answer to the doctor when he asks him where his mother was (who was 
dead and whose ashes K has buried in the ground): ‘[s]he makes the plants grow’ (130). 
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This posthumanist new materialist view of death as changing form offers significant 
implications that destabilise the boundaries between life and death.120  
However, and according to Braidotti, the nomadic subject is a mythical creature—
it does not actually exist. Braidotti explains that the nomadic subject is a ‘political 
fiction’ that serves a particular philosophical function; it constitutes ‘a move against the 
settled and conventional nature of theoretical and especially philosophical thinking’ 
(Nomadic 4)121. As if echoing Braidotti’s argument on the impossibility of the universal 
nomadic subject, the doctor addresses K: 
[d]id you think you were a spirit invisible, a visitor on our planet, a creature 
beyond the reach of the laws of nations? Well, the laws of nations have you 
in their grip now: they have pinned you down in a bed beneath the 
grandstand of the old Kenilworth racecourse, they will grind you in the dirt 
if necessary. The laws are made of iron, Michaels, I hope you are learning 
that. No matter how thin you make yourself, they will not relax. There is no 
home left for universal souls, except perhaps in Antarctica or on the high 
seas (K 151). 
However, despite Braidotti’s argument, Coetzee refuses to give up the idea of the 
possibility of the nomadic subject as the narratives eventually end by siding with those 
figures. Coetzee grants his posthumanist, liminal, and nomadic becomings a brighter 
ending than their humanist counterparts; towards the end of their narratives, all three 
figures manage to restore their nomadism and return to their liminality. K succeeds in 
escaping the hospital and the camp and going back to live in the wild; the barbarian girl 
disappears with her people into the mountains and never comes back; Friday, in his 																																																								
120 Braidotti offers political insight on this destabilisation of these boundaries in The Posthuman (2013). 
121 Braidotti’s use of nomadism in the posthumanist context, inspired by the literal sense of the word, refers 
to ‘the kind of critical consciousness that resists settling into socially coded modes of thought and 
behavior’. Nomadism, in Braidotti’s view, does not necessarily entail world travelling; according to her, it 
is a ‘performative metaphor’; she continues, ‘It is the subversion of set conventions that defines the 
nomadic state, not the literal act of traveling’ (Nomadic 5). Evidently, Braidotti’s view is different from 
Coetzee’s as well as my interpretation of the posthumanist nomadism that involves both physical and 
psychological uncertainty (body/mind non-duality). For example, the nomadic subject in Coetzee’s 
narrative equally expresses the absence of origin as well as the belief or the need for one. 
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equivocal ending, goes into the water deep in the shipwreck into a liminal space where 
‘bodies are their own signs’ (157). 
2.2.2. Silence and Language 
The existence of the posthuman is expressed in silence rather than language. 
Unlike human speech, silence is shared among all types of existence. The universe itself 
swims in a deep, dark, and seemingly infinite silence; it is the default language of matter. 
Speech, being contingent, temporary, soon fades and disappears into silence. Also, unlike 
language, silence entertains unactualised possibilities: it is a profound liberation from 
what speech inevitably entails—boundaries. Silence thus becomes the state of 
simultaneously saying nothing and everything. The posthuman subject can exist without 
an existential need for words. Between the embodied and the figurative world, the 
posthuman is biased towards materiality and embodiment; its physical presence is not 
compromised by its linguistic representation; in fact, its physical presence is its only 
representation. Through their silence, these subjects embody the idea of performativity in 
posthumanism, which, according to Barad, is ‘a contestation of the unexamined habits of 
mind that grant language and other forms of representation more power in determining 
our ontologies than they deserve’ (Meeting 133). In other words, through their silence, 
what these characters seem to do is undermine the primacy of language as a condition of 
existence. 
On the contrary to the humanist protagonists who are portrayed as linguistically 
superior (writers and lecturers), the posthumanist figures are predominantly silent. Their 
inner consciousness is either inaccessible (Friday and the girl) or simplistic (K). Speech 
represents, in varying degrees, a challenge to them; it is either absent (Friday) or very 
concise (K and the girl). What Coetzee seems to do by creating these two sets of 
characters is to showcase the vast contrast between silence and speech as two distinctive 
modes of being and becoming.  
However, as I shall come on to argue, posthumanist silence is not merely an 
absence of speech as the binary might suggest; rather, it is a much more profound and 
independent mode of existence. The silence of these subjects is a provocative silence by 
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which other characters are agitated. Failing to understand their existential and instinctive 
silence, the humanist characters step in to force them to speak and, when they fail, 
eventually resort to claiming/writing their stories. Friday, the barbarian girl, and K, all 
experience a strikingly similar situation where their humanist antagonists attempt various 
means to break their silence and articulate their stories. The three subjects, however, 
remain armed with their silence, refusing any attempt to be forced into the figurative 
world. 
Since Friday has no command over language, Susan believes that he must not 
have any appreciation of, or experience with, abstract notions. She wonders how Friday 
could understand words such as ‘freedom’ when he hardly recognises his own name (Foe 
149). Falsely presuming that the signifier precedes the signified, Susan implies that 
language determines the reality experienced. She regards language as the ultimate 
existential reality or, at least, as the primary tool that constructs the human ontological 
experiences in the world. According to Susan, not only does language constitute reality, 
but also reality without language is deemed futile. Susan wonders: ‘[w]hat benefit is there 
in a life of silence?’ (22). Susan’s belief that existence is only meaningful through 
language excludes not only animals but also the rest of the universe down to its 
microscopic organisms. Furthermore, this type of representationalism displays, as Barad 
argues, ‘a deep mistrust of matter, holding it off at a distance, figuring it as passive, 
immutable, and mute, in need of the mark of an external force like culture or history to 
complete it’ (Meeting 133). Friday’s silence thus becomes the very collapse of the 
representational distance Susan maintains, and the unity between mind and body that 
Susan lacks. For this reason, Friday’s silence becomes threatening to Susan; she describes 
his silence as thick black smoke that fills her heart, lungs, and body, and prevents her 
from breathing (Foe 118).  
Therefore, and throughout the narrative, Susan’s main goal is to unlock Friday’s 
mystery. She resorts to Foe, the ghostwriter who is supposed to help her write Friday’s 
story: ‘[w]e must make Friday's silence speak, as well as the silence surrounding Friday’ 
(142). When Cruso, her last hope of knowing Friday’s story, dies, she tries to teach 
Friday language in the hope that he might tell his story, but all her attempts end in vain. 
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Paradoxically, Susan’s interest in Friday’s story becomes far more important to her than 
Friday himself. His presence does not seem to interest her as much as its representation 
does. By refusing, or simply being unable, to speak, Friday remains equally inaccessible 
to the readers—a shadowy figure living within the story of other characters without 
having a story of his own. Friday thus becomes ‘situated inside the discursive networks at 
work both inside and outside the confines of the novel’ (MacLeod 7). As Brian 
MacAskill and Jeanne Colleran put it, Friday is ‘a character inscribed within [the] text, 
but not quite assimilated by it’ (451). Coetzee thus succeeds in creating Friday without 
actually writing him. Not only Susan and Foe but also Coetzee has no power over 
Friday’s story. Friday’s lack of story means that he can embrace all the possibilities 
without committing to any. 
The doctor is fascinated by K and admits that the special attention he gives to K, 
out of all the other patients, is because he wants to know his story (149). Similar to 
Susan, the doctor presents himself as the only person capable of saving K through writing 
his story to the world: ‘I am the only one who can save you. I am the only one who sees 
you for the original soul you are. I am the only one who cares for you . . . no one is going 
to remember you but me, unless you yield and at last open your mouth. I appeal to you, 
Michaels: yield’ (K 152). The doctor bluntly asks K to give up his silence, which would 
only burry him in oblivion, so that he has the opportunity to live forever, an offer in 
which K is clearly uninterested. K is not fond of language games; he tells the doctor: ‘I 
am not clever with words’ (139). His uneasiness towards language has made it hard for 
him to think in words; words are swallowed by his consciousness, like matter 
disappearing into a black hole: ‘[a]lways, when he tried to explain himself to himself, 
there remained a gap, a hole, a darkness before which his understanding baulked, into 
which it was useless to pour words. The words were eaten up, the gap remained. His was 
always a story with a hole in it: a wrong story, always wrong’ (110). Although, unlike 
Friday, K is familiar with language, his monologues, as well as his stream of 
consciousness throughout the narrative are, nonetheless, rather simple and direct. He does 
not indulge in propositional thinking, and his ideas lack coherence. For him, thinking in 
language is rather useless; every word he thinks of turns into nothing. Therefore, similar 
to Friday who has no verifiable story, K does not have a coherent story of his own—his 
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story is ‘always wrong’. 
The magistrate is utterly troubled by the thought of the torture the girl has gone 
through. In his frequent attempts to know her story, the magistrate fails to get her to 
speak. Like K, the girl is not interested in language games; the magistrate describes her: 
‘[s]he has a fondness for facts, I note, for pragmatic dicta; she dislikes fancy, questions, 
speculations’ (Waiting 43). The girl complains that the magistrate wants to talk all the 
time (43) and that she is ‘tired of talking’ (44). Although she briefly explains the torture 
that led to her deformities, she nonetheless remains mysterious to the magistrate who, 
despite his efforts, fails to decipher her full story. 
When the antagonists fail to make the subjects speak, they try to make up and 
claim ownership of the subjects’ stories. When Susan, for example, witnesses Friday 
scattering white petals and buds in the river, she concludes that he is performing a ritual 
or other superstitious ceremony (Foe 31). She also interprets Friday’s dancing episodes 
as his way to remove his spirit from England and back to his people (104). Evidently, 
what Susan does is trying to force meaning on Friday’s action as a way to demystify, 
subjected, and tame him by language. She is fully aware of the linguistic power she has 
over Friday; no matter what Friday thinks of himself, Susan thinks she is the one who 
determines what ‘he is to the world’ (122). Similarly, when Noël needs to submit a report 
about the barbarians, he and the doctor pressure K to speak. However, when they fail to 
get him to cooperate, the doctor suggests that Noël should ‘[m]ake up something for the 
report’ (K 141). Also, when the girl does not fully answer his persistent questions about 
what happened to her, the magistrate carries extensive investigations of officers that were 
present while the girl was tortured. His investigations, however, were not fruitful. 
Eventually, the magistrate tries to imagine/recreate what happened to her. He goes to the 
investigation room where the torture session took place; closing his eyes and kneeling on 
the floor, he tries to imagine the torture she went through in that room (Waiting 38).  
Friday’s absolute silence, in particular, has been the subject of many 
interpretations. Nearly all critics of Foe interpret Friday’s silence as a response, a protest, 
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or a metaphor.122 For instance, in his essay ‘Oppressive Silence: J.M Coetzee’s and the 
Politics of Canonisation’, as the title suggests, Derek Attridge builds his argument on 
Friday’s silence as a sign of oppression. In her essay, ‘Theory in the Margin: Coetzee's 
Foe Reading Defoe's "Crusoe/Roxana"’, Gayatri Spivak attends to the ‘rhetorical conduct 
of the text’ (4) and attempts to interpret Friday’s silence within the context of marginality 
and colonisation. In her book, Self as Narrative: Subjectivity and Community in 
Contemporary Fiction, Kim L. Worthington notes that Friday’s silence ‘has been 
inflicted on him’ (257). Through Friday’s tonguelessness, Worthington argues for ‘the 
necessity of situated speech’ (255). On the other hand, in his critique of the previous 
works, MacLeod uses the uncertainty of Friday’s mutilation to argue for opposite 
metaphors. He suggests that Friday’s silence is intentional. It is a sign of ‘heroic restraint’ 
and a ‘triumph of individual agency’ (12). However, what MacLeod and the authors he 
critiques equally do is read Friday’s silence as a response, a metaphor, and a sign to be 
interpreted. MacLeod, for instance, declares that Friday’s silence ‘seems fundamentally 
symbolic’. Furthermore, all of these readings appear to juxtapose silence to speech. 
MacLeod describes Friday’s silence as ‘a counter-discursive utterance’ (12). Not only 
Friday, but nearly all Coetzee’s ‘silent’ figures have induced similar interpretations. For 
example, in his essay, ‘Toward an Ethics of Silence: Michael K’, Duncan McColl 
Chesney approaches the narrative politically, arguing that K’s silence suggests ‘various 
obvious [political] and metaphorical explanations’ (310).123 These studies are only a few 
among many that attempt to elicit the possible political, figurative, and metaphorical 
readings of the silence of Coetzee’s protagonists. 
Albeit useful in their contexts, these readings unavoidably create another limiting 																																																								
122 I owe it to Lewis MacLeod who summarises these works in his essay ‘Narrating the World: on Speech, 
Silence, and Discourse in J. M. Coetzee’s Foe’. However, what MacLeod wishes to demonstrate through 
his review of these works is an entirely different argument than the one I am making here. He attempts to 
explain how the critics were using Friday’s tonguelessness toward their own discursive goals; he writes, 
‘[i]n all of these cases (and several others), the novel's critics need a tongueless Friday to proceed with their 
own discursive projects, and so, in a fairly serious sense, they take his tongue away and use him toward 
their own ends’ (10).  
123 Chesney dismisses what he describes as a ‘transcendent’ or an ontological, conscious state behind K’s 
silence. He contends that Coetzee uses K’s silence as a ‘nontranscendent, disruptive silence in order to 
stage the complex ethical responsibility to political action’ (316). He justifies what appears to be a 
transcendent state by arguing that it is merely the doctor’s interpretations of K’s condition or due to the 
effects of hunger on him (315). 
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binary that restricts the possibilities of understanding silence beyond the human 
experience. It defines silence as, and reduces it to, the absence of human speech, rather 
than viewing it as, what I argue, is a default cosmic and eternal state of existence. One of 
the few critics who, building a different argument, accurately distinguishes this type of 
silence of Coetzee’s characters from a mere absence of speech is Benita Parry; she states, 
‘although the silence of each of these figures has a distinctive tenor, what all signify is 
not a negative condition of lack and affliction, or of sullen withdrawal, but a plentitude of 
perception and gifts’ (153). Furthermore, what the other readings fail to see is that 
Friday’s silence is not merely an absence of language but, most importantly, a presence 
of the body. Friday exists by being present not through his words but in his flesh—the 
ultimate form of embodiment. This understanding aligns with Foe’s ending, where Friday 
lies deep underwater in what the narrator describes as a world ‘where bodies are their 
own signs’ (157).  
The other characters can sense the presence of such silence; its profound presence 
rivals, if not outweighs, the presence of speech. To the humanist characters, this silence is 
unbearable: deep, thick, and even troubling. Susan describes her nights with Friday where 
she can feel Friday’s silence: ‘a silence that rose up the stairway like smoke, like a 
welling of black smoke. Before long I could not breathe, I would feel I was stifling in my 
bed. My lungs, my heart, my head were full of black smoke.’ (Foe 118). In a similar 
fashion, while investigating K, the doctor can actually listen to K’s silence: ‘There was a 
silence so dense that I heard it as a ringing in my ears, a silence of the kind one 
experiences in mine shafts, cellars, bomb shelters, airless places’ (K 140). The silence of 
the posthumanist subjects, therefore, is not an absence or a state of withdrawal; it is also 
not a ‘helpless silence’ as Susan claims (Foe 122) but rather a powerful, profound, and 
independent presence in its own right. 
The significance of this silence in the QPist context is that it allows the 
exploration of other modes of becoming and communication that lie beyond human 
language. It emphasises the non-universality of human language in contrast to the 
universality of silence and the possibility, and plausibility, of existing beyond language. 
It also downplays the humanist overemphasis on language as the only legitimate mode of 
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being and offers silence as one of the possible modes of becoming.  
2.2.3. Embodiment and Becoming 
One of the main ideas stressed by Coetzee through his posthumanist subjects is 
embodiment and the non-duality of existence. For the posthumanist subjects, ‘[t]here 
seem[s] nothing to do but live’ (K 66). Becoming-of-the-world is a straightforward 
experience that refuses articulation, figuration, and representation that might destroy its 
immediacy. For K, there exists no space that separates him from what he thinks. His 
thoughts and beliefs are not articulated but embodied. He experiences no duality or split 
between body/mind from which Coetzee’s humanist protagonists clearly suffer. This is 
evident in his thoughts on death: ‘[i]t came home to him that he might die, he or his body, 
it was the same thing, that he might lie here till the moss on the roof grew dark before his 
eyes, that his story might end with his bones growing white in this far off place’ (69). K 
refers to himself, his body, his bones, and his story as the same thing. His story exists 
within his bones and will dissolve as his bones disappear from the earth. His body is not 
simply a statement of his story; rather, and in the most literal sense, his body is his story. 
This attitude fundamentally opposes that of David, Curren, and Dostoevsky whose egos 
continue to emerge in their visions of death. 
However, although the experiences of the posthumanist subjects clearly revolve 
around embodiment and bodies becoming their own sign (Foe 157), both the humanist 
antagonists as well as Coetzee’s critics seem to undermine the characters’ embodiment by 
reducing their bodies to figures of speech—the very thing these characters consistently 
refuse and fight throughout the narrative. Susan describes Friday’s suggested tongue 
mutilation as a metaphor for a more horrific mutilation (119). Also, the doctor describes 
K’s presence in the camp as an allegory of ‘how scandalously, how outrageously a 
meaning can take up residence in a system without becoming a term in it’ (K 166). In a 
similar fashion, Coetzee’s critics continue to reduce the posthumanist bodies to linguistic 
representations. Spivak, for instance, addressing Foe, insists that ‘Coetzee’s entire book 
warns that Friday’s body is not its own sign’ (18). In his essay on Foe and canonisation, 
Attridge goes further and contends, as Spivak puts it, that Friday is a metaphor for the 
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work of art (13). Parker (among many others) similarly argues, ‘Friday’s body becomes 
the sign of the colonizer’s brutality to the colonized and enslaved.’ (35). Evidently, what 
these readings do is what Susan, the doctor, and the magistrate, attempted to do—they 
incorporate these characters into the world of language and metaphor. They create the 
same representationalist space between the body and that for which it stands. Therefore, 
the characters’ bodies are reduced to metaphors, signs, and allegories both inside and 
outside the narrative. It is as though Coetzee anticipates and puts forward this type of 
metaphorical reading through his humanist characters. Nevertheless, exemplified in the 
failure of the antagonists to break their silence, these readings fail to disturb the subjects’ 
embodiments or to create a split between their bodies and their stories, as the characters 
remain irreducible to the linguistic interpretation they seem constantly to provoke.   
Coetzee represents full embodiment as the ultimate inner bliss. Through his 
protagonist and alter ego, Elizabeth Costello, he articulates this conviction: ‘[t]o be full of 
being is to live as a body-soul. One name for the experience of full being is joy.’ 
(Costello 77-8). As he stays with his dying mother in the hospital, hungry, homeless, 
waiting for the permit that allows them to leave the town, K experiences a profound 
happiness while eating a slice of pie: ‘[t]he pie was so delicious that tears came to his 
eyes. … K listened to the birds in the trees and tried to remember when he had known 
such happiness.’ (K 30). Living in the mountains in utter silence, beyond the reach of 
humanity, doing nothing and looking forward to nothing, K experiences several moments 
of bursting happiness: ‘his heart suddenly flow [sic] over with thankfulness’; ‘He chewed 
[the pumpkin] with tears of joy in his eyes’ (113); K even wondered ‘if he were living in 
what was known as bliss.’ (68). This seemingly cosmic state of 
silence/bliss/nothingness/totality K feels is essentially an emptiness—an emptiness of 
human language, desires, thoughts, hopes, and dreams: ‘he sometimes locked his fingers 
behind his head, closed his eyes, and emptied his mind, wanting nothing, looking forward 
to nothing.’ (69). The posthumanist inner consciousness is nearly empty. The characters’ 
minds are calm to the point where they seem to think nothing. K, for instance, ‘could lie 
all afternoon with his eyes open, staring at the corrugations in the roof-iron and the 
tracings of rust; his mind would not wander, he would see nothing but the iron, the lines 
would not transform themselves into pattern or fantasy’ (K 115). Ironically, a full 
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embodiment is impossible to describe within language; hence, only through their silence 
and emptiness can Coetzee demonstrate the embodiment of his characters. 
As I have argued earlier in the chapter, the state of becoming entails 
entanglement, possibility, fluidity, borderlessness, and contingency. However, what 
distinguishes the posthumanist becomings from the other becomings of David, Curren, 
and Dostoevsky is that these becomings are real physical events in the most literal sense 
possible. Deleuze and Guattari identify this as a real becoming (238) that does not take 
place in imagination and is not a figure or a metaphor. True becomings are not ‘a 
resemblance, an imitation, or, at the limit, an identification’ They are neither a 
progression nor a regression; they are literal, spontaneous, unplanned and ‘perfectly real’. 
(Thousand 237-8, 292). These becomings exemplify what Barad describes, quoting 
Haraway, as ‘[b]odies in the making, not bodies made’ (159). Through these true 
becomings, physical, mental, and psychological changes occur, which blur the boundaries 
between all modes of existence—bodies, entities, species, and things. 
K experiences this type of real becoming in different moments in the narrative; 
one of which is becoming-animal. Living in the open fields, K starts to develop an 
animalistic instinct as he manages to intuitively distinguish between poisonous and 
nonpoisonous plants, ‘as though he had once been an animal and the knowledge of good 
and bad plants had not died in his soul’ (102). As part of his becoming-animal, K’s 
senses—sight, smell, and touch—drastically change: 
He had become so much a creature of twilight and night that daylight hurt 
his eyes. He no longer needed to keep to paths in his movements around 
the dam. A sense less of sight than of touch, the pressure of presences 
upon his eyeballs and the skin of his face, warned him of any obstacle. His 
eyes remained unfocussed for hours on end like those of a blind person. 
He had learned to rely on smell too. He breathed into his lungs the clear 
sweet smell of water brought up from inside the earth. It intoxicated him, 
he could not have enough of it. Though he knew no names he could tell 
one bush from another by the smell of their leaves. He could smell rain-
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weather in the air. (115). 
Evidently, of all the becomings discussed so far, K’s becoming is the most literal. As a 
result of living in the wild, K’s animalistic instinct heightens and while some senses 
become more acute, others deteriorate. As the passage demonstrates, K’s body goes 
through physical changes to adjust to the new situation. This type of becoming 
successfully challenges the boundaries between species; the human body can become 
more animalistic just as the animal body (under different conditions) becomes more 
‘humanistic’.124  
The girl also experiences a nonhuman becoming. The magistrate explains that the 
torture the girl and her father were subjugated to, the horror they witnessed, contributed 
to her becoming nonhuman, incapable of human feelings: ‘she was no longer fully 
human, sister to all of us. Certain sympathies died, certain movements of the heart 
became no longer possible to her’ (Waiting 88-9). As a result of her physical and 
psychological degradation, the girl’s nature changes into something that is beyond 
humanity. 
However, and surprisingly, it is the magistrate himself who experiences a more 
elaborated real becoming—becoming-beast. What distinguishes this real becoming from 
the others is that the magistrate is presented, at the beginning of the narrative, as an 
exemplary humanist figure. Working for the empire, the magistrate used to be a symbol 
of order and social hierarchy, whose job is to maintain discipline and enforce law. To 
facilitate his becoming-beast, the magistrate first experiences liminality as he abruptly 
moves from being a well-respected magistrate to a filthy homeless creature sleeping on 
the streets of the town of which he was once in charge. The magistrate is stripped of his 
status, job, ranking, reputation, respect, and home, living off charity, being the object of 
laughter, torture, and mockery, and ridiculed and teased by children. During his time in 
the confinement, however, the magistrate experiences his first becoming-beast. He 
reflects on his time in the solitary confinement: ‘I build my day unreasonably around the 
hours when I am fed. I guzzle my food like a dog. A bestial life is turning me into a 																																																								
124 In the next part, I discuss an example of an animal becoming-human. 
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beast’ (84). During episodes of physical and psychological torture, the magistrate loses 
the use of his hands, so he starts ‘lickin[ing] his food off the flagstones’ (136).  
As time passes in torture and confinement, the magistrate experiences profound 
sense of his embodiment. He describes himself as ‘no more than a pile of blood, bone and 
meat’ (93). Confirming his statement, Deleuze declares that ‘every man who suffers is a 
piece of meat’. As Deleuze notes, meat is the shared ground of both man and beast, ‘their 
zone of indiscernibility’ (Francis 23). The magistrate’s existence is reduced to 
Agamben’s bare life that results from extreme violence and torture which, in turn, 
destroys the political life or bios125, stripping life of political status, leaving it bare, 
damaged, and exposed, suspended somewhere between unprotected humans and 
protected beasts126 (Puchner 25).127  
As the narrative progresses, the magistrate’s becoming-beast is more literal, as he 
becomes more of an animal than a human. He reflects, 
I daily become more like a beast or a simple machine, a child's spinning-
wheel, for example, with eight little figures presenting themselves on the 
rim: father, lover, horseman, thief . . . Then I respond with movements of 
vertiginous terror in which I rush around the cell jerking my arms about, 
pulling my beard, stamping my feet, doing anything to surprise myself, to 
remind myself of a world beyond that is various and rich’ (93). 
By experiencing a real becoming, the magistrate showcases the random, 
spontaneous, and abrupt nature of becoming, which Deleuze and Guattari emphasise. In 																																																								
125 Agamben distinguishes between two types of existence: biological existence (zoe) and political one 
(bios) (1). 
126 The concept of bare life shares many characteristics with liminality; in both situations, for instance, the 
subject is stripped of any political significance. 
127 Another relevant notion in the magistrate’s becoming is one of Agamben’s most notable ideas, namely 
homo sacer (in a book that carries the same title). Homo sacer is a banned figure, whom Agamben borrows 
from the Roman law, who may be killed by anyone as he is excluded from the law, unfit for, and unworthy 
of, legal prosecution or religious sacrifice (8). This perfectly applies to the magistrate who, after escaping 
his confinement, was left roaming the street, subject to ridicule; the officials no longer took him seriously 
or even bothered to capture him. Homo sacer, hence, lives in liminality; he is both included in, and 
excluded from, the political realm; as Agamben puts it, in the juridical order, homo saucer is ‘included 
solely through its exclusion’ (18). 
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Deleuze and Guattari’s view, becoming is not an existential quest as Coetzee’s humanist 
characters portray it to be. It is rather an unexpected event: ‘[w]e can be thrown into a 
becoming by anything at all, by the most unexpected, most insignificant of things’ (292). 
Through the magistrate’s becoming-beast we learn that real becoming is not exclusive to 
posthumanist subjects. Everyone is becoming at any point of their existence. However, 
the most striking types of becomings involve crossing boundaries between identities and 
species. 
Table 1 recapitulates the key differences between Coetzee’s humanist and 
posthumanist figures discussed in this chapter. Indeed, Coetzee offers (and this analysis 
seems to accentuate) a striking juxtaposition between the two sets of characters. 
Coetzee’s novels do include further binaries— black/white, male/female, 
coloniser/colonised, master/slave, and human/animal. Such juxtapositions may falsely 
imply that the relationship is oppositional between these binaries. Nevertheless, at its 
core, posthumanist logic stresses the movement beyond all type boundaries, and 
particularly humanist/posthumanist. However, what Coetzee does in his narratives is to 
disturb the very boundaries he establishes by creating moments (and creatures) that 
challenge the very validity of these binaries, where man becomes-woman, the human 
becomes-animal, and, in the magistrate’s case, the humanist becomes-posthumanist. 
These posthumanist moments represent glimpses of recognition of the illusionary nature 
of these binaries/boundaries. The magistrate’s literal becoming, in particular, disturbs the 
very distinction that this discussion presumes to exist between the two sets of characters, 
stressing Badmington’s earlier declaration that the human is always becoming 
posthuman. It becomes, therefore, a matter of recognising the posthuman in the human, 
rather than attempting to reach or achieve the state of the posthuman. 
The dividing line between the two sets of characters in Table 2.1 is thus to be 
understood not as an exterior, inherent, border between the characters, but rather as a 
flexible cut from within that only emerges through my particular reading/arrangements of 
Coetzee’s novels, in the same manner the physical apparatus128 within the quantum 																																																								
128 The physical apparatus in Bohr and Barad’s philosophy refer to the measurement devices used in/within 
the quantum experiment, which inevitably determines the values of measurements while simultaneously 
becoming entangled with the process of measurement. Within the literary context, my reading works as the 
	122	
measurement works by temporarily distinguishing between the subject/object without 
negating the irreducibility, fluidity, and entanglement of the phenomenon.  
 
 
Humanist Figure 
(David, Curren, Dostoevsky) 
Posthumanist Figure 
(Friday, K, the girl) 
Complete/normal Physically deformed/repulsive 
Intellectual Illiterate 
Articulate 
(Speech is their main mode of existence) 
Silent 
(Silence is their main mode of existence) 
Parent Childless 
Egocentric Egoless 
Sexually identifiable/active Sexually undetermined/inactive 
Suffer from body/mind divide Full embodiment 
Politically engaged Apolitical 
Obsessed with the idea of leaving behind Trackless 
Live through their own ideas/ideals/morals 
of the world 
Do not express pre-existing notion or 
judgment about the world 
Struggling in their liminality Protecting their liminality 
Living in the past and Future Living in the present 
Ultimate goal is to reach ‘salvation’ Ultimate goal is to protect their freedom 
Metaphorical becoming Real becoming 
 
Table 1: A comparison between Coetzee’s humanist and posthumanist figures 
 
 
 
 
 																																																																																																																																																																					
apparatus as it determines the values (actualised meanings) of the texts. I discuss the reader’s consciousness 
as the physical apparatus of the text in detail in Chapter Four. 
	123	
2.3. Thoughts on Becoming(-with)-animal and Becoming-Human 
 
In his novel, Elizabeth Costello, Coetzee explicitly discusses the idea of real 
becoming, specifically becoming-animal. In her speech ‘The Lives of Animals’ Costello 
reviews Thomas Nagel’s essay ‘What is it Like to Be a Bat?’ (75). In his essay, Nagel 
argues that it is impossible for humans to know what it is like to be a bat. While scientific 
knowledge can explain how bats behave, this is not the question Nagel has in mind: ‘I 
want to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat. Yet if I try to imagine this, I am 
restricted to the resources of my own mind, and those resources are inadequate to the 
task.’ (439). In Nagel’s view, any becoming is impossible; humans and animals have 
distinct, fixed, and separate identities that cannot be transgressed. Costello comments that 
Nagel’s argument is extremely ‘restrictive and restricted’ (Costello 76). She proposes 
another way to approach Nagel’s question. For Costello, the experience of being a bat is 
not about the modalities as Nagel assumes. Instead, it is about the ontological experience 
of being. She states, ‘[t]o be a living bat is to be full of being; being fully a bat is like 
being fully human, which is also to be full of being. Bat being in the first case, human 
being in the second, maybe; but those are secondary considerations. To be full of being is 
to live as a body-soul. One name for the experience of full being is joy’ (77-8). Evidently, 
Costello believes in the posthumanist becoming as the fundamental state of existence. 
Through his alter ego, Coetzee expresses his conviction in the possibility of real 
becoming-other and crossing the boundaries between different modes of becoming: ‘there 
is no limit to the extent to which we can think ourselves into the being of another’ 
(Costello 80). 
 
2.3.1. Becoming(-with)-animal  
On the other hand, in her book, When Species Meet, Haraway criticises Deleuze 
and Guattari’s argument on becoming-animal. Haraway argues that Deleuze and 
Guattari’s approach to deconstructing the boundaries between humanity and animality is 
rather unproductive. She believes that their metaphysical stance on animals is detached as 
it lacks a concrete and embodied relationship with animals that is built on curiosity and 
emotional attachment (27-31). She, instead, proposes an alternative to the idea of 
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becoming-animal—companionship or becoming-with-animals (3), and co-living as fellow 
creatures of the world.  
However, I do not see Haraway remarks on co-evolution and companionship as 
contradictory to Deleuze and Guattari’s insights on becoming-animal. What Deleuze and 
Guattari emphasise in becoming-animal are the intense, abrupt moments of becoming that 
touch one’s core existence, rather than Haraway’s ideas of the everyday, embodied 
relationships with animals. In other words, Deleuze and Guattari’s argument seems 
ontological whereas Haraway’s concerns address the practicalities of the human-animal 
relationship. We can sense this in Haraway’s statement that Deleuze and Guattari ‘had no 
eye for the elegant curve of a good chow’s tail, much less the courage to look such a dog 
in the eye’ (29). Furthermore, in her criticism, Haraway neglects the fact that becoming 
(not becoming-animal), as an ontological and existential event, is the ultimate concern of 
Deleuze and Guattari. In this sense, I believe becoming-animal and becoming-with-
animal are in fact complementary to each other. 
Becoming-with-animal, as Haraway sees it, is also present in Coetzee’s novels. 
We can trace this companionship in Lucy’s relationship with her dogs and the mutual 
dependence between them in Disgrace. We also find this companionship in Vercueil’s 
relationship with his dog which follows him everywhere in Age of Iron. Because of the 
good relationship between Vercueil and his dog, Curren starts to trust him: ‘perhaps it is 
because of the dog that I trust him. Dogs, that sniff out what is good, what evil’ (84-5). 
Even the special bond that suddenly forms between David and the homeless dog in the 
clinic, which becomes particularly fond of David, is another instance of this 
companionship. Coetzee’s novels thus celebrate both types of becoming: becoming-
animal and becoming-with-animal, further demonstrating the complementarity of both 
perspectives. 
2.3.2. Becoming-Human: The Case of Red Peter 
As this chapter demonstrates so far, humans can become-animal in the real sense 
of becoming, as the case of K and the magistrate exemplify, and as Costello’s critique of 
Nagel’s essay demonstrate, thus blurring the boundaries between humanity and animality. 
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However, it is worth noting that becoming is a universal ontological event where any 
being can become-another. Similar to human-becoming-animal, we can find the opposite 
taking place, namely animal-becoming-human. This becoming is demonstrated through 
the case of Red Peter. Red Peter is a talking ape in Franz Kafka’s story ‘A Report to an 
Academy’, where Red Peter delivers a speech to an academic society. In his speech, Red 
Peter presents his journey from apehood to humanity. Coetzee comments on Kafka’s 
story through Costello’s speech ‘The Lives of Animals’ in which she discusses the ethical 
side of the story.129 
Before addressing his becoming-human, as an ape, and according to the 
Darwinian evolutionary model, Red Peter already exists on the boundaries between 
humans and animals, blurring the traditional distinction that assumed a separation 
between species. Costello notes that of all the animals, apes are the only group that is 
nearly ‘giving up’ its silence. Acknowledging their resemblance to their own species, 
humans are trying to include apes in the larger family of the Hominoidea (Costello 70). 
Consequently, Costello notes, humans believe that the great apes, as human(oids), 
deserve to be given human(oid) rights—the minimum rights given to the mentally 
defective of  Homo sapiens, including the right to be protected by the law and the right 
not to be harmed or killed (70-1). The Great Ape Project, founded in 1933, advocates 
such rights for nonhuman apes. In his book Animal Rites, Wolfe criticises such a project 
for reinforcing the very humanist values that separate humans and animals. Apes have 
rights because they are ‘inferior versions of ourselves’; it is now humans and great apes 
versus the rest of the world (192). Wolfe describes this as ‘humanist posthumanism’130, 
where humanist methodologies and reasoning underlie seemingly posthumanist stances 																																																								
129 Costello positions the story of Red Peter within a historical context. She speculates that Kafka wrote the 
story based on the story of a real ape, Sultan, which was part of the experimentations on animals conducted 
by the psychologist Wolfgang Köhler. Costello notes that in 1912, the Prussian Academy of Sciences 
founded a station for the purpose of experimenting with apes and exploring their mental abilities. One of 
the scientists working there was Köhler who published his research in his book, The Mentality of Apes, in 
1917. Costello notes that in the same year Kafka published his story on Red Peter (71). 
130 Wolfe distinguishes between four types of theoretical frameworks: (1) humanist humanism, which 
includes, according to Wolfe, philosophers such as Jürgen Habermas, Martin Heidegger, Luc Ferry, and 
John Rawls; (2) posthumanist humanism, which includes Richard Rorty, Slavoj Žižek, and Foucault; (3) 
humanist posthumanism, which includes Martha Nussbaum, Peter Singer, and Tom Regan; and finally (4) 
posthumanist posthumanism, which includes Latour, Derrida, Niklas Luhmann, and Haraway. For more see 
Wolfe’s What is Posthumanism? (124-5). 
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on animals’ welfare. The resemblance between apes and humans is to be understood 
within the posthumanist context of entanglement and fluidity between species, rather than 
used a way to reinforce the humanist beliefs in the supremacy of human beings and the 
creatures that bear the most resemblance to them. 
Going back to Red Peter, various commentators on Kafka’s story view it as an 
ethical protest against cruel scientific experimentations on animals. Similarly, through 
Costello’s interpretation of Red Peter’s case, Coetzee argues against anthropocentrism in 
studying animal behaviour. The experimentations conducted by the scientific institutions 
on animals are, as Costello notes, profoundly anthropocentric. They use human standards 
and logic in constructing their experiments, expecting the animal to be able to, as 
Costello puts it, ‘find … [its] way out of a sterile maze’ (108). According to Costello, 
delivering his report to the scientists, Red Peter was clearly ‘a branded, marked, wounded 
animal presenting himself as speaking testimony to a gathering of scholars’ (70). What 
both Costello and Coetzee see in Red Peter is a tortured animal exposing his wounded 
body to his audience. 
Indeed, human-based experiments tell us nothing about animal consciousness. 
However, what these experiments and what Red Peter’s case imply, despite their 
questioned ethicality, is the possibility of the animal-becoming-human. These 
experiments stand as another proof of the flexibility of boundaries between species. 
Hence, in this part of the discussion, I wish to view Red Peter’s case in a different light. 
Despite the clear ethical ground on which Coetzee, through Costello, and other critics 
stand in approaching Kafka’s story, I, nonetheless, wish to approach Red Peter’s story as 
posthumanist evidence of the possibility of animal-becoming-human. I contend that Red 
Peter becoming-human is a manifestation of species entanglement and dynamic 
becoming. However, the only problem with Red Peter’s becoming is the lack of freedom 
it entails: ‘he’ is forced to become-human. Coetzee’s negative depiction of Red Peter’s 
becoming, therefore, is not a critique of becoming-human per se, but rather a protest 
against the unethical means that led to this becoming. The ethical difference, hence, lies 
in the presence/absence of freedom that accompanies becoming. Consequently, Kafka 
and Coetzee’s negative representation of becoming-human is not about animals crossing 
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the boundaries to humanity, but rather about animals being cruelly forced into becoming-
humans.  
In Red Peter’s case, becoming-human was only possible through subjugation and 
torture. According to Red Peter, he was chased, hit, injured, captured, and caged in a 
hunting expedition. His injury left a ‘large, naked, red scar which earned [him] the name 
of Red Peter’. His second injury, in the hip, left him with a disability (Kafka 251). Red 
Peter himself confesses that he began imitating men not because he wanted to, but 
because it was the only away out (257). Costello imagines what goes on inside the ape’s 
mind during these experiments, or in the process of forcing it to become-human. As she 
explains, the ape is deprived of food until it is hungry, and the only way to satisfy its 
hunger is to reach for the bananas that are hung from a metal wire above the ground. The 
ape can also see three wooden crates. Facing its painful hunger, the ape realises that it is 
required to think. There are possibly many ideas that go through the ape’s mind (who is 
starving me? what have I done?). However, only one of these ideas is correct (how can I 
use the crates to get the bananas?), and the ape ought to guess which one (Costello 72-3). 
The experiments with the ape continue as the method of getting the bananas changes 
every time and the ape is starved until it finds the right thought. However, the main 
thought that goes through the mind of the ape is not about the bananas, but as Costello 
articulates it: ‘Where is home, and how do I get there?’ (75). Indeed, Red Peter explains 
to the community that the only idea that he could think of in the early stages of 
experimentation was to escape confinement (Kafka 253).  
However, forcing such becoming does not make it less real. Red Peter’s becoming 
exhibits many characteristics of Deleuze and Guattari’s criteria of becoming. For 
example, Red Peter notes that his becoming was only possible because he let go of his 
preconceived notions about himself as an ape. As Deleuze and Guattari describe it, 
‘Becoming is an antimemory’ (Thousand 294). Red Peter explains that he could never 
have achieved what he has achieved had he ‘been stubbornly set on clinging to [his] 
origins, to the remembrances of my youth’ (Kafka 250). Here, Red Peter confirms that 
what stands between a being and its becoming is ego—or the sense of separation between 
the self and the world. Once Red Peter has let go of his identity as an ape, he was soon 
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able to move beyond the boundaries and eventually become-human. Moreover, in his 
becoming, Red Peter experienced psychological and physiological changes. For instance, 
he describes his declining desire to escape as a sense of calmness that he has managed to 
acquire as a result of being among men (254). Also, he explains that during his ape days 
he had the ability to bite his way through the lock of his cage. However, after a while, his 
teeth were weakened; now he has to be careful just to be able to crack a nut (255). 
Moreover, not only is Red Peter capable of speaking, reading, shaking hands, and 
enjoying wine, but he also demonstrates a sophisticated logic and excellent command of 
language, exemplified in his witty speech to the academy. 
Furthermore, Red Peter mentions that he often ‘undresses’ in front of visitors to 
show them the place of his injury (251-2). On a different occasion, Costello notes, 
invoking the incident where she uncovered her breasts to Mr Philips to paint her: ‘[a]cts 
like that are not available to animals, who cannot uncover themselves because they do not 
cover themselves’ (150). In his essay, ‘The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to 
Follow)’, Derrida begins by arguing that the story of Genesis, which involved the 
recognition of nudity of Adam and Eve and the shame they felt, was the moment of 
creation of humanity. Besides the human, no other animal feels ashamed to be naked. 
Furthermore, only humans can be described as being ‘nude’; Derrida explains, ‘[t]he 
animal would be in non-nudity because it is nude, and man in nudity to the extent that he 
is no longer nude’ (‘Animal’ 374). Hence, to be able to uncover and be conscious of his 
nudity, Red Peter further demonstrates the reality and extent of his becoming-human.  
However, Red Peter’s becoming is a very specific becoming-human; he is 
becoming-the-Cartesian-Man. In other words, his becoming- is not merely human but 
rather humanist. This becomes rather evident when Red Peter describes the cage in which 
he was first confined as being too small for him to stand or sit, to the point where the bars 
were cutting his flesh. Reflecting upon this memory retrospectively from his new 
humanist perspective, Red Peter remarks that the method he was treated with is in fact 
particularly beneficial for the initial period of confining wild beasts (Kafka 252). 
Furthermore, and despite the torture he went through and the set of experiments dedicated 
to his becoming-human, including his teacher scorching his fur with his pipe out of 
frustration with his slow progress, Red Peter is convinced that his teacher was doing it for 
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his own good, for they were both fighting ‘on the same side against the nature of apes’ 
(257). In his forceful and cruel becoming, Red Peter clearly becomes-his-oppressor. 
Interestingly, Red Peter’s becoming is described in a more linear, gradual, and 
temporal process, with historical points of beginning and end—rather than the types of 
cyclical, fluid, and contingent becomings we find in the discussion of posthumanist 
characters. For instance, Red Peter notes that it has been five years since his 
transformation, and describes his ape days as the past from which he is further and further 
distanced (250). He describes his transformation as consisting of ‘stages’ (251), a 
‘progress’, a ‘development’, an ‘achievement’ (258), a ‘success’ (259), and a journey ‘in 
the right direction’ (255), in which he was able to penetrate, and establish himself in, the 
human world (251) and let go of his ‘past’ as an ape (250). These depictions clearly 
involve temporal and linear-based words with definitive points of beginning and arrival, 
suggesting that Red Peter’s becoming is viewed as an evolutionary, linear, temporal 
model, rather than the QPist model that inherently rejects linearity and progression. 
One of the most significant implications of Red Peter’s becoming-human is that 
both humans and nonhumans equally participate in becoming without having any 
privilege in it. Simultaneous to Red Peter’s becoming-human, another becoming takes 
place—his teacher’s becoming-ape. In his speech to the academy, Red Peter briefly and 
casually mentions that his first teacher turned ‘almost apish’ as a result of training him. 
The teacher was admitted to a mental hospital for a short period (Kafka 258). The 
teacher’s becoming shows the mutuality, arbitrariness, and even unintentionality of 
becoming. Furthermore, as the case of Red Peter shows, becoming is not a moral but an 
ontological phenomenon; hence, the event that emerges is not always favourable. As 
Alain Beaulieu notes, in his reading of Deleuze and Guattari, ‘just like any other 
becoming, non-human becomings of humans do not imply perfect symbiosis. After all, 
these becomings can always be “botched,” rendering possible what might be called 
“natural catastrophes”’ (79). Accordingly, during her speech, Costello makes several 
remarks likening herself to Red Peter (62), and towards the end of her talk, she makes an 
another comment on the similarities between Kafka and Red Peter: ‘Kafka saw both 
himself and Red Peter as hybrids, as monstrous thinking devices mounted inexplicably on 
suffering animal bodies’ (75). Costello proposes that she herself, Kafka, and Red Peter 
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are all monstrous creatures of becoming, stuck between species, suffering, rather than 
rejoicing, in their embodiments. 
Red Peter’s becoming poses many challenges to the idea of becoming as it sheds 
light on the ethical question of becoming and demonstrates how humanism can still 
reside at the heart of the very process of becoming. The case of Red Peter becoming-
human invokes other concerns about the domestication of animals and the lack of 
freedom such becoming involves. Furthermore, Red Peter’s becoming-human poses, or 
rather implies, an important question: without human interventions, will animals ever 
wish to become-human? Although their fictions are full of examples of becoming-animal, 
neither Coetzee nor Kafka provides positive representations of animals positively 
becoming-humans. This implies that, for both authors, desirable becoming is essentially a 
one-way process; it is always the human who needs to become-animal, not the other way 
around. In other words, humans are the ones who need to remember and return to their 
animality. A very problematic humanistic notion underlies this assumption: animality 
here is understood as being the ‘original’ state of humanity, whereas the latter is 
perceived as being unnatural. This view reinforces the divide between nature and 
culture—the source of all divisions. Also, assuming that humans need to return to 
animality contradicts the very core of becoming as being a coreless and an emergent 
event without origins or ends. Becoming-animal, becoming-human, and even becoming-
thing, are equally valid QPist possibilities. 
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2.4. Becoming-Writing/Reading: Coetzee and the Reader 
 
‘Great poets can tell their own stories without once saying “I”, and in doing so, lend 
their voice to all of humanity.’ -Orhan Pamuk (‘Countries’ 1 qtd. in Attwell 27). 
‘If to write is to surrender to the interminable, the writer who consents to sustain 
writing's essence loses the power to say "I."’ (Blanchot 27). 
In the recently published book, J.M. Coetzee and the Life of Writing: Face to 
Face with Time, Attwell mentions that the book could equally be called ‘the life in the 
writing’ (17) because of the strong autobiographical nature of Coetzee’s works. Attwell 
describes Coetzee’s writing as a ‘huge existential enterprise, grounded in fictionalized 
autobiography’ (26). Indeed, the majority of Coetzee’s critics acknowledge the fictional-
autobiographical nature of Coetzee’s work. In fact, Coetzee admits to this entanglement 
between the writer and narrative through Curren’s confession to her daughter: ‘[w]hen I 
write about him [Mr Vercueil] I write about myself. When I write about his dog I write 
about myself; when I write about the house I write about myself’ (Age 9). Coetzee 
acknowledges this entanglement more blatantly in an interview with Attwell where he 
declares, ‘all writing is autobiography: everything that you write, including criticism and 
fiction, writes you as you write it’ (Doubling 17). 
Throughout his fiction, Coetzee is known to create alter egos; his protagonists 
bear so much resemblance to him it is hard for critics to ignore. Perhaps the closest figure 
he creates to himself, not only in terms of views and beliefs but also career and personal 
life, is Elizabeth Costello—an accomplished middle-aged author with strong ethical 
views on animals. Before publishing Elizabeth Costello, Coetzee introduced his 
protagonist when he was invited to give one of the Tanner Lectures at Princeton 1997. 
Instead of giving a lecture, Coetzee read two short stories under the general title ‘The 
Lives of Animals’ (which are published later in the novel). The two stories concern a 
lecturer, Elizabeth Costello, who is also expected to give a lecture on literature but 
instead delivers a speech on animal rights. As Alena Dvorakova rightly puts it, ‘Coetzee 
as the actual speaker of the lectures comes as close to being a Costello as it is possible to 
be between an embodied human and a fictive creation’ (377). During his lecture, Coetzee 
effectively becomes-his-character. Furthermore, carrying his author’s initials, JC, in 
	132	
Diary of a Bad Year, also seems to share many characteristics with Coetzee: he is a South 
African distinguished writer (also a former academic and a vegetarian) who lives in 
Australia. JC also wrote Waiting for the Barbarians. However, there are differences 
between Coetzee and these protagonists. Costello, for instance, is an Australian female 
author who has a son named John. JC is born in 1934 and lives in Sydney, whereas 
Coetzee was born in 1940 and lives in Brisbane. Unlike Coetzee, JC does not have any 
offspring. These protagonists have strong views and opinions on ethical, political, and 
social matters that, to some extent, align with Coetzee’s public views.  
Furthermore, Michael S. Kochin observes that Coetzee’s work is full of what he 
describes as ‘author-figures’. These include Foe and Susan in Foe; Costello in Elizabeth 
Costello, the magistrate in Waiting for the Barbarians, Curren in The Age of Iron, David 
in Disgrace, JC in Diary of a Bad Year, Robinson Crusoe, the author, in his 2003 Nobel 
lecture ‘He and His Man’, and Coetzee himself in his fictionalised memoirs, Boyhood, 
Youth, and Summertime (79). With varying degrees, all of these protagonists intersect 
with Coetzee. They all seem familiar and, at different points in the narratives, Coetzee 
seems to emerge through them. There are, on the other hand, less notable characters that 
allude to Coetzee. For example, John Coetzee in Dusklands seems to be the opposite of 
his author. For instance, while Coetzee, the author, is a compassionate vegetarian, 
Coetzee, the character, a Vietnam-era American bureaucrat, is non-vegan; one of the 
narrators describes this Coetzee as ‘a hearty man, the kind that eats steak daily’ (2).  
Furthermore, Coetzee uses certain events from his life and implements them in 
the narratives. The reader familiar with Coetzee’s life can easily recognise that Pavel’s 
death (which in reality never took place as the real Pavel outlived Dostoevsky) parallels 
the death of Coetzee’s son, Nicolas, who also fell from a high building. While the reader 
can discover some of these allusions in Coetzee’s novels, it is likely that many of them 
remain undiscovered. Attwell’s recent book, however, sheds new light on many 
undiscovered aspects of Coetzee’s life that unfold in his fiction. 
 In his fictionalised autobiographies, or autofiction, to use Serge Doubrovsky’s 
term, Boyhood, Youth, and Summertime, Coetzee blurs the boundaries between 
storytelling and autobiography and deliberately uses fragments of his personal life and 
others that the reader can recognise as fictional, weaving them into the narrative in a way 
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that does not give validity to one over the other. Based on Doubrovsky’s original 
definition of, and Phillip Vilain’s comment on, autofiction, Robert Kusek defines 
‘generic autofiction’ to be the narrative that is presented as completely referential whilst 
simultaneously acting as a novel by ‘welcoming elements of historical inaccuracy’ (101). 
Attwell notes that Coetzee’s texts that are categorised as autobiographies are in fact an 
extension of his fiction; the only difference is the ‘degree of fictionalization’ (Life 26). 
Kusek uses another term, autobiographics, which he borrows from Leigh Gilmore, to 
describe Coetzee’s autobiographies. According to Kusek, autobiographics ‘welcomes 
contradictions and multiple angles’ (102). Through his literary techniques, Coetzee 
successfully transgresses the boundaries between fact/fiction and challenges established 
literary genres.  
Coetzee’s literary techniques seem to align with the QPist ideas of fluidity, 
multiplicity, contingency, and entanglement. He creates versions/parallels/possibilities of 
himself through the manipulation of similarities and differences between himself and his 
protagonists, thus challenging any attempt to separate his life from his fiction. As evident 
in his writing, Coetzee does not believe in one authoritative view that excludes all other 
possibilities. His entire fiction, in fact, resists this type of monopolisation and 
reductionism. By extension, Coetzee does not seem to believe in the existence of the 
possibility of a single, pure, and self-referencing self that is not subject to distortion. 
Coetzee states, ‘[t]he self cannot tell the truth of itself to itself and come to rest without 
the possibility of self-deception’ (Doubling 51). A large part of Coetzee’s writings hence 
remains elusive, existing as possibilities rather than actualised truths, favouring QPist 
parallelism and probability over linearity and definitiveness.  
Consider this statement made by Costello when she is required to write down a 
statement about her beliefs so she can pass through ‘the gate’:  
I am a writer, a trader in fictions, it says. I maintain beliefs only 
provisionally: fixed beliefs would stand in my way. I change beliefs as I 
change my habitation or my clothes, according to my needs. On these 
grounds – professional, vocational – I request exemption from a rule of 
which I now hear for the first time, namely that every petitioner at the gate 
should hold to one or more beliefs (Costello 195). 
	134	
This can be read as a statement that expresses Coetzee’s personal contention, for, 
throughout his fiction, Coetzee clearly demonstrates the same desire not to commit to a 
single belief or position. Costello further clarifies, ‘[i]n my work a belief is a resistance, 
an obstacle. I try to empty myself of resistances’ (200). This understanding of belief as a 
hindrance to becoming-other aligns with the ideas of becoming as an event that requires 
letting go of any pre-existing notions one might have, especially one’s idea of oneself. If 
one must have a belief, then, like Costello, it should be a belief in unbelief (201). The 
woman in charge of the dorm in which Costello stays describes this state of unbelief in 
posthumanist quantum terms, as ‘entertaining all possibilities, floating between 
opposites’ (213). Unbelief is akin the state of superposition which involves maintaining a 
parallel seemingly contradictory stance of affirmation and negation. 
As an author, Coetzee understands that he cannot stand outside of writing. He 
becomes what he writes as much as what he writes becomes him. Writing is thus is an 
intra-active phenomenon; as Coetzee puts it, it ‘writes you as you write it’ (Doubling 
17).1 Wilson Harris expresses the same idea of the artist being both the subject/object of 
his/her creation when he writes: ‘[t]he creator's creation is alive: the sculptor sculpts, and 
is sculpted and subtly changed by what he sculpts, the painter paints, and is transfused by 
what he paints; and all these reciprocities are susceptible to alteration in the mind of 
fiction’ (5). Figure 1 is an artwork by M. C. Escher which can be seen to express the 
same cyclical idea of the artist being simultaneously the subject/object of his/her creation, 
or how the artwork ‘writes you as you write it’, to use Coetzee’s words. 
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Figure 1: ‘Drawing Hands’ (Escher) 
Moreover, the author not only becomes what he writes, or what he writes becomes 
him but also, and most importantly, the author, as he writes, becomes-writing itself. 
Coetzee suggests this becoming in the same interview with Attwell, albeit in different 
words: 
Writing reveals to you what you wanted to say in the first place. In fact, it 
sometimes constructs what you want or wanted to say. What it reveals (or 
asserts) may be quite different from what you thought (or half-thought) you 
wanted to say in the first place. That is the sense in which one can say that 
writing writes us. Writing shows or creates (and we are not always sure we 
can tell one from the other) what our desire was, a moment ago. … I don’t 
see that “straight” autobiographical writing is different in kind from what I 
have been describing. Truth is something that comes in the process of 
writing, or comes from the process of writing’ (Doubling 18). 
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As Coetzee’s words suggest, it is hard to separate the writer from his writing. It is 
impossible to tell which of what is written belongs to the writer and which emerges 
through writing, which is motivated by the writer’s desires and which is restricted by 
language. Writing constitutes an emergent event where the writer becomes one of its 
entangled agencies (along with language, the reader, and the physical tools used in 
writing, to name a few). The author, thus, is not the centre of writing, the creator of 
meaning, or an external witness of the event; rather, the writer is an integral and 
entangled part of the event—the writer-becomes-writing. As Trinh T. Minh-ha puts it, 
‘[t]o write is to become. Not to become a writer (or a poet), but to become, intransitively. 
Not when writing adopts established keynotes or policy, but when it traces for itself lines 
of evasion’ (19 qtd. in Braidotti, Nomadic 16). 
Going back to the overwhelming similarities between the protagonists themselves 
on the one hand, and the protagonists and Coetzee on the other, these parallels entertain 
an intriguing possibility: all of these seemingly different protagonists are in fact different 
becomings of Coetzee himself. Each of the characters can be read as a different becoming 
of Coetzee’s ‘I’; for example, Coetzee becoming-woman in Costello, becoming-Nicolas 
in The Master of Petersburg, becoming-reader in Foe131, becoming-boy in Boyhood, 
becoming-dead in Age of Iron and Summertime. Moreover, and just like his protagonists 
in their paths of becoming, Coetzee, as the hearty non-vegan Vietnam-era American 
official, becomes precisely that which he is not/does not want to become. John, Costello’s 
son, apparently talking about his mother but also talking about Coetzee: ‘[b]ut my mother 
has been a man . . . [s]he has also been a dog. She can think her way into other people, 
into other existences. I have read her; I know. It is within her powers. Isn't that what is 
most important about fiction: that it takes us out of ourselves, into other lives?’ (Costello 
22-3). 
This fragmentation of the author’s voice, through creating narratives in which 
voices cancel each other, is a prominent theme in Coetzee’s fiction. As Faber notes, 
dialogism, a term Coetzee borrows from Mikhail Bakhtin and uses in his analysis of 
Dostoevsky’s work, can equally be applied to his own novels. Coetzee defines dialogism 
as technique that expresses ‘no dominating, central authorial consciousness, and therefore 																																																								
131 I explain this becoming in Chapter Four of the thesis. 
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no claim to truth or authority, only competing voices and discourses’ (‘Artist’). 
Evidently, Coetzee willingly steps out of the author position (or external observer) to 
experience all those modes of becoming. Coetzee, in other words, loses his ego to 
become-his-characters.  
Although there is no central consciousness that directs narrative and claims truth, 
I contend that there is a form of entangled totality that emerges through Coetzee’s fiction. 
This idea corresponds to the quantum law: the sum is not equal to the parts. The similar 
structure and compositions of protagonists suggest an underlying consciousness that 
fragments and manifests itself in different forms across Coetzee’s fiction. I argue that this 
underlying wholeness is only possible to grasp by reading Coetzee’s work collectively 
and, as readers, experiencing these different states of becoming. The reader can enjoy an 
entirely different experience when s/he reads the novels collectively as opposed to the 
experiences s/he has from reading the novels separately. 
This underlying entanglement of Coetzee’s texts/characters suggests a far more 
dynamic narrative that is becoming. Such a narrative cannot be read but only experienced 
by and through the reader as s/he embarks on the journey of reading not only Friday in 
Foe, or David in Disgrace, but reading Coetzee in his work. This underlying narrative is 
one that Coetzee cannot write or control; it is for the reader to write, read, and become. 
Therefore, the reader becomes involved in a much more complex and entangled process 
than reading: s/he is an integral part of the phenomenon of meaning (along with the other 
agencies of meaning, such as the author and the text), which I explain in detail in Chapter 
Four. Furthermore, and since the narratives end with the protagonists in a state of 
suspension/superposition, the reader is invited into the becoming of these characters. S/he 
is expected to go beyond sympathy and become the protagonists by carrying their 
existential angst and beginning his/her own inner journey of recognising his/her own 
becoming.  
Just like the characters, the reader is also required to recognise the simple essence 
of his/her becoming; s/he is not apart from but part of the meaning that emerges. The 
distance between the reader and the text collapses for the reader to become what s/he 
reads. Evidently, we end up with a foundational notion of quantum mechanics: the 
impossibility of an external apparatus/observer (reader/author/text) outside the event 
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(reading/writing/meaning), or the collapse of distinctions between the 
observer/observation/object of observation. In his critical essay on Beckett’s 
‘Unnamable’, Coetzee acknowledges this collapse as he writes, ‘[t]he separation of 
thinker and thought, creator and creature, is a fiction of fiction, one of the internal rules 
by which the game of the novel is played’ (Doubling 38). Through this becoming, all 
boundaries collapse between the event and the agencies of meaning, which translates into 
the impossibility of any exteriority outside the phenomenon of meaning. As Barad 
declares in the context of quantum theory, ‘we are part of that nature that we seek to 
understand’ (26). By the same token, the author and reader are part of the meaning they 
try to understand.  
Reading/writing, therefore, become part of the phenomenon of meaning in the 
quantum sense that does not merely indicate the epistemological inseparability of the 
observer/observed/outcome of measurement (or author/reader/text/meaning); rather, as 
Barad notes, phenomenon here implies ‘the ontological inseparability/entanglement of 
intra-acting "agencies." That is, phenomena are ontologically primitive relations-
relations without preexisting relata’ (Meeting 139). In other words, within the 
phenomenon of meaning, there are no inherent pre-existing distinctions between, or 
values of, the entangled agencies of meaning. Also, meaning emerges through the intra-
action of these agencies. 
This understanding of the role of the reader/author/text within and of the 
phenomenon of meaning is a marked break with the traditional role of the reader as an 
external agent or even as a participant in the concretisation of the literary work—as 
proposed by Roman Ingarden and Wolfgang Iser, and their ideas on the intentionality of 
the reader and author in the literary process.132 Furthermore, it challenges E. D. Hirsch’s 
distinction between meaning (as intended by the author) and significance (as perceived 
by the reader and the critic), for meaning, as a phenomenon, can only emerge, and be 
understood, through entanglement. This vital understanding of the extent of the organic 
entanglement of the critic/reader/author/character within the phenomenon of meaning 																																																								
132 For more, see Ingarden’s The Literary Work of Art: An Investigation on the Borderlines of Ontology, 
Logic, and Theory of Literature and Iser’s The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response. It is 
difficult to speak of such ‘intentionality’ as proposed and developed by Ingarden and Iser without falling, 
once again, into the Cartesian agency in analysing the literary process. 
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carries many more radical implications that have the potential to revolutionise our 
understanding of, and applications in, literary criticism. 
This QPist understanding of the nature of reading/writing/becoming creates a need 
for a new understanding of agency to replace the traditional, now empty, position of the 
reader/author/subject. Barad proposes a useful reworking of agency as she explains, 
‘[a]gency is not held, it is not a property of persons or things; rather, agency is an 
enactment, a matter of possibilities for reconfiguring entanglements’ (‘Interview’). This 
new understanding does not propose the need to locate agency in the author, the reader, 
or the text. Rather, it proposes the view of agency as an emergent quality of the 
entanglement and dynamic configurations within the phenomenon of meaning.  
Furthermore, Barad provides a relevant insight into ‘knowing’ as ‘an ongoing 
performance of the world’ that is not bounded to the closed practice of an external 
‘knower’ that ‘knows’ from above or outside (149). Similarly, meaning should be 
realised as an ongoing irreducible phenomenon that is determined not by the author and 
the reader (as external subjects/enforcers of meaning), or the text (as an external object of 
meaning). Addressing Maximov, Dostoevsky describes reading as the following: ‘reading 
is being the arm and being the axe and being the skull; reading is giving yourself up, not 
holding yourself at a distance and jeering.’ (47). Dostoevsky’s statement clearly 
illustrates the QPist understanding of reading where the reader is not the doer/actor, and 
where reading becomes the very subject of its own manifestation: reading is being the 
arm, the axe and the skull. Unlike the traditional notion of agency, QPist grants agency 
not to the human or nonhuman, but to the very phenomenon that emerges.  
To distinguish the agencies of meaning (for analytic and practical purposes) 
within this holistic and entangled view of the phenomenon of meaning, a dynamic 
flexible distinction is introduced to the phenomenon, which Barad refers to as the 
‘agential cut’ (Meeting 140) between the subject/object. This subject/object cut, as Barad 
explains, does not at all indicate ‘absolute exteriority’ but is a rather play of shadows, 
darkness, and light, that exhibit ‘exteriority within’ (135). In my discussion, I 
intentionally refer to this interior cut by using (/) to indicate the flexible, emergent, yet 
non-inherent distinction between subject/object, reader/author/meaning, 
reading/writing/becoming, and so forth. Analogous to this agential cut is the Heisenberg 
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cut in quantum theory that temporarily separates what is otherwise a coherent quantum 
world based on wave function. Similarly, Heisenberg’s epistemological cut does not pre-
exist the phenomenon but rather emerges through it. 
This final conclusion allows us to grasp the essence of the posthuman world, post-
author narrative, and post-reader reading: a world without Man as a centre of its 
becoming, a narrative in which the author, as he writes, is written, a reading where the 
reader is part of the meaning s/he understands. Through QPist’s reworking of agency, the 
events of reading/writing/becoming replace the traditional subjects (reader/author/ 
protagonist) in the phenomenon of meaning. Within a QPist framework, it becomes thus 
possible to refer to reading without a reader, writing without an author, and becoming 
without a subject. The absence of the subject/reader/author as external observers/subjects 
only means that they become part of the phenomenon they were thought to stand outside. 
In other words, the absence of the subject in posthumanism is not true absence; it is only 
the aftermath of the collapse of the illusory, representationalist space between the subject 
and the world. Without such a space, there is nothing, and no need for anything, outside, 
or beyond. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Inside Out: Things, Objects, and Extended Becoming in Coetzee’s Slow Man 
 
‘At such moments even a negligible creature, a dog, a rat, a beetle, a stunted apple tree, 
a cart track winding over a hill, a mossy stone, counts more for me than a night of bliss 
with the most beautiful, most devoted mistress. These dumb and in some cases inanimate 
creatures press toward me with such fullness, such presence of love, that there is nothing 
in range of my rapturous eye that does not have life. It is as if everything, everything that 
exists, everything I can recall, everything my confused thinking touches on, means 
something.’-Hugo von Hofmannsthal ‘Letter of Lord Chandos to Lord Bacon’ (1902). 
(qtd. in Coetzee, Costello 226). 
 
This chapter explores the nature of things and objects and the role of these 
inanimate beings in the process of extended becoming in Coetzee’s novel Slow Man. 
Through a reading of the life of Paul Rayment after a car accident that led to his 
disability, the chapter aligns with the earlier QPist discussions by stressing the 
inevitability of entanglement, the contingency of agency, and the flexibility of boundaries 
not only between the subject/object, but also between the body/environment. Although 
primarily focused on Coetzee’s Slow Man, the discussion will also refer to relevant 
moments from Elizabeth Costello and Life and Times of Michael K. 
The chapter begins by briefly staging a discussion of objects and agency. It is then 
divided into two main parts; the first, ‘Extended Becoming’, explores how the body 
extends into its surroundings, blurring the boundaries between the subject/object, 
body/environment, animate/inanimate, and internal/external. I develop the term extended 
becoming based on Clark’s work on extended cognition and his contention of the 
impossibility of an internal, separated, and local cognition that is not constantly shaped, 
defined, and affected by the environment (Supersizing xxviii). I discuss instances of 
Paul’s life after his leg amputation and the possible mobility aids/substitutes offered to 
him, including the crutches, the Zimmer frame, and limb prosthesis.  
The second part, ‘On Things’, explores Bill Brown’s work on thing theory, 
including his ideas on the thingness of things and the strangeness of things. I demonstrate 
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how these ideas provide a refreshing contrast to the notion of extended becoming 
discussed in the first part. I look closely at several moments where Paul is interrupted by 
the thingness of things—including the thingness of his own body. This contrast 
demonstrates that while the human body is confronted by its own thingness, the thing 
emerges as a dynamic, living entity.  By demonstrating the inseparable and intra-active 
relationship between animate and inanimate becomings, the chapter thus brings matter to 
life and returns the human to matter. 
This chapter carries what seem to be two completely different, if not 
contradictory, arguments. The first is that objects are extensions of the human’s becoming 
body. The second is that things are strange; they are entities distinct from human 
cognition and reside outside its linguistic realms. Nevertheless, these two arguments 
carry at their heart the Heideggerian distinction (advanced by Brown) between things and 
objects; objects are entities that serve common functions (hence extended), while things 
are objects that no longer serve their function (hence distinctive). Furthermore, the two 
arguments are essentially built on the same premise: inanimate and animate entities exist 
on the same ontological and quantum level and share the same degree of entanglement. 
Brought together, I hope to demonstrate how these two arguments show that inanimate 
entities might be seen as equally extended and distinctive, familiar and strange. 
 
3.1. Objects and Agency 
In his book, What is a Thing? (1967), Heidegger brings the subject and the object 
poles closer together. He casts doubt upon the distinction between subject and object and 
the relationship that is normally seen to govern them (27). However, in his influential 
book, We Have Never Been Modern (1991), Latour criticises Heidegger’s analysis for 
effectively maintaining the modernist gap in his use of the terms ‘subject’ and ‘object’, 
noting that our world is full of hybrids, of what he calls, borrowing Michel Serres’ terms, 
quasi-objects and quasi-subjects (51). As Latour puts it, ‘things do not exist without 
being full of people’ (‘Berlin’ 10), and, equally, people are full of things. Indeed, 
Latour’s concept of hybridisation is ontologically and semantically equivalent to the 
notion of entanglement as it asserts the impossibility of achieving a cleanly cut 
distinction between subject/object. Latour’s argument resonates with the laws of quantum 
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physics; the complexity and contingency of the phenomenon and the instability of agency 
translate into the impossibility of the breaking of the phenomenon into isolated and fixed 
components with intrinsic qualities that could be accurately referred to as subject and 
object.  
In Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy (2004), Latour 
argues that objects that act are not actors but actants. Latour defines actant as anything 
whose actions ‘modify other actors’. In other words, actants do not take action in the 
narrow humanist, intentional sense; rather, they produce an effect, which is a common 
trait of both humans and nonhumans (75). Although the word actant is meant to avoid 
‘any traces of anthropocentrism’, Latour, nonetheless, does not provide a radical 
reworking of the notion of agency; actor and actant are more similar than they are 
different. Actant seems to be a way of re-distributing agency and attempting to replace 
the Subject with the Object. This is also evident in the ‘Parliament of Things’ where 
Latour stresses the rights of Objects. On a similar note, commenting on Jean 
Baudrillard’s declaration that the subject controls the world and its history whereas the 
object is  ‘shamed, obscene, passive’, Brown notes that Baudrillard's assertions about the 
Object (and its history) ‘threatens the subject no more than it threatens (by absorbing) 
both objects and things’ (8). Therefore, replacing the actor with the actant, the Subject 
with the Object, does not render the dilemma of agency less problematic. 
Nevertheless, in a QPist framework, the very definition of agency needs to be 
addressed. Barad’s notion of agential realism is the most significant recent attempt to 
rework the concept of agency in the light of quantum entanglement.133 Agency, according 
to Barad, ‘is a matter of intra-acting; it is an enactment, not something that someone or 																																																								
133 In her essay, ‘Getting Real: Technoscientific Practices and the Materialization of Reality’, Barad 
explains the term agential realism. She writes, 
[agential realism] is an epistemological and ontological framework that extends Bohr's 
insights and takes as its central concerns the nature of materiality, the relationship 
between the material and the discursive, the nature of "nature" and of "culture" and the 
relationship between them, the nature of agency, and the effects of boundary, including 
the nature of exclusions that accompany boundary projects. Agential realism entails a 
reformulation of both of its terms - "agency" and "realism" - and provides an 
understanding of the role of human and nonhuman factors in the production of 
knowledge, thereby moving considerations of epistemic practices beyond the traditional 
realism versus social constructivism debates (89). 
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something has’ (Meeting 214). Barad notes that she intentionally tries to stay away from 
words such as ‘agent’ and even ‘actant’ because they do not represent the relational 
ontology to which she is committed. It is not the position or the degree of agency that is 
at stake, but rather the idea of agency itself. As Barad argues, agency is not a property of 
the animate or inanimate entity; it is the expression of possibilities and accountability 
involved in the formation of entanglements (‘Interview’). This understanding of agency 
aligns with my conclusion in Chapter Two: there is no actor (or actant)—only action. 
The QPist agency is thus defined in a way that an agent, in the Cartesian sense, is no 
longer needed.  
Although this may seem self-evident at this point, it is nevertheless worth 
stressing that my concern here is not the role that objects play in the lives of human 
subjects. Questions regarding how objects constitute human subjects, threaten them, 
change them, and determine their relations with other subjects, as Brown notes, ‘hardly 
abandon the subject, even when they do not begin there’ (7). Consequently, the chapter 
does not deal with matter as a medium or a facilitator for the subject’s feelings and 
desires, because, as Barad argues, materiality itself is agentive: ‘[it] is always already a 
desiring dynamism, a reiterative reconfiguring, energized and energizing, enlivened and 
enlivening’ (‘Interview’). As Barad proposes, instead of viewing matter as being acted 
upon by humans, or the alternative view of acting upon humans, matter, instead, becomes 
an event; it is, therefore, not a static and fixed quality of things or an outcome of certain 
processes. Instead, matter is constantly becoming ‘produced and productive, generated 
and generative’ (137). Evidently, this new QPist view of matter emphasises matter’s 
contingency, emergence, relationality, entanglement, and intra-activity, and abandons 
traditional notions of matter as fixed, inherent, external, passive, and receptive, as well as 
the reactive views of matter that portrays it as the new replacement of the subject.  
Consequently, the subject/object distinction becomes an emergent, flexible, and 
relational ‘agential cut’ (Barad, Meeting 140) limited to, and within the limits of, the 
measured/observed event. As shall be further explained, the object is always an object-
subject, and the subject is inevitably a subject-object. Such a view bridges the gap 
between animate and inanimate beings. Russian constructivist Aleksandr Rodchenko 
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declares, ‘[o]ur things in our hands must be equals, comrades’ (qtd in. Brown 10). Things 
are our equals in the sense that they are becoming as phenomena, indiscriminately and 
indistinguishably entangled with our own and the world’s becoming, sharing and 
constituting not only our lives but also our destiny. 
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3.2. Extended Becoming 
 
‘[O]nce the hegemony of skin and skull is usurped, we may be able to see ourselves more 
truly as creatures of the world’ (Clark & Chalmers 18). 
Before I explain what I mean by extended becoming, it is important to outline the 
‘source’ theory—extended cognition [EC], developed initially in the influential paper 
‘The Extended Mind’ (1998), by Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers, and later advanced 
in the work of Andy Clark, and in particular, his book Supersizing the Mind (2008).134 As 
Chalmers notes in his foreword to the book, while Clark’s work is the most extensive in 
developing the theory specifically in such terms, the prospect of the extended mind can 
be traced in older works and has its roots in the writings of Dewey, Heidegger, and 
Wittgenstein (x).135 
The traditional view of cognition, which Clark calls the brainbound model (xxv) 
and which Mark Rowlands refers to, in his book The New Science of the Mind: From 
Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology, as Cartesian cognitive science (2), holds 
the unquestioned presumption that human cognitive processes are located in the brain. On 
the other hand, the new model of cognition, which Clark and Rowlands refer to as 
extended cognition and the new science of the mind, respectively, holds that cognitive 
processes are not located in a specific area of the human body; they depend on internal 
and environmental factors equally. According to the extended model, not all the 
mechanisms of the mind exist in the head; local cognitive operations involve complex 
knots of ‘feedback, feed-forward, and feed-around loops: loops that promiscuously criss-
cross the boundaries of brain, body, and world’ (Clark xxviii). Cognition, thus, as Clark 
																																																								
134 Clark dedicates other works to his theory, such as Being There: Putting Brain, Body and World 
Together Again (1998), Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human 
Intelligence (2003), and ‘Magic Words: How Language Augments Human Computation’ (1998). 
135 Chalmers further notes that recent authors have similarly argued that consciousness lies partly outside 
the head, such as Fred Dretske (1996), J. C. Fisher (2007), and M. G. Martin (2004). The difference 
between the arguments of these authors and the extended model is that the latter emphasises the ‘two-way 
coupling between the organism and the environment’, which is fundamental to the EC thesis (Chalmers 
xv). 
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declares, ‘leaks out into body and world’.136 This extended cognition is non-Cartesian: 
what it is concerned with, as Rowlands puts it, ‘is the mental processes, and not whatever 
it is that has them’ (8). In other words, it is concerned with the event rather than the 
subject/object of the event. Rowlands’ statement is posthumanist at heart; it refuses to 
replace the human ‘cogniser’ with another –er; instead, it views the cognitive process as 
agentive. 
Closely related to the EC thesis is the 4E cognition approach, which helps 
reconcile the idea of embodiment with EC.137 The 4Es stand for embodied, embedded, 
enactive, and extended.138 Cognition is embodied: largely dependent on what governs the 
organism’s embodiment; it is embedded: crucially determined by our relations and our 
surrounding environment; it is enactive: influenced by aspects of the activities carried out 
by the organism; finally, cognition is extended: not limited to the boundaries of the 
organism (Ward & Stapleton 89-90). These different aspects of the 4E cognition, as we 
shall come to see, perfectly correspond with the QPist idea of becoming that was 
advanced in the previous chapter. 
 
3.2.1. Extended Becoming 
However, I am not arguing for EC per se. I am extending the argument into what I 
shall call extended becoming [EB]. In other words, I am proposing that extension is not 
only limited to cognition but also includes the whole entity as it is becoming—emerging 
within and of the world. Indeed, Clark and Chambers have already proposed that the EC 
thesis can be extended. Chalmers believes that ‘[i]t is natural to ask whether the extended 																																																								
136 One of the implications of this model is that environmental engineering becomes self-engineering. As 
Clark explains, when we construct our physical world, we are simultaneously constructing and expanding 
our cognitive abilities (xxviii). 
137 The 4E approach is by no means a homogeneous theory. It involves a wide array of works and authors 
that deal with at least one aspect of cognition. Despite having a more or less common ground between these 
different accounts, the 4E approach does not offer a consistent theory that encompasses all aspects of 
cognition and what is written about them. For more on the different stances within the theory, see Richard 
Menary’s ‘Introduction to the Special Issue on 4E Cognition’. However, as a method, 4E cognition 
proposes a way to see the complementarity and complexity of aspects of cognition. Dave Ward and Mog 
Stapleton summarise the authors and the works on each aspect of 4E cognition; these include: The 
embodied, (Haugeland, 1998; Clark, 1997; Gallagher, 2000); 
the embedded, (Haugeland, 1998; Clark, 1997; Hurley, 1998,); the enactive, (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 
1991; Hurley, 1998; Noë, 2004; Thompson 2007); and the extended (Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Hurley, 
1998; Clark, 2008) (89-90). 
138 Rowlands provides a thorough explanation of each factor. For more, see The New Science of the Mind 
(51). 
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mind thesis might itself be extended’ (xiv). The ‘coupling’ of the two words (extended + 
becoming) is crucial as it entails the most fundamental QPist qualities: entanglement, 
intra-action, contextuality, relationality, and fluidity. In EB, the human and nonhuman 
entities are openly entangled, becoming (which includes, but is not exclusive to, the 
processes of coupling and decoupling), within their environments. Similarly, the 4E 
cognition theory can extend to the whole entity rather than being limited to its cognitive 
processes; the becoming entity is embodied, embedded, enactive, and effective. 
A great part of the reason I see EB as more sufficient than EC is that it is as hard 
to separate cognition from the entity itself, as it is hard to separate cognition from the 
environmental factors as the EC thesis holds. In other words, for the same reasons Clark 
and Chalmers saw the difficulty of limiting cognition to inner processes alone, I find a 
similar difficulty in separating cognition from whatever that is normally assumed to be 
not cognitive. Moreover, based on quantum entanglement, it is hard to separate the entity 
that is cognising as opposed to the thing that is being cognised. The idea of cognition 
itself becomes limiting/limited and isolating/isolated.  To understand the paradox of EC, 
we should ask the question: what is it that is part of us that is not cognitive, or not related 
to cognition?139 Let us consider Chalmers proposition of what the extended mind could 
extend to: ‘[w]hat about extended desires, extended reasoning, extended perception, 
extended imagination, and extended emotions?’ (xiv). All that Chalmers proposes here 
are cognitive processes of a human being, hence already part of the extended cognition 
theory. Clark and Chalmers also make a similar suggestion in their co-authored essay: 
‘[d]oes the extended mind imply an extend self? It seems so’ (18). Again, it would be 
difficult to imagine a ‘self’ that is not largely and integrally composed of, and defined by, 
cognitive processes. In other words, it would be rather hard to find something of which 
any entity is constituted that is not already entangled with its cognition, from its most 
abstract thoughts down to its very atoms. In his book, A Treatise of Human Nature, 
David Hume writes, ‘when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always 																																																								
139 This question invokes the works of the pioneers of the embodied mind theory such as Humberto 
Maturana, Francisco Varela, and Evan Thomson. They see the mind as emergent and propose that 
intelligence (from an evolutionary perspective) is a property of everything that survives. For more see The 
Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (1991). Thompson’s Mind in Life 
Thompson (2007), for instance, demonstrates the entanglement of mind and life, where the two share 
common foundational properties.   
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stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or 
hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and 
never can observe any thing but the perception’ (165). Hume’s passage is an excellent 
example of the posthumanist coreless self (I discuss in Chapter Two) and what I am 
proposing here as the concept of EB. Hume entertains the idea of embodiment 
(perception) and also embeddedness (heat, cold, light, shade). What he describes as ‘self’ 
is constantly emerging and becoming every aspectival possibility without actually being 
reducible to any one of them. Most importantly, Hume’s ‘self’ never claims to be distinct 
from what it experiences. One’s self, cognition, body, and environment are evidently 
inseparable in the perpetual process of becoming. 
Paradoxically, in the traditional view of cognition (i.e. brainbound or Cartesian 
cognitive science), where cognition has a locus (brain/mind), the word ‘cognition’ is 
perfectly justified, as it includes the processes that were thought to be brain-exclusive; 
therefore, cognition is often simply understood to be the newest scientific term for 
thinking, whereas thinking is assumed to be a Cartesian activity that happens in the mind 
reinterpreted as the brain. However, in EC, cognitive processes are so entangled and 
embedded it is almost impossible to separate from everything else to the point where the 
word cognition seems redundant. Hence, the need for a more holistic alternative to the 
word cognition rises: becoming.  
One of the main differences between cognition and becoming is that while 
cognition is conventionally thought to be limited to animate entities, becoming includes 
both animate and inanimate entities. Also, while the word cognition, despite EC, remains 
suspiciously Cartesian or, at least, with Cartesian residues, becoming, on the other hand, 
is strictly posthumanist. Moreover, while cognition implies mental processes for the most 
part, becoming suggests the entanglement between the physical and nonphysical 
processes and the move beyond the illusion of any separation. It is interesting to see that 
Chalmers makes a prediction similar to the idea being advanced here, namely that EC 
could extend to include the physical: ‘it is plausible that it is precisely the nonconscious 
part of them [cognitive processes] that is extended. I think there is no principled reason 
why the physical basis of consciousness could not be extended in a similar way’ (xiv). 
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Similarly, Clark hints towards an holistic view that underlies the extended mind theory 
when he states, ‘it is relatively unsurprising if what we think, do, and perceive all turn out 
to be in some sense deeply intertwined’ (xxvi). These two statements are further reasons 
why the word cognition falls short whereas the word becoming constitutes a much more 
suitable alternative for the premises of the extended thesis.  
Furthermore, one of my main reservations about EC is that it problematically 
assumes that cognition depends on an external environment. Although Clark and 
Chalmers assert that EC proposes a new variation of externalism, which they call active 
externalism, and describe as being ‘based on the active role of the environment in driving 
cognitive processes’ (Clark & Chalmers 7); nevertheless, a QPist stance organically 
rejects the idea of externalism altogether. As previously argued, the work of many 
quantum theorists and scientists, most notably Bohr, demonstrates the impossibility of 
externalism. The boundaries that are thought to distinguish the entity from its 
surroundings do not indicate ‘absolute exteriority’; they are, as Barad describes them, a 
play of shadows, darkness, and light that exhibit ‘exteriority within’ (135). 
Moreover, EB perfectly corresponds with the idea of quantum decoherence140. 
Quantum decoherence happens when the quantum system observed is not perfectly 
isolated from its surroundings, which leads to the gradual loss of quantum coherence and 
behaviour. Decoherence is a manifestation of the spontaneous entanglement between the 
quantum system and its surroundings where the system ‘leaks’ into the environment. It 
thus demonstrates the EB impossibility of separation between the entity as a becoming 
system within the environment.  
Aligning with QP, EB undermines the boundaries between the body/environment. 
Objects become an integral part of our becomings, sharing with us not only one of our 																																																								
140 It is important here to distinguish between the collapse of wave function and decoherence, which 
equally result in the loss of quantum behaviour and the disappearance of the interference pattern in the 
double-slit experiment. The difference, however, is that while the wave function collapse exhibits the loss 
of the interference pattern as a result of measurement, decoherence takes place when no collapse is 
observed, but the disappearance of the interference pattern is thought to be due to the spontaneous 
entanglement between the quantum system and the environment (Bacciagaluppi). For a thorough 
explanation of the phenomenon of decoherence as a manifestation of the quantum entanglement between 
the system and the environment, see Erich Joos, H. Dieter Zeh, and Claus Kiefer's Decoherence and the 
Appearance of a Classical World in Quantum Theory (1996). 
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most intimate acts—our thinking—but also every atom of our existence. As Haraway 
rightly asks in her manifesto: ‘[w]hy should our bodies end at the skin, or include at best 
other beings encapsulated by skin?’ (178). Haraway’s question, although seemingly 
metaphorical, is, in fact, very literal. The bodily boundaries that appear to determine 
where the body ends and where the environment begins are, according to the scientific 
research on vision, optical illusions. An example to demonstrate this is in one of the 
lectures of Nobel laureate physicist Richard Feynman on ‘the mechanisms of sight’. 
Feynman states, 
The fact that there is an enhancement of contours has long been known; in 
fact it is a remarkable thing that has been commented on by psychologists 
many times. In order to draw an object, we have only to draw its outline. 
How used we are to looking at pictures that have only the outline! What is 
the outline? The outline is only the edge difference between light and dark 
or one color and another. It is not something. It is not, believe it or not, 
that every object has a line around it! There is no such line. It is only in 
our own psychological makeup that there is a line (36-1). 
The boundaries or edges are not determined visually or even ontologically. As Barad 
comments, in the case of a hand holding a mug, it is wrong to assume that there is a 
certain number of atoms that constitute the hand and another that constitute the mug. 
Looking closely at an edge, Barad notes, one cannot see harsh boundaries between light 
and dark but instead a cluster of light and dark bands, or what Barad calls ‘a diffraction 
pattern’ (Meeting 156). Furthermore, vision is only part of seeing, as Barad continues, 
‘[i]nteracting with (or rather, intra-acting "with" and as part of) the world is part and 
parcel of seeing’ (157). Evidently, seeing, as a cognitive ability, can only be explained 
through the holistic act of becoming. 
If bodies are without exterior boundaries, then the very notion of the body needs 
to be revisited. Bodies, both human and nonhuman, are not objects with intrinsic 
properties and stable boundaries; rather, they are ‘material-discursive phenomena’, 
constantly becoming ‘through the world's iterative intra-activity’ (Barad 152). Bodies, 
hence, are not ‘already there’; they become through certain practices (157). This applies 
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not only to the ‘contours of the body’ but also down to the very atoms that make up its 
being. Due to the dynamic, flexible, and emergent constitution of the human and 
nonhuman bodies, they are, hence, always ‘open to contestation’ (153). Bodies are, thus, 
not closed systems; they are open circuits of intra-action. Seaman explains that 
posthumanist bodies are released from all the ideological constraints and are allowed to 
‘roam free’ and connect with other animate and inanimate entities (248).  
An example of the integration between the animate entity and inanimate entity is 
Paul and the crutches with which he is provided after the accident. After his leg 
amputation, Paul uses the crutches which soon become ‘second nature’ to him (35). For 
Paul, the crutches are not external; they are an integral part of his everyday life, actions, 
and capabilities, as much as, and in the same manner, his old leg used to be. As Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty puts it, ‘[t]o get used to a hat, a car or a stick is to be transplanted into 
them, or conversely, to incorporate them into the bulk of our own body’ (Phenomenology 
166). Similar to Merleau-Ponty’s blind man’s stick, Paul’s crutches have ‘ceased to be an 
object for him, and is no longer perceived for itself’ (165). The crutches have become 
points (joints) of strength, expanding the power of his body, and widening the 
possibilities of his mobility. Through becoming, the crutches are not foreign to Paul’s 
body; rather, they merge with and become his body. As a person with a similar disability, 
Nancy Mairs explains such an integration: ‘the wheelchair I experience is not “out there” 
for me to observe, any more than the rest of my body, and I'm invariably shocked at the 
sight of my self hunched in its black framework of aluminum and plastic’ (46). In a 
similar manner, Paul’s body and his crutches are integrated with his own becoming; Clark 
and Chalmers describe this merging as a ‘coupled system’, where ‘the human organism is 
linked with an external entity in a two-way interaction, creating a coupled system that can 
be seen as a cognitive system in its own right’ (8). However, for EB, this coupling is not 
exclusive to Paul’s cognitive abilities but extends to his entire becoming.  
The criterion against which Clark and Chalmers judge the success of the coupling 
is that in the case of removing what they call the ‘external component’ of the system, the 
behavioural competence should inevitably drop (8-9). In Paul’s case, not having his 
crutches means he is unable to walk properly. The crutches become central to his actions 
in the same way that a leg would. Crutches, therefore, are not just ‘external props and 
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aids’; they become ‘deep and integral part of the problem-solving system’ (Clark, 
Cyborgs 5) that we call the body. In such integrations, the body does not distinguish the 
‘organic’ from the ‘inorganic’. This is evident in the cases of body ownership or body 
transfer illusion141. In such cases, the body perceives inorganic parts and reacts to them 
as if they were its own. Furthermore, these cases can be induced by manipulating visual 
perception and providing visual and sensory alternatives that interfere with the body’s 
own signals.142 
However, as Clark and Chalmers note, a sensible objection to the proposition that 
the inorganic parts behave as extensions of the body as much as organic ones is based on 
the chances of breakdown or potential decoupling. They respond to such objection by 
rightly noting that the brain, in the case of EC (and the body in case of EB), faces similar 
risks; in fact, cognition/body abilities diminish or decline in cases of sleep, intoxication, 
and extreme emotions. The rule of thumb for Clark and Chalmers is ‘[i]f the relevant 
capacities are generally there when they are required, this is coupling enough’ (11).  
Notably, Paul’s accident and the following surgery where his leg gets mutilated 
demonstrate a permanent decoupling of ‘organic’ parts of the body.  Paul uses the words 
‘unstrung’ to describe the experience of decoupling—the loss of his leg: ‘[u]nstrung: that 
is the word that comes back to him from Homer. The spear shatters the breastbone, blood 
spurts, the limbs are unstrung, the body topples like a wooden puppet’ (Slow 27). In fact, 
the decoupling Paul experiences, in his view, is far more profound than ordinary 
decoupling; it changes the very definition of his body from an able into a disabled body. 
Clearly, Paul maintains the idea of his body as an independent, closed off system with 
well-defined, fixed, and pre-determined borders. Consequently, he feels that his body 
sans his leg is no longer complete: ‘[a] man not wholly a man, then: a half-man, an after-
man, like an after-image’ (33-4).  
However, in EB, the term disability becomes rather redundant. Looking at the 
body not as an object but rather as a perpetually becoming event cancels the distinction 																																																								
141 I do not agree with the word ‘illusion’ as it carries Cartesian presumptions about what is considered real 
or illusory in our relations to objects. 
142 A famous experiment of this nature is Ehrsson, Spence, and Passingham (2004) study on the ‘rubber 
hand illusion’, where the original left hand is concealed, and a real-looking left hand is positioned as an 
extension of their body. When both the right (organic) and left (inorganic) hand are stroked simultaneously 
and using the same movement, participants report feeling the left inorganic hand as if it were as their own. 
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between ‘able’ and ‘disabled’ bodies. The human body’s pairing with tools and devices 
happens to all types of bodies. All bodies are, thus, hybrids, cyborged: ‘able’ bodies rely 
on tools and devices in the same way ‘disabled’ bodies do. In other words, all bodies 
connect with objects to maximise their competence in everyday life. The coupling of 
‘normal’ bodies, however, is often unnoticed because only when the body breaks down, 
when it stops working or functioning properly—revealing its thingness—that its relation 
to its surroundings is first noticed (Barad, Meeting 158). Furthermore, ‘able’ bodies are 
not inherently more sufficient; their efficiency is a result of the appropriation of 
structures that favour ‘normal’ and exclude all other types of bodies. As Nayer notes, it is 
not a case of a body that is unable to deal with the structure; it is a case of a structure that 
is unable to accommodate different bodies. Structures co-evolve with ‘able’ bodies; 
however, for ‘disabled’ ones, co-evolution ‘takes a different route’ (146). The 
construction of the environment, as Barad puts it, is carried with the image of ‘“normal” 
embodiment in mind’ (158).  
Not having his leg means that Paul has a choice to integrate with other devices. 
Beside the crutches and the standard Zimmer frame, there are other options available for 
him: ‘from a device that adds wheels and a safety brake to the quadrangular Zimmer 
frame, to a vehicle with a battery-powered motor and a steering bar and a retractable rain-
hood, intended for advanced cripples’ (Slow 35). Paul’s body becomes a creative locus of 
possibilities, where various devices could couple with his body, giving him different 
options, experiences, becomings and, most notably, bodies. Paul’s body, hence, might not 
be seen as disabled but rather enabled through various potential and innovative 
configurations with different objects.  
However, of all the potential devices available to him, the most important and 
anticipated device Paul might obtain is the artificial limb. Nonetheless, Paul firmly and 
repeatedly refuses to have a prosthesis installed. Paul justifies his refusal by claiming that 
he dislikes fakes and wants to feel natural (59). When Ljuba, Marijana’s little daughter, 
asks him if he has an artificial leg, his response is that his leg is ‘all natural’ without any 
screws—just bones inside (55), and that if he had screws he would be ‘a mechanical man’ 
which he obviously is not (56).  
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Clearly, Paul’s reason for refusing the prosthesis is based on the same premise 
that rejects the idea of EB. It can be traced back to the profound belief in the 
nature/culture divide, or what Latour describes as the modern process of purification 
whereby a division exists between what is considered natural and what is considered 
cultural (Never 10-11). Here, what is natural (the human body) and what is artificial (the 
prosthesis) are viewed as intrinsically and fundamentally different. Their coupling is 
superficial as it maintains the boundaries of each entity without true integration. 
Although all the devices offered will equally couple with his body and become an 
extension of his becoming, Paul, nonetheless, refuses the prosthesis but accepts the 
crutches. By resembling, in their construction and appearance, the ‘real leg’, the 
prosthesis declares its desire to become part of the body, and not just to couple with it, 
which Paul is not ready to accept. The crutches, on the other hand, are far less blatant in 
their desire to become part of the human anatomy. In other words, while the crutches 
maintain clear and distinct semiotic and visual boundaries between themselves and the 
body: (wooden, slim, and not resembling the human anatomy); the prosthesis, on the 
other hand, does the exact opposite—it deliberately attempts to blur the visual and 
semiotic boundaries between itself and the body to which it is attached: (realistic looking 
in terms of shape, size, feel, and colour). This distinction can be clearly read in Paul’s 
reaction to the prosthesis:  
But if this fleshly object is repulsive, how much more so a leg moulded 
out of pink plastic with a hinge at the top and a shoe at the bottom, an 
apparatus that you strap yourself to in the morning and unstrap yourself 
from at night and drop on the floor, shoe and all! He shudders at the 
thought of it; he wants nothing to do with it. Crutches are better. Crutches 
are at least honest (Slow 58). 
Wearing the prosthesis implies the acceptance of the diminishment of the sacredness of 
the human body and the reduction of the post-industrial gap between the human and 
machines. By refusing to wear the prosthesis, Paul’s body is still not immune to being 
‘cyborged’ through his use of the crutches, which only help in maintaining his illusion of 
the separation between his body and the world. 
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To refute the idea of the unconditional familiarity of the ‘normal/organic’ parts of 
the body and the indiscriminate alienation of the ‘inorganic/fake/inanimate’ extensions, 
Paul’s accident reveals that even organic parts of the body can feel ‘foreign’, whereas 
extended parts can feel ‘natural’. After he wakes up in the hospital, and before his 
amputation, Paul becomes self-conscious of the strangeness of his right leg: ‘[h]e tries to 
touch the right leg, the leg that keeps sending obscure signals that it is now the wrong 
leg’ (4). The right leg feels independent, as though it separated from the rest of his body 
before being actually separated: ‘[a]s if it knows it is being spoken of, as if these terrible 
words have roused it from its troubled sleep, the right leg sends him a shaft of jagged 
white pain’ (5). On the other hand, when Paul gets used to the crutches, they soon 
become ‘second nature’ to him (35). These examples further demonstrate. that bodies are 
not fixed objects with a set of pre-existing natural parts with specific functions. All 
entities, including the human body, emerge through becomings in constant processes of 
coupling, decoupling, extending, and expanding, in an attempt to maximise their 
efficiency. In doing so, the distinctions between natural/unnatural and original/fake 
become not only highly debatable but also redundant. 
 
3.2.2. Reversing the Relation 
To avoid falling into the trap of a further Cartesian perspective, it is important to 
note that not only is it inanimate bodies that function as extensions of animate ones, but 
also human bodies can become extensions of inanimate bodies. An example of this can be 
found in Life and Times of Michael K, where K’s body becomes inanimate—an extension 
of its surroundings. K lies on his mattress in the shade next to the hut, covering his face 
with his arms. He is very still so that the children, who at the beginning keep their 
distance, soon feel at ease as they knew that he would not move. They begin to 
‘[incorporate] his body into their game. They clambered over him and fell upon him as if 
he were part of the earth’ (84). K’s body becomes an extension of the ground on which he 
is lying. His body becomes what the children make of it in their games. His body, 
therefore, loses all of its connotations; it becomes sexless, ageless, and lifeless—an object 
of playing. Children cease to see his body as human. Instead, they see it as an object of 
possibilities in their games.  
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Indeed, K’s case of EB can apply in everyday life where all human bodies 
inevitably function at different points of their constant becomings as extensions of other 
bodies with which they intra-act and couple. To apply the same logic to Paul’s case, not 
only do Paul’s crutches become an extension of his body, but also, and more 
interestingly, Paul’s body becomes an extension of the crutches. Of course, this is not 
only a more radical but also a more posthumanist suggestion of EB. The suggestion is 
particularly significant to QP as it disturbs the very centrality of the human body as the 
locus of the extended thesis. The implications are rather remarkable. In one of her 
lectures, Costello quotes Montaigne’s line: ‘[w]e think we are playing with the cat, but 
how do we know that the cat isn't playing with us?’ (Costello 82). Another example to 
demonstrate this mutuality of EB is the case of the human body and the apple tree. From 
the perspective of a human eating an apple, they are using the apple tree for their own 
good. However, for the tree, the human body acts as a seed dispersal vector and fertiliser. 
In the first instance, the apple tree is an extension of the human body, whereas, on the 
other, the human body becomes an extension of the apple tree.  
In either perspective, the relationship between animate and inanimate bodies can 
only be read from and within a local perspective. Instead of claiming an omniscient 
vantage point, or a central humanistic perspective, QP stresses the mutuality, 
complementarity, and extendedness of bodies, objects, and things. Another good example 
of the mutuality, dependence, and lack of true borders, between the animate and 
inanimate bodies, is when K’s buries his mother’s ashes under the ground, and when 
asked about her, his answer was: ‘[s]he makes the plants grow’ (K 130). K’s mother is 
viewed here as an extension of the earth as much as the earth is an extension of her.  
From the perspective of QPist EB, Rodchenko’s statement ‘[o]ur things in our 
hands must be equals, comrades’ falls short—things are not ‘in our hands’; they are an 
integral part of our cognitive, physical, and emotional aspects of our becoming. They 
extend us as much as we extend them. We are equally an integral part of their meaning, 
utility, and becoming. Things of our hands, therefore, are not our equals; they are 
certainly not our comrades. Rather, we are the things in our hands—in the most literal 
and quantum senses of the words. 
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3.3. On Things 
3.3.1. The Thingness of Things 
Based on Heidegger’s original distinction between the object and the thing, 
Brown notes that the object becomes a thing when it ceases to be functional, meaningful, 
and purposeful: ‘[w]e begin to confront the thingness of objects when they stop working 
for us’ (4). Brown provides an example of a window: you only begin to really look at the 
window when it gets filthy. Hence, Brown comments that while we ‘look through objects 
… we only catch a glimpse of things’ (4). Unlike objects, things are meaningless, 
dysfunctional, abrupt, and noncompliant. 
The first example that illustrates the thingness of things in Slow Man is the 
shower incident with the Zimmer frame. Alone in the shower, wearing his Zimmer frame, 
Paul loses his balance and falls, hurting his back. Paul faces a dilemma because he cannot 
‘decouple’ his body from the frame without sitting up, while sitting up would cause him a 
great deal of pain (206). Lying down on the floor, naked, unable to move, the Zimmer 
frame takes its place on top of his body, ‘blocking the cubicle door, while water 
continues to pour down and leaking shampoo rises in a froth all around’ (207). Lying on 
the floor, Paul begins to think about the Zimmer frame on top of him: ‘[n]o one bothered 
to inform him, and he did not think to ask, who the Zimmer is or was who has come to 
play such a role in his life’. Paul goes on to imagine Zimmer’s (the inventor’s) life and 
the circumstances that led to his invention and immortality (6). 
For Paul, the Zimmer frame suddenly changes from being an integral part of his 
body, function, movement, and physical boundaries, into an inconvenient metal piece that 
blocks him from moving. It is one of those moments of suddenness where things appear 
to declare their presence and power (Brown 3). As G. Harman puts it, inanimate entities 
move from a state of silence and withdrawal into sudden obtrusiveness (19). The 
significance of this moment lies in the fact that Paul has never given much thought to 
Zimmer’s frame before this incident. From the moment Paul comes away from the 
hospital with this‘four-footed aluminium stand’ (Slow 35), the frame becomes part of his 
body, helping him move around his flat. Now, standing over his body, David notices the 
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size, shape, and strange, unwelcome presence of this giant piece of metal. 
This is not the first incident where the Zimmer frame stressed its thingness. On 
another occasion, when Paul meets the blind Marijana, with whom he plans to be 
intimate, she asks him, ‘What is this?’. Her question suddenly asserts the thingness of the 
frame. Paul answers, ‘[i]t is an aluminum frame, known colloquially as a walker’. Paul 
anticipates that the frame can become a barrier between them, so he puts it aside as he sits 
on the sofa (103). Triggered by her question, the frame reveals its true nature, its 
thingness, as it suddenly becomes obtrusive, standing in the middle, interfering between 
Paul and Marianna’s body. 
Another example is Paul’s photograph collection. Paul has an extremely rare and 
extensive collection, which he began to collect in the 1970s, of photos and postcards of 
life in the mining camps of Victoria and New South Wales. As he shows them to 
Marijana, Paul narrates the stories and histories of the people in the pictures (48). Paul 
tells Marijana that by saving these pictures, he is saving the history and stories of these 
people. However, this is only part of it: ‘[h]e saves them too out of fidelity to the 
photographs themselves, the photographic prints, most of them last survivors, unique’ 
(65). For Paul, the pictures are both objects and things; he appreciates the fact that they 
are not only evidence of stories of old survivors, but also survivors in their own rights, 
asserting their own independent physical and unique presence. Showcasing his collection 
to Drago, Paul begins to describe the photos of his collection, this time not concerned 
with their content but rather with their physical form, encouraging Drago to look at them:  
They are what we call albumen prints,' he tells Drago. 'The paper is coated 
with diluted egg white in which silver chloride crystals are suspended. 
Then it is exposed to light under the glass negative. Then it is chemically 
fixed. It was a way of printing that had only just been invented in 
Fauchery's day. Look, here is a pre-albumen print to compare it with, on 
paper that has been soaked rather than coated — soaked in a solution of 
silver salts. Can you see how much more full and luminous the Fauchery 
is? That is because of the depth of the albumen coating. Less than a 
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millimetre of depth, but that millimetre makes all the difference. Take a 
look through the microscope (175). 
There are other moments when these photos cease to express their interpretive 
powers and, instead, assert their thingness. For instance, Costello tells Paul that he should 
check his collection, implying that Drago might have stolen something from it. Although 
Paul finds his collection to be complete, one particular picture, nonetheless, raises his 
suspicions:   
It is not that any of the prints are actually missing. Nothing is actually 
missing. But one of the Faucherys has the wrong feel to it and, as soon as 
he brings it out of its plastic sleeve into the light, the wrong look too. 
What he is holding in his hands is a copy, in tones of brown that mimic the 
original sepia, made by an electronic printer on half-glazed photographic 
paper. The cardboard mount is new and slightly thicker than the original. 
It is the added thickness that first gives the forgery away (218). 
As the passage demonstrates, suspecting that his collection has somehow been altered, 
Paul ceases to look at the content, the stories and the histories these pictures represent. 
Instead, Paul begins to see these photos in their physical presence and sheer thingness—
their shape, material, thickness, feel, and distribution of colour. In such moments, the 
photos exist as much, and are as real, as Paul himself, revealing their physical certainty 
more than any time before. 
Not only the nonhuman but also the human body can reveal its profound 
thingness. For instance, the car accident Paul went through accentuated the thingness of 
his own body. The accident left Paul and his bike damaged indiscriminately. Paul’s leg 
and knee bones were shattered and twisted whereas the frame of his bike was bent and 
the tubing was cracked. In his surgery, the doctors unanimously agree not to save Paul’s 
knee. The doctor justified their decision by noting that the knee was crushed and 
misshapen at the same time. Saving his knee would have required a series of operations 
that do not have a high success rate (7). In other words, saving Paul’s knee was not a 
good investment. Ironically, Drago delivers a similar assessment regarding fixing (saving) 
Paul’s bike. After examining his bike, Drago mentions that he could probably bend it 
back into shape and respray it. Paul, however, would need to buy a new wheel hub and 
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derailleur and brakes, which would cost him as much as if he were to buy a second-hand 
bike. They both agree that saving the bike would not be a good investment (68). The 
irreversible damage to Paul’s body and his bike reveal the shared thingness of both 
bodies. 
Furthermore, the ramifications of the accident on Paul’s everyday life remind him 
of the inherent thingness of things, especially the thingness of his own body. During his 
encounter with Marijana, Paul thinks of embracing her: ‘[b]ut to embrace her he must put 
aside the absurd crutches that allow him to stand up; and once he does that he will totter, 
perhaps fall’ (77). In his dilemma of whether or not he should use the crutches, and how 
to manage without them, Paul is reminded that the human is ‘caught up in things’ and 
that the ‘body is a thing among things … caught in the fabric of the world, and its 
cohesion is that of a thing’ (Merleau-Ponty, Reader 354). This is precisely how Paul’s 
body feels to him: caught up in objects of his apartment—sofas, chairs, stairs, his desk. 
To move his body is to coordinate with all these objects, to acknowledge their existence 
in order for them to acknowledge his. 
 
3.3.2. The Strangeness of things 
Looking closer at things only makes them appear stranger than ever before. As 
Brown notes, the closer you look at things, the less clear they get. Brown quotes Georg 
Simmel’s statement on telescopic and microscopic technology: ‘coming closer to things 
often only shows us how far away they still are from us’ (5). This is especially so for the 
quantum world where subatomic particles exhibit weird and unpredictable behaviour, 
which seemingly defies everything we think we know about the world. Not only for 
physicists, but also (and equally) for poets, Brown comments that the most familiar 
things, once we closely look at them, appear to be ‘unpredictable and inexplicable’ (5). 
Similarly, Morton tackles the same aspect of our relations to things in what he calls the 
stranger strangers. For Morton, each entity in the mesh (by which he refers to universal 
interconnectedness) appears strange. All of our attempts at getting to know other entities 
only make them stranger (Thought 15).  
We encounter a moment of this unfamiliarity of things in Waiting for the 
Barbarians. In the first few lines of the narrative, the magistrate, living in a small town in 
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the middle of the desert his whole life, meets Colonel Joll for the first time. However, it is 
not the Colonel that has caught his attention, but what the Colonel is wearing:  
I have never seen anything like it: two little discs of glass suspended in 
front of his eyes in loops of wire. Is he blind? I could understand it if he 
wanted to hide blind eyes. But he is not blind. The discs are dark, they 
look opaque from the outside, but he can see through them. He tells me 
they are a new invention. "They protect one's eyes against the glare of the 
sun," he says. "You would find them useful out here in the desert. They 
save one from squinting all the time. One has fewer headaches (1). 
Evidently, to the magistrate, the sunglasses, which he inspects and describes with 
fascination, are strange, unfamiliar, unnameable, and unidentifiable, suggestive yet 
uncertain, present yet ambiguous. However, the thingness/strangeness of the sunglasses 
quickly fades away as the Colonel begins to describe their function—an object used to 
protect the eyes from the sun. As the narrative progresses, the sunglasses inevitably 
retreat to the background, the familiar, the functional, and the unnoticed. 
Brown rightly observes that we use the word ‘thing’ to indicate the ambiguity of 
things in everyday life: ‘[i]t functions to overcome the loss of other words or as a place 
holder for some future specifying operation: "I need that thing you use to get at things 
between your teeth."’ (4). We can sense this thingness in its ambiguity and difficulty of 
identification in Paul’s response when he first inspects his amputation after the surgery: 
Certainly this thing, which now for the first time he inspects under the 
sheet, this monstrous object swathed in white and attached to his hip, 
comes straight out of the land of dreams. And what about the other thing, 
the thing that the young man with the madly flashing glasses spoke of with 
such enthusiasm — when will that make its appearance? Not in all his 
days has he seen a naked prosthesis. The picture that comes to mind is of a 
wooden shaft with a barb at its head like a harpoon and rubber suckers on 
its three little feet. It is out of Surrealism. It is out of Dali. He reaches out a 
hand (the three middle fingers are strapped together, he notices for the first 
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time) and presses the thing in white. It gives back no sensation at all. It is 
like a block of wood. ([my emphasis] Slow 9). 
Paul is no longer able to identify with what remains of his leg. Since his leg stopped 
functioning as part of his body, what is left of Paul’s leg is described as a monstrous thing 
that is wrapped in white. Paul faces the strange and unfamiliar thingness of his body for 
the first time. The word ‘leg’ can no longer signify what he sees or feels. It is a thing, 
devoid of any function or significance; strange, abrupt, and astonishingly assertive, it 
looks like a ‘block of wood … attached to his hip’. Paul attempts to dismiss his disbelief 
by pretending it is all a dream; however, he knows it is real: ‘this is clearly no dream, it is 
the real thing, as real as things get’ ([My emphasis] 9). As real as things get, for the 
powerful presence of things is impossible to ignore or interpret in any way other than 
their physical presence. 
To appropriate its strangeness, unfamiliarity, dysfunction, and unjustifiable 
presence, the doctor and nurses conveniently call it a stump. Unlike when it used to be a 
leg in the realm of the ordinary, functional, and the unnoticed; as a stump, it is now 
looked at and inspected down to its core materiality. As Dr Hansen examines it with his 
hand, he comments, '[i]t is coming together beautifully’ (16). When she meets Paul, 
Marijana raises it carefully in one hand, ‘as if it were a watermelon’; impressed, she 
comments: 'Good job’ and asks about the surgeon who did it (28). 
However, Paul refuses to call it a stump. For him, it is still a thing—unnamable, 
unrecognisable: ‘[t]o himself he does not call it a stump. He would like not to call it 
anything; he would like not to think about it, but that is not possible’ (29). Lightly 
touching it, Paul asks Marijana if she has seen ‘many of… these’ (28). He gives it no 
name but only gestures, as one often does when one has no name to what he addresses. 
By refusing to name it, and thus inscribe it within language, Paul insists on preserving its 
thingness, and hence declares his refusal to cope with it and make it part of his 
body/everyday life; it remains a thing: distanced, dysfunctional, abrupt, and strange. 
Consequently, Paul never stops looking at it; its strangeness and irrelevance invites both 
his interest and aversion. As days pass, Paul notices that it begins to lose ‘its angry colour 
and swollen look’ (35). As Marijana washes it, however, the warmness of the water 
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‘brings out a pink-and-white flush. It begins to look less like a cured ham than like some 
sightless deep-water fish’ (28). Evidently, Paul refuses to look beyond its thingness and 
justify its presence; although it is technically still attached to his body, it is no longer part 
it. 
The word thing stands outside history, time, and meaning. It functions as a liminal 
linguistic space, embracing the unnameable, unidentifiable, and the ambiguous. As 
Brown puts it, the word thing ‘hover[s] over the threshold between the nameable and 
unnameable, the figurable and unfigurable, the identifiable and unidentifiable’ (5). 
Furthermore, things are suggestive but not conclusive. In this sense, things are 
unactualised possibilities of utility and significance—they can be but never are. In short, 
things are model QPist entities by their very nature—their presence yet awkwardness, 
solidity yet fluidity, and openness yet illusiveness.  
Brown declares that objects are drained; they are sick of our constant 
reconstruction of them as objects of our desires and affection and of dealing with our 
longing (15). If given a chance, Brown imagines, in order just to relax and ‘be 
themselves’, objects will ‘sink into themselves, weary of form; they [will] consider 
sinking into an amorphous heap, submitting to the idée fixe of gravity’ (15). Through our 
action, language, and gaze, we constantly work to maintain our objects fixed, structured, 
divided, defined, and isolated. Objects becoming things, hence, is an act of defiance and 
disobedience to, and rebellion against, us. Their disobedience becomes a reminder of 
their agency, will, and independent presence, particularly when we stop looking at them 
and take them for granted. 
In Figure 2, Jesper Magnusson demonstrates the main differences between an 
object and a thing. Interestingly, the qualities of each align, more or less, with the 
humanist and the posthumanist conceptions of matter, respectively. Indeed, this 
comparison is not meant to undermine Latour’s critique of Heidegger where he observes 
that our world is full of contaminates—hybrids. However, what the figure does not say is 
what it actually says: The white space that separates the two columns is full of quasi-
things and quasi-objects. It is worth noting that I have made a similar acknowledgement 
earlier regarding the humanist/posthumanist distinction: there is nothing fully human and 
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nothing fully posthuman; the human is always becoming posthuman. In the same manner, 
objects and things are always becoming one another. Paradoxically, this very inability to 
define and separate the object from the thing, the human from the posthuman, and the 
wave from the particle, is QPist. Hence, to become itself, QP has to resist its very 
definition, and similarly, for the thing to become itself, it has to resist all of its definitions, 
for objects are but things that have settled for meaning. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The Differences Between Objects and Things (Magnusson). 
 
3.3.3. The Materiality of Thought 
From a QPist perspective, thoughts/ideas/words and objects/things/matter are not 
inherently different; they are both emergent events of becoming. Representationalism, 
Barad holds, is to be blamed for the separation of the world into the disjointed domains of 
words and things and the struggle of the linkage between these two domains, so that 
knowledge becomes possible (Meeting 137). Barad declares that ‘[m]attering is 
simultaneously a matter of substance and significance’ (3). Thoughts are more material 
and embodied than we tend to think they are, whereas things are more enigmatic and 
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transcendent than what they appear to be. In his formulation of thing theory, Brown 
acknowledges the indistinguishable nature of thinking and thingness. He ends his essay 
with the following statement: ‘[i]f thinking the thing, to borrow Heidegger's phrase, feels 
like an exercise in belatedness, the feeling is provoked by our very capacity to imagine 
that thinking and thingness are distinct’ (16). On similar grounds, Barad notes that 
‘[m]atter and meaning are not separate elements. They are inextricably fused together, 
and no event, no matter how energetic, can tear them asunder’ (3). This unification of 
thought/object is present in Coetzee’s fiction. Costello entertains the same notion of the 
inherent similarity between beliefs and things: ‘[b]elief may be no more, in the end, than 
a source of energy, like a battery which one clips into an idea to make it run’ (Costello 
39).  
Not only are thoughts/objects inherently similar, but it is also possible for the two 
to interfere and interchange: thoughts can be touched while objects can be thought. This 
is evident in Costello’s experience with reading Paul West’s novel The Very Rich Hours 
of Count von Stauffenberg and, in particular, the chapter of the execution of the July 1944 
plotters. Costello was horrified by the ‘absolute evil’ she has felt when she read the 
chapter. Costello claims that, as she read, a touch of evil was passed on to her, ‘like a 
shock. Like electricity’. West’s ideas took a physical form that Costello was able to feel 
through her body; it travelled beyond language and articulation: ‘[i]t is not something that 
can be demonstrated … It is something that can only be experienced’ (176). This is a 
clear moment of thought-becoming-object, expressing the complementarity of what can 
be described as ‘thought-object’, which parallels the wave-particle complementarity in 
the quantum world. The complementarity of thought-object is based on the inseparability 
of matter-meaning within any phenomenon of becoming. Matter/thought, hence, are not 
essentially physical or nonphysical; rather, they are composed of intra-active relations, 
which are equally physical and nonphysical, possible and actual, local and distributed. 
Coetzee further expresses the unification of matter/thought through staging a 
physical encounter between Costello, the author, and Paul, the character. To Costello and 
Paul, and even to the reader, there are no ontological or physical distinctions between the 
two. Coetzee takes it a step further; through various techniques, he also blurs the 
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distinctions between himself and Costello (as demonstrated in Chapter Two), further 
reducing the gap between physical/nonphysical. This blurring of boundaries extends to 
the reader of the novel. If Costello, the author of Paul’s story, exists within her own 
narrative, and if Coetzee exists within his own fiction, then the reader is inevitably part of 
this phenomenon of meaning: his/her thoughts, emotions, and presence are entangled 
with the text.143 
The ‘physical’ aspect, so to speak, of the phenomenon of meaning is manifested 
in, and determined by, not only the actual presence of the body of the text (paper, ink), 
but also extends to include the tools with which the author wrote the text (pen, paper, 
computer), as well as the tools with which the reader read the text (glasses, book, laptop). 
It also includes the author and the reader’s brain activity while writing and reading. These 
are only a few examples of the entanglement between physical/nonphysical elements 
through whose intra-action the phenomenon of meaning emerges. 
To summarise, inanimate entities are inextricably entangled with our own 
existence and our own becomings, and in a similar manner, we are entangled with their 
own becomings. There are moments, however, when objects become things as a way to 
contest us by asserting their will, disobedience, and agency, leaving us confused, 
helpless, or even injured. Paul’s accident, for instance, was the result of another, darker, 
encounter between his body and the car, which, at that instant, stopped being a car, and 
turned into a monster of steel, a missile, attacking his body: ‘the instant when the missile 
he [the driver] was piloting in a haze of loud music dug into the sweet softness of human 
flesh’ ([my emphasis] Slow 21). Hence, if things in (of) our hands, as Rodchenko’s 
declares, are our equals, our comrades, then they are inevitably our foes too.  
 
 
 
																																																								
143 I discuss the reader’s presence in the text Chapter Four. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Tracing Robinson Cruso(e): A Quantum Posthumanist ‘Adventure’ in 
Consciousness and Narrative in Coetzee’s Foe 
Based on Bohr’s philosophy, Barad notes that the subject/object distinction is 
ambiguous unless a physical apparatus is introduced to and within the phenomenon 
(Meeting 118). The physical apparatus here refers to the measurement device(s) used 
in/within the quantum experiment, which inevitably affects, while simultaneously 
becoming entangled with the phenomenon. The apparatus can be seen (in many quantum 
interpretations, including CI144) to include the presence of the observer. In this chapter, I 
argue that the reader’s consciousness functions as a physical apparatus within the 
phenomenon of meaning.  
This chapter begins with a brief overview of Daniel Defoe’s The Robinson Crusoe 
Trilogy145 [RC] and its subsequent variations. I attempt to deconstruct the notion of 
originality, time, and linearity through viewing the text within a complex spatialised 
relationship with other texts instead of a linear chronological timeline. I briefly trace the 
changes that occur to the story of RC throughout the years and argue for the impossibility 
of an original story of Crusoe by demonstrating that the figure has no definitive meaning 
prior to the act of reading. Crusoe emerges through the reader’s consciousness; meaning 
is thus determined through the reader effect, which I equate to the observer effect146 in 
quantum theory. I also explore the relationship between Foe and RC. I argue that Foe 
rejects the originality of RC through deconstructing the simple past/present, original/copy 
relations, and creating a more complex entangled, multidirectional, and multilayered 
relationship between the two texts. 
Drawing on many ideas from quantum interpretations, most notably Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty principle, the ‘consciousness causes collapse’ interpretation, and the MWI, I 																																																								
144 Unlike observer-dependent interpretations, the role the observer plays in CI is thought to be casual. 
145 The trilogy includes: The Life and Strange Surprising Adventures of Robinson Crusoe, The Farther 
Adventures of Robinson Crusoe, and Serious Reflections of Robinson Crusoe. 
146 The observer effect in quantum theory can be further used to compare to, and develop on, Lacan’s ideas 
on the gaze and its postmodern and postcolonial aspects. 
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explore the role of the reader’s consciousness within the phenomenon of meaning. I then 
shift my focus to the last chapter of Foe; I propose that this chapter represents a narrative 
method which I call a quantum posthumanist narrative [QPN], which corresponds to 
many ideas in the QPist framework, including that of contesting the linear arrow of time, 
the progressive nature of narration, and the syntactical logic of language. 
It is important to pause here to emphasise that this chapter adopts different 
quantum interpretations than in previous chapters. In Chapter Two, for instance, based on 
the views of Bohr and Barad and the CI, I argue against the notion of the subject by 
demonstrating that the subject of the literary phenomenon is the event itself as being both 
the subject and the object of its becoming. On the other hand, this chapter largely adopts 
the observer-dependent view in some quantum interpretations such as ‘consciousness 
causes collapse’ and the relational interpretation; it focuses on the role of the 
observer/reader in formulating the meaning within the phenomenon of meaning. 
However, although an observer-dependent approach might at first seem to contradict the 
posthumanist premise of abandoning the traditional subject, they are not at all 
contradictory; in fact, I might venture to argue that they are complementary when we 
understand the distinction of observer/reader here as Barad’s theoretical and agential cut 
within the phenomenon—not outside it. Furthermore, while the observer here refers to the 
reader and his/her consciousness, the posthumanist view does not exclude other types of 
observers—that are not necessarily human, other degrees of consciousness—that are not 
necessarily self-reflective, and other forms of meaning—that are not necessarily 
language-based. 
4.1. Robinson Crusoe 
Defoe’s novel The Strange and Surprising Adventures of Robinson Crusoe, 
written in 1719, is one of the most distinguished classics in English literature. The 
‘source’ novel for Foe, as well as numerous other novels, stories, and other works, it is 
regarded by many critics as the ‘first’ English novel, having marked the ‘beginning’ of 
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realist fiction as a literary genre.147 Ever since its publication, RC has inspired many other 
castaway novels throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, and though many were forgotten, 
many have also survived. The numerous imitations and variations of RC differ in their 
degrees of explicit intertextuality: some include only elements, events or even passing 
hints of RC, while others represent more serious adaptations of the novel through 
borrowing the major events and characters.148 
Although there is enough evidence to safely suggest that RC acts as a clear point 
of reference for all these works, critics have not always been content to assign RC this 
referential historical status. Most critics agree, for instance, that the travel and adventure 
theme of the novel is not new and appeared in earlier, continental, novels. Furthermore, 
RC has its own text sources, critics conclude, including ‘real’ accounts of survival stories, 
most notably the castaway Alexander Selkirk, who survived a shipwreck and lived on an 
island, and, to a lesser extent, Robert Knox’s historical account of his abduction by the 
King of Ceylon in 1659. It also resembles many elements in Ibn Tufail's novel Hayy ibn 
Yaqdhan, the first Arabic novel that was translated into English several times, preceding 
Defoe’s writings by half a century.  In his book, The Strange Surprizing Sources of 
Robinson Crusoe, David Fausett explores, as the title suggests, many earlier continental 
narratives that share striking elements with Defoe’s narrative, but overlooked by Western 
critics. Similarly, in his 1927 essay, ‘Robinson Crusoe: A Literary Accident’, Raymond 
F. Howes attacks the alleged originality—or genius, to use his term—of Defoe’s novel. 																																																								
147 In his famous book The Rise of the Novel (1957), Ian Watt traces the pivotal role Defoe’s novel has 
played in setting the ground for formal realism in the English novel (60). 
148 Some of the most notable works that survived include Johann Wyss’ The Swiss Family Robinson (1812) 
which gained great popularity. Others such as Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels and Robert Louis 
Stevenson’s Treasure Island were written in part as parodic takes on RC and the travellers’ tales subgenre. 
Other novels based on or elaborations of one or more of the characters of RC include Beatrix Potter The 
Tale of Little Pig Robinson, Wilkie Collins’ The Moonstone and Michel Tournier’s Friday, where 
Tournier’s Crusoe refuses to go back to England and chooses to continue living on the island. Some 
modern variations include Thomas Berger’s Robert Crews that imagines Crusoe as an alcoholic plane crash 
survivor who encounters a young woman that turns out to be his ‘Friday’. Moreover, there were Latin, 
French148, German, Chinese and other Crusoe(s), including a Jewish version of RC, who was re-named Reb 
Alter-Leb in Robinzon di geshikhte fun Alter-Leb by Yoysef Vitlin (1829) (Garrett). RC was also produced 
in many other artistic forms including stories, poetry, opera, theater, international films (including a 1927 
silent film) and television series. There are many references to RC, including some that appeared in popular 
songs, including Weird Al’s [Yankovic’s] song ‘Amish Paradise’. Moreover, RC has also influenced 
language usage. For instance, in the 1920s, the large umbrella was still called un robinson (Free 105). Also, 
in economics, Robinson Crusoe became a term to refer to the idea of a one-man economy. 
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He argues that the fame of Defoe was not due to its originality but rather due to 
‘circumstances’ that led to its prominence (31).  
I wish to draw on basic quantum principles to argue against RC as a singular, 
fixed point of reference in the history of the English novel. Through proposing the role of 
consciousness as the physical apparatus or as the observer in the actualisation of 
meaning, I argue that RC is an emergent and dynamic phenomenon of meaning that is 
continuously becoming through other texts as well as through the reader’s consciousness. 
This ultimately means that there is no original or universal RC—only local and 
distributed possibilities of Crusoe. 
Presuming the possibility of ‘some level’ of originality, we might ask: to what 
extent is RC ‘original’? Fausett and Howes’ perspective, viewed above, on determining 
originality is certainly problematic. The most relevant question in determining the extent 
of influence of continental works on Defoe’s narrative is not whether similar works to 
Defoe’s in theme or technique had been published before his novel, but whether Defoe 
himself had, in fact, read them. As Blaim rightly observes in his review of Fausett, there 
is no clear evidence that Defoe had any knowledge of them. It is difficult to prove that 
Defoe had, for instance, read the Dutch Utopian narratives of Foigny and Vairasse. 
Without a definitive answer to this question, we are left with a perpetual state of 
uncertainty, or, in quantum terms, a state of superposition where Defoe both read and did 
not read these works.  
Furthermore, such a question shifts our focus to a significant factor in the 
phenomenon of meaning: the role of consciousness in determining and changing the 
meaning and significance of the literary work in question. Howes and Fausetts’ 
awareness of these earlier works created a different experience/meaning than Defoe’s 
who might not have been exposed to these works. There is no objective meaning outside 
their consciousness against which their meanings are measured for the observer is always 
part of the observation. This conclusion implies the impossibility of an objective ‘source’ 
text to which all the novels can be ascribed. It unsettles the hierarchical relationship 
between Defoe’s narrative and the narratives that come ‘before’ and ‘after’ it.  
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Moreover, further to the impossibility of judging the ‘originality’ of Defoe due to 
the impossibility of determining Defoe’s experience, the chronological ‘primacy’ is 
hardly significant if we expand our observation to include the ways in which RC has 
influenced previous works (not the other way round) and, most importantly, how later 
works (such as Foe) have significantly influenced the meaning and significance of RC. 
Before moving to explore the ways in which Foe has reshaped key moments in RC, it is 
worth noting that RC, in a similar manner, has, in fact, influenced the narratives that 
‘preceded’ it. As Blaim notes, ‘earlier continental desert island narratives […] were 
renamed after Defoe's book in the wake of its spectacular success in England and on the 
continent. This suggests that, against chronology, it was Robinson Crusoe that established 
the frame of reference for the earlier texts and not the other way round’ (255). The mere 
fact that RC was able to claim earlier texts further emphasises the quantum qualities of 
the literary text, particularly its nonlocality and its ability to move in different, 
multilayered chronological and spatial dimensions. 
An interesting phenomenon in the history of RC demonstrates the power not only 
of the individual reader’s consciousness but that of the collective consciousness of 
interpretive communities in deciding the emergent meaning of RC. Not surprisingly, 
Crusoe’s image has been transformed repeatedly since the publication of the narrative. 
Most contemporary readers of the novel are unaware that it was originally written as a 
trilogy: The Life and Strange Adventures of Robinson Crusoe (1719) (RC1), The Farther 
Adventures of Robinson Crusoe (1719) (RC2), and Serious Reflections During the Life 
and Surprising Adventures of Robinson Crusoe (1720) (RC3).  The modern story we are 
familiar with ends with the first volume, while the other two are mostly neglected. 
However, this was not always the case. In her essay ‘Un-Erasing "Crusoe": 
"Farther Adventures" in the Nineteenth Century’, Melissa Free offers statistical 
information (based on Robert W. Lovett’s previous work) of the abrupt neglect of RC2 
after WWI. As Free’s Figure 3 demonstrates, while RC3 was not commonly printed as 
part of the story of RC, RC1 and RC2, on the other hand, were often printed together. For 
two hundred years, Free notes, RC2 was read alongside RC1 and was considered an 
integral part of the story of Crusoe. In the 19th century, RC1 and RC2 were published as 
	173	
one novel with little to no hint that they were two separate volumes.149 
 
Figure 3: Publications of RC in English 1720–979 (Free 91). 
 
However, the publication of the combined first two volumes steeply declined after 
the Great War. Along with RC3, RC2 was almost entirely dropped by publishers and 
therefore erased from the memory of critics who neglected this omission and viewed RC1 
as the complete story of the original Crusoe. Furthermore, Free interestingly observes 
that, in the same period, RC2 was still published alongside RC1 in other parts of the 
world. The implications of such an omission are worth considering. The Crusoe that was 
read during Defoe’s life is different from the 19th-century Crusoe, which is also 
significantly different from the modern Crusoe we read today. 
Furthermore, in the 18th century, various abridgements of RC were being 
published, and many specifically targeted younger audiences. By the end of the 18th 
century, Free notes, quoting Kevin Carpenter, that RC (in the form of the first two 																																																								
149 Free notes that several 19th-century editions offer no break between RC1 and RC2 (94). 
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volumes) had turned into a children’s book. Johann Heinrich Campe’s German adaptation 
of Crusoe’s adventure, Robinson der Jüngere (translated into English in 1788)—a tale 
narrated by a father to his children—gained huge popularity and was translated into more 
than 27 languages, facilitating the conversion of Crusoe’s story to a children’s narrative. 
However, after World War I, as RC2 was eliminated from publication, RC1 gradually 
returned as a book for adult readers. In an introduction to a 1930 edition of RC1, Ford 
Maddox Ford claims that the edition was intended to reclaim Crusoe from children’s 
classics (Free 114). 
The modern Crusoe, hence, emerges. As Free notes, this Crusoe is different from 
the 19th-century Crusoe in many ways.150 Although, as Lovett notes, the myth of Crusoe 
remains consistent as ‘the man on the island’ (xiv), Free points out that by omitting RC2, 
readers neglect many other aspects of the original Crusoe.  However, looking at Crusoe 
from a wider perspective, I argue differently: that there is no original ‘Crusoe’—or, in 
quantum terms, there are no definitive a priori values of Crusoe. Crusoe, as I shall argue, 
is an emergent event that does not pre-exist the act of reading or, consequently, the 
phenomenon of meaning. In other words, any image of Crusoe constitutes one 
actualisation of infinite possibilities of Crusoe.  
Free interestingly, and casually, mentions that the earliest readers of Crusoe ‘were 
not merely encountering the novel for the first time; they were creating it culturally’ (97). 
By deciding to read the two first volumes of RC, while ignoring the third, publishers were 
compelled to popularise the first two and almost completely to neglect the third novel.151 																																																								
150 Free writes about the changing image of the modern Crusoe: ‘He does not fail as a colonial 
administrator, lose his man Friday, travel to Madagascar, or witness his shipmates (fellow Europeans) 
“violate the terms of [a] trade agreement,” then brutally massacre a village there. Nor does he visit the Bay 
of Bengal, the Malay Archipelago, China, Pekin, Tartary, and Russia; get kicked off his nephew’s ship; get 
mistaken for a pirate; trade with savvy far Easterners; spew invectives against the Chinese; destroy an idol; 
decimate a village; run out of unexplored territory; or pale in spiritual comparison to a Russian nobleman, 
only to return home rich but without family or subject. And finally he does not declare that “heaven car 
gorge us with our own desires.” It is the thriving East, above all, that is erased from the modern Crusoe, a 
fictional East perhaps too suggestive of an actual East, newly emerging as a powerful counter—a 
conceivable threat—to the West’ (114-5). 
151 There is a seemingly legitimate reason, Free believes, for the unpopularity of the third volume. While 
RC1 and RC2 told a story, RC3 was a tiresome non-narrative text composed of six long essays that focus on 
instructions, which made it appear ‘extraneous’ to the narrative, despite Defoe’s assertions (through the 
voice of Crusoe) in the preface of RC3, that this book is key to understanding the whole work. The general 
impression, however, remained that the third part was written as ‘an after-thought’ and for profit (97-8). 
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Free unwittingly alludes to the power of the reader’s consciousness in determining the 
meaning of the narrative. This could be further demonstrated by comparing a 19th-century 
reader who reads the full trilogy to another who reads an abridgement of the first volume, 
or a third who is familiar with the survival story of Alexander Selkirk. The depth and 
dimensions of Crusoe inevitably change as the reader changes.152 It is thus hard to argue 
for a definitive modern version of Crusoe’s figure. Crusoe, hence, is in fact, Crusoes’ 
versions and parallels which multiply indefinitely. These versions are dynamic 
becomings of meaning that emerge as manifestations of the entanglement between the 
agencies of meaning.  
These views of the reader and text correspond to basic laws of some quantum 
interpretations. For instance, the idea of the reader’s consciousness as a determining 
factor of meaning corresponds to observer-dependent interpretations of quantum theory, 
which proposes that the observer inevitably interferes with the results of the 
measurements—a phenomenon referred to as the observer effect. In the context of literary 
analysis, this phenomenon could analogously be called the reader effect, which refers to 
the entanglement and interference of the reader’s consciousness within the phenomenon 
of meaning. Furthermore, texts do not have definitive meanings prior to reading in the 
same manner that objects do not possess pre-existing qualities prior to observation; their 
values/meanings emerge through the measurement/reading process. These premises 
violate some of the fundamental laws of classical physics, such as the idea of 
representationalism, definitive values, and the concept of locality. In classical physics, 
any given object has pre-existing measurable qualities prior to, and unaffected by, 
observation. In the same fashion, in the traditional literary analysis, the text has pre-
existing values prior to reading, while the reader’s role in the formation of meaning is 
external and interpretive at best.153 																																																								
152 In his reader-response criticism, Iser uses star-gazing as an example: ‘The impressions that arise as a 
result of this process will vary from individual to individual, but only within the limits imposed by the 
written as opposed to the unwritten text. In the same way, two people gazing at the night sky may both be 
looking at the same collection of stars, but one will see the image of a plough, and the other will make out a 
dipper. The ‘stars’ in a literary text are fixed; the lines that join them are variable.’ (‘Process’ 287). 
153 The view of the text as largely constructed by the reader is a perennial debate in literary criticism; it 
begins with Ingarden’s work on reading, particularly The Literary Work of Art: An Investigation on the 
Borderlines of Ontology, Logic, and Theory of Literature (1931), translated into English and published in 
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Moreover, reading, as an interpretive and mentally complex form of engagement, 
produces effects that are not inherently different from those of quantum-based 
observation on the values of objects. Reading actualises the possibilities of the text in 
singular acts of determining meaning (measured values) at certain points of space-time. 
In this sense, and from a quantum perspective, the idea of Crusoe can be seen to resemble 
the indefinitiveness of the wave function; the emergent meanings of Crusoe (over the 
years and from one reader to another), on the other hand, constitute the collapse of the 
wave function and thus the actualisation of meanings through different acts of reading—
in an analogous manner to the actualisation of the values of atoms through the act of 
quantum measurement. So Frank Mills proposes the entanglement of the agencies of 
meaning and implies the parallelism of stories in his statement: ‘[a] story is nothing less 
than a conversation between the storyteller, the story itself, and the hearer … Storytelling 
is not only cyclic; with each retelling, the story becomes a new story, told in a new 
context’ (‘Storytelling’). Evidently, Mills’ statement emphasises this understanding of the 
‘wave function’ dynamism of stories, which provides infinite and indefinite possibilities 
that are actualised in every reading.  
This view of meaning as an emergent property of reading carries significant 
implications. The notion of a ‘source’ or an ‘origin’ text is impossible as the idea of 
Crusoe is constantly changing, offering a wide array of possibilities, none of which is 
more ‘original’ than the other. In this sense, the worlds concretised through the reading of 
literary texts are essentially subjective and do not correlate with the temporal linearity 
(responsible for the idea of originality) of the narratives. Texts, hence, move fluidly in 
time and exist simultaneously on different levels of meaning. 
Moreover, not only is it impossible to argue for the ‘origin’ of the text but, as 																																																																																																																																																																					
1974. Ingarden introduces the role of the reader in the ‘concretisation’ of the work of art from a scheme of 
different strata to a full aesthetic object. Ingarden’s work has influenced Iser’s reader-response theory in his 
book The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response (1978). In Iser’s view, meaning is not an object 
located in the text but an event that takes place between the reader and the text. The debate was then taken 
up by others such as Hirsch in Validity in Interpretation (1967) who makes the famous distinction between 
meaning as intended by author and significance as received by reader and critic. Indeed, this view of the 
reader as a participant and influencer on the text largely parallels the notion of the observer as an active 
participant in the process of measurement, and may even be inspired by it. It is likely that Ingarden, a pupil 
of Husserl, was familiar with Bohr and Heisenberg and informed by their ideas on quantum theory. 
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another consequence of abandoning the idea of temporal linearity, it is also equally futile 
to argue for its ‘beginning’. There is no definitive temporal moment where the story of 
Crusoe begins, as it is constantly ‘re-written’ in past and future texts. The difficulty of 
determining the rigid ‘beginning’ of any given text equates to the difficulty of 
conclusively determining the beginning of one species and the end of another, or the 
beginning of ‘time’ or the ‘universe’. The concept of beginning in itself is fundamentally 
problematic. Although Edward Said argues for beginnings as the secular counterpart of 
the mythical origin, the ontological nonlinearity of the text I propose here regards all 
beginnings as problematic. Said realises some of the consequences implicated in the 
notion of beginning; that it suggests ‘(a) a time, (b) a place, (c) an object—in short, 
detachment’ (‘Beginnings’ 41). However, in the QPist logic, the idea of beginning is 
problematised precisely in relation to these vectors. Furthermore, a beginning necessarily 
requires an end, another ontological and epistemological break that, like beginnings, does 
not correspond to the human observation of continuity of the naturalcultural phenomena. 
Beginnings too are definitive, static, fixed, and inflexible, which goes against the QPist 
dynamism of becoming. 
Nevertheless, Said stresses the significance of beginnings: ‘[w]ithout a least a 
sense of a beginning, nothing can really be done’ (45). In the context of literary critique, 
Said maintains, the beginning is ‘a magical point that links critic and the work criticized’ 
(48). However, what Said regards as the significance of beginnings can simply be 
replaced with the QPist points of intra-action that offer the advantages of beginnings, but 
unlike beginnings, do not imply historicity and linearity or force an end. The alternative 
QPist vision of the literary text/event is that it exists in a complex a-historical level of all 
the works that have been, and will be, written. Beginnings can therefore be regarded as 
theoretical flexible points (akin to Barad’s agential cut), never inherent and pre-existing, 
but rather emergent, interior, and only possible within the phenomenon of meaning. 
Therefore, the ‘beginnings’ of the stories of the characters in Foe, including those of 
Susan, Cruso(e), Foe, or Friday, can be traced back to Defoe’s novel, earlier, or later, 
depending on the previous knowledge of the reader or the intended analytical goal of the 
critic.  
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On a more ontological level, the phenomenon of meaning is an ongoing event 
without beginning or end. Meaning does not begin with, nor end at, the text; it is a 
continuous becoming that exhibits a deep entanglement with the reader, the author, as 
well as other texts. In this sense, then, the meaning of the text ‘begins’, so to speak, in so 
far as we can determine the beginning of consciousness. 
4.2. Foe 
Coetzee wrote Foe explicitly as an engagement with Defoe’s RC and, to a lesser 
extent, his novel Roxana154. There are also allusions to some of Defoe’s other writings, 
such as Moll Flanders and The Apparition of Mrs. Veal, RC, however, remains the key 
text capable of unlocking the potential interpretive powers of Foe. Although it is not 
quite clear whether Coetzee has, in fact, read the entire trilogy, the first two volumes, or 
the first novel only, the events and characters of Foe suggest that they are solely based on 
RC1.155 
As I have noted earlier, critics believe that RC still ‘fathers’ an ever-growing 
number of novels, including Foe, which is widely considered to be a postmodern 
variation of RC. The connection between both texts is directly apparent, as Coetzee uses 
many elements of RC, including proper names, themes, and events. For example, both 
stories express a similar plot that involves a shipwreck, an isolated island, and a rescue 
attempt. They both include a castaway, a white, middle-aged man named Cruso(e), and a 
slave named Friday.  
However, Coetzee contrasts the similarities between the narratives whilst 
introducing striking differences. To begin with, Coetzee omits the ‘e’ from Crusoe. He 
also includes Defoe, the author, as a character in his novel whom he calls Foe (omitting 																																																								
154 As Tisha Turk notes, Coetzee’s borrowings from Roxana, unlike those from RC, have been discussed by 
a limited number of critics, including ‘Attridge, Marshall, David Attwell, Susan VanZanten Gallagher, 
Dominic Head, and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’ (302). The reader can conclude from the many hints 
provided in Foe that De(Foe) turns Susan’s story into another novel, Roxana, where Barton becomes a 
whore. Susan is, for instance, Roxana’s real name; she abandons her daughter in Deptford, where the 
daughter is born, and her father was a brewer. All of these hints come back in the form of a mysterious girl 
who hunts Susan in Foe, whom Susan denies as her daughter. 
155 For instance, in RC2, Friday is killed in a sea battle, which suggests that Coetzee wrote Foe based on the 
events of the first volume only. 
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the ‘De’ from Defoe’s name). These omissions play both on similarity and difference in 
order equally to invite and prevent the reader from presuming the origin/copy, 
before/after, and past/present relationships between the texts. Instead, these variations 
create a sense of parallelism between the two narratives. 
The rhetorical differences, however, are much more pronounced. The most 
notable alterations include the presence of a female castaway in Foe and the physical and 
behavioural changes of Friday, most notably his suggested tongue mutilation and 
inability to communicate. Also, while the first Crusoe has guns, seeds and keeps a journal 
to document his life on the island, this Cruso has none of these objects and expresses no 
interest in documentation.  Furthermore, while Crusoe is eventually saved and arrives 
safely in England, Cruso, who shows no interest in being saved in the first place, dies in 
the sea on his way there. These differences seem to challenge RC’s narrative on multiple 
levels: postcolonial, postmodern, feminist, historical, and others, as the extensive 
scholarship on Foe has sought to demonstrate.156 
Nevertheless, I wish to investigate not the differences per se but the effects these 
have on Defoe’s narrative. As I shall come to demonstrate, the intertextual relations 
between the texts are more than just allusion or simple parallelism; Foe acts as a 
transformative text, or hypertext157, as it alters ‘previous’ events and creates new ways of 
reading Defoe’s narrative. This power to change the meaning of RC is most evident in 
Susan Barton’s case. Coetzee introduces a female castaway who did not previously exist 
in RC. Susan meets Foe and has lengthy conversations with him, most of which revolve 
around how her survival story with Friday and Crusoe should be written. In one of her 																																																								
156 Extensive studies have been written on Coetzee’s Foe with references to postcolonial, feminist and 
postmodern contexts. Much is written on the tensions between male/female, master/slave, voiced/voiceless, 
speech/writing, and history/fiction. Examples of these studies, among many, include, on history: Brian 
Macaskill and Jeanne Colleran’s ‘Reading History, Writing Heresy: The Resistance of Representation and 
the Representation of Resistance in J. M. Coetzee's "Foe"’; on speech/writing: Abdel Karim Daragmeh and 
Ekremah Shehab’s ‘Signs Tell Their Own Stories: Rethinking the Status of Writing and Speech in J.M. 
Coetzee’s Foe’; on feminism/postcolonialism: Spivak’s ‘Theory in the Margin: Coetzee's Foe Reading 
Defoe's "Crusoe/Roxana"’, Mina Mehrabadi and Hossein Pirnajmuddin’s ‘(Hi)story in Search of 
Author(ity): Feminine Narration in J.M.Coetzee’s Foe’, Shadi Neimneh’s ‘Postcolonial Feminism: Silence 
and Storytelling in J. M. Coetzee’s Foe’, Robert M. Post’s ‘The Noise of Freedom: J. M. Coetzee's Foe’, 
and Sheila Roberts’ ‘“Post-colonialism, or the house of Friday” — J.M. Coetzee's Foe’. 
157 Transformative texts, or hypertexts, are literary texts that transform, either directly or indirectly, other 
literary texts (Genette 5,7). 
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dialogues with Foe, Susan anticipates that Foe would omit her presence from the story 
altogether when she announces, ‘“[b]etter had there been only Cruso and Friday,” you 
will murmur to yourself: “Better without the woman”’ (Foe 71-72).  These lines 
drastically change the way the reader judges the absence of females on the island in RC: 
there could have been a woman whose presence was omitted by the author. This 
possibility not only effects the fictional but also the historical narrative of RC and the 
survival stories upon which it is based, and from which possible female castaways could 
have been omitted.158 
This ability of the latter (Foe) to alter the previous narrative (RC) is a not a 
strange phenomenon in quantum logic. A similar idea of nonlinear, non-chronological 
effect is exhibited in Wheeler’s ‘delayed choice experiment’ in 1999, based on Young’s 
‘double-slit experiment’ from 1801 and its subsequent variations. One interpretation of 
the results of Wheeler’s experiment demonstrates that the experimenter’s later awareness 
of the system affects the history or past of the photons.159 This phenomenon raises 
questions concerning time’s arrow and, in particular, its direction and linearity. It also 
seems to suggest that consciousness can determine not only the present but also the past. 
Hence, the multidirectional connection between RC and Foe questions the significance of 
linearity and historicity in viewing the intertextual relations between those narratives. It 
offers a new reciprocal, entangled perspective that transcends these temporal 
structures.160 																																																								
158 Even in Foe, the possibility of Susan’s existence is never confirmed; even she herself seems to doubt her 
own existence, or ‘substantiality’, as she puts it. In fact, based on some clues, particularly in the last chapter 
of Foe, some commentators have argued that Susan might have been a ghost, or have not existed in the first 
place, or might have died before arriving at the island (Foss 14). However, the possibility of her existence 
after the publication of Foe now forever haunts RC and the survival stories at large. 
159 Wheeler’s experiment was designed so that the act of observation would not interfere with the behaviour 
of the photons in certain paths and that the wave function should not, therefore, collapse (as is the case with 
the double-slit experiment). The results of the experiment were unexpected; despite the complex setting 
which insured that photons were not observed while fired, and the path the photons take would be able to 
give the answer concerning which slit the photon passed through, the photons still created a clump instead 
of an interference pattern—apparently based on the observer’s knowledge of the system and his/her ability 
to infer, albeit indirectly and retrospectively, the slit through which the photon had passed. 
160 It is worth noting that in his essay ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’ (1919), T. S. Eliot expresses 
similar ideas of temporal entanglement, and the ability of the texts to affect one another without regard to 
their linearity/historicity. Eliot’s passage below can, self-evidently, be re-interpreted in the light of quantum 
theory: ‘No poet, no artist of any art, has his complete meaning alone. His significance, his appreciation is 
the appreciation of his relation to the dead poets and artists. You cannot value him alone; you must set him, 
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Moreover, similar to the observer-dependent interpretations of quantum theory, a 
key feature of any hypertext is the necessary presence of the reader’s consciousness, 
which not only interferes with, but also helps create, actualise, and determine the 
meaning of the text. Mills summarises the role of the reader/listener in actualising as well 
as re-creating stories; he writes, ‘[i]n a very true sense, there is no story unless there is 
someone to hear the story. Further, the story will die unless the one hearing continues the 
story by telling the story to another’ (‘Storytelling’). Mill’s statement suggests the 
significance of the reader/listener’s consciousness not only in actualising the stories but 
also in the continuation of their actualisation. As long as there is consciousness, there is 
meaning, or as Hirsch puts it, ‘there is no magic land of meaning outside … 
consciousness’ (‘Reinterpreted’ 202)161. The reader’s consciousness, therefore, is what 
ultimately determines the extent to which a text is transformative. Accordingly, Foe is a 
transformative narrative only for a reader who is aware of Defoe’s RC. 162 Therefore, the 
text does not inherently project either quality (that is, being (a) transformative or (b) not); 
rather, its transformative-ness and its extent emerges/changes through different readings. 
The reader’s consciousness thus actualises what is otherwise a world of different 
possibilities or, rather, from the perspective of MWI, different possible worlds. This role 
of the reader/observer shall be further elaborated on in relation to Foe’s last chapter. 
 																																																																																																																																																																					
for contrast and comparison, among the dead. I mean this as a principle of aesthetic, not merely historical, 
criticism. The necessity that he shall conform, that he shall cohere, is not one sided; what happens when a 
new work of art is created is something that happens simultaneously to all the works of art which preceded 
it. The existing monuments form an ideal order among themselves, which is modified by the introduction 
of the new (the really new) work of art among them. The existing order is complete before the new work 
arrives; for order to persist after the supervention of novelty, the whole existing order must be, if ever so 
slightly, altered; and so the relations, proportions, values of each work of art toward the whole are 
readjusted; and this is conformity between the old and the new. Whoever has approved this idea of order, of 
the form of European, of English literature will not find it preposterous that the past should be altered by 
the present as much as the present is directed by the past. And the poet who is aware of this will be aware 
of great difficulties and responsibilities’ (44-5). 
 
161 Hirsch’s full statement reads: ‘there is no magic land of meaning outside human consciousness’ ([my 
emphasis] 202), which is evidently problematic as it presumes that meaning is exclusive to language and 
humans. 
162 Turk similarly explains, ‘[a] reader who encounters Jean Rhys’s Wide Sargasso Sea without having read 
Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre may still enjoy the novel; she may still find it interesting, engaging, effective. 
But what she reads will be, in a very real sense, a different text than it would be for someone who brought 
to it a knowledge of Jane Eyre’ (296). 
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4.3. The Notion of Time 
RC follows a tedious linear chronology, consisting of a certain number of 
progressive, consequent events. The narrative, I argue, exemplifies the classical time 
structure in Newtonian physics in its linearity, sequence, and certainty. In their book 
Being Quantum: Ontological Storytelling in the Age of Antenarrative, Boje and 
Henderson explain that the Newtonian linear temporal paradigm is based on traditional 
science, supported by the second law of thermodynamics and increasing entropy. The 
observable irreversibility of some processes seemingly implies the idea of time’s arrow 
that only travels in one direction. As Frank Arntzenius puts it, ‘[t]ime, according to 
standard Newtonian physics, can be pictured as a one-dimensional line, consisting of an 
infinite sequence of instants, all lined up in order of occurrence’ (7). 
On the other hand, the linearity of time is deconstructed through temporal 
manipulation of/in Coetzee’s narrative. The narrative of Foe deconstructs this classical 
logic of time on many different levels. For example, through rhetorical effects, Coetzee 
writes Foe as if it predates the writing of RC and Roxana. The events seem to take place 
in the 18th century, and, as Jo Alyson Parker notes, ‘in order for Susan to meet (De)Foe, 
Coetzee has to move the events of Robinson Crusoe forward by about 30 years’ (20). 
However, there is no definitive moment in Defoe’s life where the events are located, 
leading to what Attridge describes as ‘chronological uncertainty’ which runs throughout 
the narrative (‘Oppressive’ 234).  
Indeed, Foe seems to correspond to the changing scientific perception of the 
notion of time, particularly with the emergence of quantum theory. Various alternative 
conceptions of time have since emerged, many of which are event-based.163 Furthermore, 																																																								
163 Boje & Henderson outline some key authors who propose an alternative event-based view of time. They 
mention Donald Roy’s concept of “Banana time” (1959), which links the punctuality of the work by 
particular events that are meaningful to the workers. Also, Marco Giuliani (2009) proposes time as 
‘sequence of key events’. Staudenmayer, Tyre, & Perlow (2002) suggest ‘temporal shifts are explained as 
shared experiences that alter perceptions of time, control over time, and its use’. In the context of market 
behaviours, Benoit Mandelbrot (2004), describes financial markets as ‘operating on their own trading 
time’, which is different from the default ‘clock time’ which we assume to be objective and accurate. 
Ronald Purser and Jack Petranker (2005) investigate multiple concepts of time, arguing for the present as 
the source of the future. Jeff Waistell (2006) argues for the role of metaphor in linking the past and future 
in human perception. As Boje & Henderson comment, viewing all of these works, all of these authors, 
despite their varying methods and arguments, treat time as a complex multidirectional concept instead of 
the traditional linear unidirectional view of time that has for long dominated our understanding of time (2-
3). 
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in his book Space, Time and Stuff, Frank Arntzenius argues for the radical idea that on a 
fundamental level, time has no structure at all. Consequently, there is no fundamental164 
truth not only regarding the universality and certainty of time, but its intrinsic 
implications such as linearity, history, beginnings, and ends. Arntzenius argues that 
human-based temporal structures are in fact derived from a fundamentally non-temporal 
structure (6).  He also notes that neither the Newtonian nor the relativistic physics 
contradict the fundamental assumptions that ‘at bottom, the world has no temporal 
structure whatsoever’ (6).165 What the current scientific views on time share, despite their 
varying methods and arguments, is the view of time as a complex multidirectional 
concept; the human linear sense of time is but a reflection of the local human 
consciousness. 
Foe expresses this temporal uncertainty by deconstructing temporal structures not 
only of but also within the narrative. Time appears to be unorganised and without 
dimensions. The island seems to exist beyond time; no sign of time or progression takes 
place, and time appears cyclical and almost still. Susan recalls, for example, that the ‘drab 
bushes’ that live on the island ‘never flowered and never shed their leaves’ (Foe 7). The 
characters’ perception of time also changes in the island. There is never a lack of time, as 
Susan notes (17). The days on the island are repetitive with hardly any signs of 
progression.  
The characters’ actions reflect this new perception. For example, while Defoe’s 
Crusoe was excellent at keeping time and consistently writing his journals, Cruso, on the 
other hand, seems uninterested in keeping time. Susan observes that Cruso did not keep 
any journal, paper, or ink, because ‘he lacked the inclination to keep one’. Keeping a 
journal entails accepting temporal notions such as time, history, linearity, progression, 
past, and future. Moreover, Susan could not find any evidence or carvings that show that 
Cruso ‘counted the years’ or the ‘cycles of the moon’ while staying on the island (16). 
Cruso’s cyclic philosophy of time is reflected in his statement: ‘we sleep, we eat, we live’ 																																																								
164 Arntzenius stresses on the word ‘fundamental’ so as not to dismiss the human consciousness’ sense of 
linearity and the traditional arrow of time, which are not completely wrong or irrelevant within the context 
of the human experience (5). 
165 For the detailed philosophical arguments on the non-structure nature of time see the first chapter of 
Arntzenius’s Space, Time and Stuff (5-38). 
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(32). Moreover, instead of performing actions that help the progression of events, Cruso 
engages in seemingly meaningless repetitive tasks, such as building numerous terraces 
and clearing the land in futile preparations that lead to nothing. Furthermore, Cruso is 
also not inclined to the idea of leaving the island, and is not looking forward to being 
rescued in the future; Susan notes that Cruso exhibited ‘indifference to salvation’ (14). 
Also, Cruso is not interested in Susan’s lengthy investigations about his and Friday’s 
past. His inconsistent stories concerning his and Friday’s past frustrate Susan. She 
remarks that Cruso seems to believe that his history of each one of them began with their 
arrival on the island and not before: ‘It was as though he wished his story to begin with 
his arrival on the island, and mine to begin with my arrival, and the story of us together to 
end on the island too’ (34).  
Clearly, the island, as well as the lives of the characters, is impossible to think of 
within the traditional structure of time. In her own attempt to narrate the events on the 
island in her writings to Foe, Susan seems unable to think beyond the cyclical structure 
that characterised their lives on the island. She raises this issue as she writes, ‘I have set 
down the history of our time on the island as well as I can, and enclose it herewith. It is a 
sorry, limping affair (the history, not the time itself)–“the next day," its refrain goes, "the 
next day . . . the next day"–but you will know how to set it right’ (47). Susan attempts to 
force a temporal structure on what seems to be a sequence of events that lacks the natural 
‘flow’ of time. As a mental structure, time seemingly ‘moves’ by manifestations of 
progression and irreversibility of actions and events; the lack of real progression on the 
level of characters and events, therefore, ‘paralyses’ the movement of time in the 
narrative. This confirms the subjectivity of the temporal experiences as well as the 
impossibility of objectivity of time beyond consciousness. Once the characters stop 
believing in, and showing, progress, time ceases to exist.  
Through this manipulation of temporal structures, Coetzee showcases the 
flexibility, non-universality, and ultimately, the non-fundamental nature of time. Instead, 
he presents a QPist alternative view of time as a complex, fluid, and multidirectional 
structure. This view carries many implications; one of which is the ability of the present 
to alter and change the past and the future through its ongoing becoming. In fact, the past 
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and the future are parallel structures that are but manifestations of the present’s 
becoming.  
The rewriting of (hi)story, hence, is not figurative in the traditional sense of 
‘revisiting history’, such as in Adrienne Rich’s notion of revision—or ‘re-vision’ as she 
puts it166. The revision I refer to here takes a more literal sense; it is based on the uncanny 
properties of texts I have previously explained, such as nonlocality, nonlinearity, 
parallelism, and entanglement not only on the level of meaning but also on the level of 
temporal significance. It involves complete omission, (re)creation, and manipulation of 
possible (hi)stories and alternative worlds. As Hayden White states, ‘[i]n choosing our 
past, we choose a present; and vice versa. We use the one to justify the other’ (135). It is 
a literal interpretation of the temporal entanglement. While this view of history is 
undoubtedly postmodernist, introducing it in the QPist framework suggests that this view 
goes beyond the epistemological to the ontological nature of history. If we were to accept 
quantum notions with relation to history, particularly the notion of entanglement, then we 
are introduced to the possibility of changing the past on a deeper level than that proposed 
by postmodernism. We access history not only through narrative, memory, and 
consciousness but also through our present actions; we, in other words, become our very 
pasts and futures with all the possibilities they open and entail. The ideas of revising 
history are clearly expressed in Foe, where, as I shall come to demonstrate, the theme of 
rewriting and altering the stories of the characters runs throughout the narrative, which 
forces the reader to constantly revise and alter the meaning as s/he reads. 
While the past and future are essentially written in the form of narratives, the 
present is necessarily unwriteable: the present can only become. The present (presence) 
is the only temporal unit of becoming; it does not refer to the classical temporal structure 
but to the opposite: the absence of all temporal structures. The unwritability of the 
present/presence is embodied in Friday’s silence. Friday’s inability to have a story of his 
own renders him with no history, future, or any historical record of existence except his 
present/presence. As a consequence of his unwritability, Friday exists in the narrative as a 																																																								
166 In her essay ‘When We Dead Awaken: Writing as Re-Vision’, Adrienne Rich writes, ‘Re-vision––the 
act of looking back, of seeing with fresh eyes, of entering an old text from a new critical direction––is for 
us more than a chapter in cultural history; it is an act of survival. Until we can understand the assumptions 
in which we are drenched we cannot know ourselves.’ (18). 
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shadow (115), a cold statue (70), without desires, dreams, fears, or imagination. As he 
has no story of his own, he exists on the margin of the other characters’ stories. 
Paradoxically, his silence/absence from/within the narrative is what renders him 
present/presence. His present/presence is not recognised by Susan and Foe who seem 
absorbed in their narratological/ontological battle, where their ‘substantiality’ is 
determined by the extent to which they can ‘narrate’ their existence in the past and future 
tenses.  
4.4. Between Fact and Fiction 
Coetzee destabilises the boundaries between history/story and fact/fiction by 
placing Defoe within the narrative—among the characters Defoe himself created—as 
another character named ‘Foe’.167 By manipulating the logics of history and time, 
Coetzee successfully ‘hacks’ Defoe’s narrative and engages the reader in what is 
seemingly the period of events that preceded, and led to, the writing of RC. By giving 
Defoe the same ontological level as his characters, Coetzee successfully disturbs the 
boundaries between history/fiction. In a similar manner, and in his Nobel lecture ‘He and 
his Man’ (referring to (De)Foe and Cruso(e)), Coetzee blurs any left distinction between 
the two. To Coetzee, both (De)Foe and Cruso(e) are characters with varying degree of 
fictionality; this stems from Coetzee’s contention in the fictionality of history as he 
declares: ‘history is nothing but a certain kind of story that people agree to tell each 
other’ (‘Novel’ 4). Coetzee, therefore, deconstructs the distinction between history/story 
through highlighting their shared narrativity. 
This blurring of fact/fiction is further emphasised when Susan reflects on her own 
and other characters’ existence, or substantiality, to use her term. She believes there are 
several orders of reality or different levels of ontological status. She suggests the 
existence of textual creatures—creatures of words with no substance, which emerge from 
the author’s imagination—and believes that the mysterious girl who follows her and 
																																																								
167 Placing Defoe inside the narrative is also an exemplification of the earlier discussion in Chapter Two on 
the inevitability of the author becoming part of the text. In Coetzee’s fiction, the fictionalised figures of 
Defoe, Dostoevsky, and Coetzee himself are all examples of this highly entangled relationship between the 
writer and the writing, and their ontological inseparability. 
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claims to be her daughter is a character of Foe’s imagination (Foe 133). Furthermore, in 
one metafictional moment, Susan’s certainty suddenly collapses: ‘[n]othing is left to me 
but doubt. I am doubt itself. Who is speaking me? Am I a phantom too? To what order do 
I belong? And you: who are you?'’ (133). Not only Susan, but the reader too cannot 
determine whether, for instance, the mysterious girl is Susan’s lost daughter, or part of a 
script Foe has written for Susan. All the characters in Foe exist, more or less, on the same 
ontological level of uncertainty, particularly in the final chapter, as we shall come to see. 
This ontological uncertainty indirectly invites the reader to question his/her own 
substantiality. In many ways, the reader, as I have demonstrated in Chapter Two, through 
becoming within the phenomenon of meaning, is inevitably entangled with the characters. 
Questioning the characters’ substantiality necessarily entails questioning his/her own. 
However, counterintuitively, it is the question itself—not the answer—that is 
problematic. The characters or the reader are fictional or real and opposed to, and in 
comparison with, whom? The distinction between fact/fiction is but an indirect 
manifestation of the profound commitment to representationalism and the inherent belief 
in externalism and Platonic dualism. Thus, instead of asking if Susan, Foe, the girl, or 
even the reader are definitive ‘facts’ or ‘fictions’, the questioning turns to the question 
itself: what is ‘fact’ and what is ‘fiction’ beyond the immediate present/presence, and 
particularly within the context of the phenomenon of meaning? Coetzee’s blurring 
between fact/fiction and history/storytelling becomes thus more justified.  
Although readers of Foe might get the impression that they are going to be 
offered an alternative account of what happened on Cruso(e)’s island, this is not what 
transpires. The novel does not offer an alternative reading of RC; rather, it distorts all 
possible readings of what actually happened on the island, and, instead, opens an array of 
possibilities of what could have happened. Through Cruso’s inconsistent accounts of his 
and Friday’s history, and through Susan’s writings to, and conversations with, Foe, and 
finally through the anonymous narrator of the final chapter, these characters offer 
multiple, parallel, and contradictory, accounts of each story, without validating any over 
the others, leaving the reader with several possible paths for each story of the characters 
(Cruso, Friday, Susan, Foe, and the mysterious girl). 
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The reader, for instance, does not know the exact history of Cruso, what brought 
him to the island and how he met Friday, despite Susan’s frequent interrogations. Susan 
narrates,  
I would gladly now recount to you the history of this singular Cruso, as I 
heard it from his own lips. But the stories he told me were so various, and 
so hard to reconcile one with another, that I was more and more driven to 
conclude age and isolation had taken their toll on his memory, and he no 
longer knew for sure what was truth, what fancy. Thus one day he would 
say his father had been a wealthy merchant whose counting-house he had 
quit in search of adventure. But the next day he would tell me he had been 
a poor lad of no family who had shipped as a cabin-boy and been captured 
by the Moors (he bore a scar on his arm which was, he said, the mark of 
the branding- iron) and escaped and made his way to the New World. 
Sometimes he would say he had dwelt on his island the past fifteen years, 
he and Friday, none but they having been spared when their ship went 
down (11-2). 
Similarly, Friday’s life and history remain a mystery. According to Cruso’s conflicting 
accounts of what happened to Friday, Susan does not know conclusively if Friday is a 
cannibal, a slave, or whether his mutilation is caused by slave traders or by Cruso himself 
(or whether it is, in fact, real as Susan comments in retrospect). Furthermore, the reader is 
unable to decide whether Susan has in fact lost a daughter, and whether she actually lived 
on the island, whether she drowned before arriving in England as the scene in the last 
chapter suggests, or whether she, in fact, exists at all as some commentators have argued 
(Foss 14). The reader is also uncertain of the nature of the affairs between Susan on the 
one hand, and Cruso, the Captain, and Foe on the other. The reader never knows the truth 
of the mysterious girl who claims to be Susan’s lost daughter, with whom Susan denies 
any relationship, claiming she is an actress whom Foe hires. It is also not clear what Foe 
is hiding from, and if he, in fact, met Susan and had a relationship with her, or if he wrote 
this novel or was merely a character in Susan’s narrative. These scenarios coexist as 
parallel possibilities; the reader is not rewarded with any resolution or provided with any 
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hint to validate any particular possibility over the others. 
On the level of technique, and to create these parallels, Coetzee repeats sentences, 
scenes, and events with some variations, including altering descriptions, changing the 
tenses of the verbs, adding or omitting details, replacing the setting or the medium with 
which the utterances are delivered. These varying techniques are meant to generate 
parallel (but not identical) possibilities where the reader is introduced to what s/he feels is 
a familiar situation, only with slight variations to create different impressions and 
multiple possibilities of the same situation. One of these instances can be seen in Susan’s 
words with which the narrative begins: 
At last I could row no further. My hands were blistered, my back was 
burned, my body ached. With a sigh, making barely a splash, I slipped 
overboard. With slow strokes, my long hair floating about me, like a 
flower of the sea, like an anemone, like a jellyfish of the kind you see in 
the waters of Brazil, I swam towards the strange island, for a while 
swimming as I had rowed, against the current, then all at once free of its 
grip, carried by the waves into the bay and on to the beach (5). 
After a few pages, Susan recounts her story to Cruso in their first encounter; she begins 
by recalling her background followed by the abduction of her daughter. She then talks 
about her arrival on the island: ‘[t]hen at last I could row no further. My hands were raw, 
my back was burned, my body ached. With a sigh, making barely a splash, I slipped 
overboard and began to swim towards your island. The waves took me and bore me on to 
the beach. The rest you know’ (11). There are several notable differences between the 
two quotations. The first appears to be an official beginning of both Coetzee’s narrative 
and Susan’s story. However, in the second quotation, the same words are placed in 
another story within the larger context of Susan’s life, thus exemplifying the 
impossibility of a single beginning—or arguably any beginning. Every event is a possible 
beginning and a possible end, while simultaneously forever becoming-in-between. Susan 
precedes the narration of the event in the second quotation by the word ‘then’, which 
effectively cancels what the reader assumed to be the beginning of the narrative. 
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In the final chapter of the novel, the same sentence appears again in a different 
context. The anonymous narrator finds a ‘tall, looping script’ which he begins to read; ‘I 
read the first words of the tall, looping script: 'Dear Mr Foe, At last I could row no 
further’ (155). Unlike the previous examples, this time, the reader is abruptly faced with 
the nature of the narrative. The sentence appears to represent both a faux ending of the 
previous narrative and a faux beginning of a new ontologically different narrative. 
Whether these characters have existed, even merely as characters, or whether these events 
have taken place, even as fictional events, or whether this is all in the reader’s ‘head’, is 
now uncertain.  
These three quotations seem to introduce the same story in vastly different 
contexts; one as a beginning of a text (in real time), another is a beginning within the 
narrative (in narrative time), and a third as an ending of the previous world and a 
beginning of an entirely different reality (in QPist time). This not only successfully 
creates parallel possibilities, but also, and most importantly, multiple realities. Drawing 
from the MWI, it is not unacceptable to suggest that all these possibilities have taken 
place in three different hermeneutic universes. According to the MWI, all possible 
alterations of pasts and futures are equally real; for every possibility, a new universe 
unfolds. The ‘real’, or, in more accurate term, the ‘experienced’ universe/meaning is only 
one actualisation of many.  
Another example occurs in the third chapter; it begins with the sentence: ‘The 
staircase was dark and mean’ (113) which is repeated in the fourth chapter with a slight 
difference: ‘The staircase is dark and mean.’ (153). Clearly, the difference lies in the 
grammatical structure of both sentences; the past tense in the first occurrence of the 
sentence changes into the present. Furthermore, the staircase scenes are delivered in 
different contexts. The first takes place when Susan stands in front of Foe’s apartment; 
she narrates, ‘[t]he staircase was dark and mean. My knock echoed as if on emptiness. 
But I knocked a second time, and heard a shuffling, and from behind the door a voice, his 
voice, low and cautious. 'It is I, Susan Barton,' I announced’’ (113). In the second scene, 
however, the anonymous narrator stands in front of Defoe’s house and speaks in the 
present tense (155). The scenes get even more complicated in reference to another, earlier 
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occurrence of the staircase in one of Susan’s conversations with Foe: ‘‘Listen! I describe 
the dark staircase, the bare room, the curtained alcove, particulars a thousand times more 
familiar to you than to me; I tell of your looks and my looks, I relate your words and 
mine. Why do I speak, to whom do I speak, when there is no need to speak?’’ (133). 
Although probable, given the consistent clues, it is nonetheless impossible to fully 
determine whether these scenes refer to the same staircase. However, the occurrence and 
significance of the staircase changes in every scene. Other uncertainties include whether 
Susan, in fact, went to Foe’s house, whether this is all of her or Foe’s imaginings, 
whether the anonymous narrator has stepped into their actual world or inside their story. 
These clues are all left to the reader to make sense of. 
Another repetition takes place in the last chapter. The anonymous narrator enters 
the house; two pages later, the narrator enters the same house again, repeating the same 
scene, only realising certain things he had missed in the previous scene. The first scene 
begins as follows: 
I stumble over a body. It does not stir, it makes no sound. By the light of a 
match I make out a woman or a girl, her feet drawn up inside a long grey 
dress, her hands folded under her armpits; or is it that her limbs are 
unnaturally short, the stunted limbs of a cripple? Her face is wrapped in a 
grey woollen scarf. I begin to unwrap it, but the scarf is endless. Her head 
lolls. She weighs no more than a sack of straw. The door is not locked. 
Through a solitary window moonlight floods the room. There is a quick 
scurrying across the floor, a mouse or a rat. They lie side by side in bed, 
not touching. The skin, dry as paper, is stretched tight over their bones. 
Their lips have receded, uncovering their teeth, so that they seem to be 
smiling. Their eyes are closed (153). 
The narrator enters for the second time to what appears to be the same place: 
I enter. Though it is a bright autumn day, light does not penetrate these 
walls. On the landing I stumble over the body, light as straw, of a woman 
or a girl. The room is darker than before; but, groping along the mantel, I 
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find the stub of a candle and light it. It bums with a dull blue flame. The 
couple in the bed lie face to face, her head in the crook of his arm. (155) 
The narrator enters again through a staircase, this time under the sea: 
I come to a bulkhead and a stairway. The door at the head of the stairway 
is closed; but when I put a shoulder to it and push, the wall of water yields 
and I can enter. It is not a country bath-house. In the black space of this 
cabin the water is still and dead, the same water as yesterday, as last year, 
as three hundred years ago. Susan Barton and her dead captain, fat as pigs 
in their white nightclothes, their limbs extending stiffly from their trunks, 
their hands, puckered from long immersion, held out in blessing, float like 
stars against the low roof. I crawl beneath them. (156-7) 
There is enough consistency and familiarity between the three scenes, yet there is enough 
difference to alert the reader of the parallel realities these scenes represent. The first 
scene takes place at night while the ‘moonlight floods the room’, whereas the second 
takes place in a ‘bright autumn day’. The narrator stumbles upon a body in both scenes. 
S/he finds ‘the couple’ dead, lying in bed, side by side, not touching, in the first scene, 
and face to face, with her head in his arm, in the second. The dead bodies are referred to 
as ‘they’ and ‘the couple’ and the reader, based on the previous chapter, instantly 
assumes they are the bodies of Foe and Susan.  
The third scene, however, takes place underwater inside a new shipwreck that has 
not been mentioned. It seemingly concerns the ‘rescue ship’ in the main narrative, which 
saves Susan and Friday, while Cruso dies on board, and takes them from the island to 
England. The couple in this scene is identified as Susan and ‘her dead captain’. This 
scene forces the reader to revise the meaning of the previous events in an attempt to make 
sense of the unfolding narrative: if Susan and Friday drowned before arriving at the 
England, then the following events, which constitute the majority of the novel, have not 
taken place. They could have been merely Foe’s creations or the writings of another 
author who could also be the narrator of the last chapter. There is an even more unsettling 
possibility; if this shipwreck is the one that carried Susan before arriving at the island, 
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then Susan has never existed, which leads us back to Defoe’s original story where there is 
no female presence. All of these remain possibilities the narrative suggests but does not 
confirm. 
In the last chapter, the narrator describes three encounters with Friday’s body—or 
three bodies of Friday. These encounters behave as if they build on each other and at the 
same time seem to contradict one another in some of their details. In the first encounter, 
the narrator finds Friday ‘stretched at full length on his back’; after testing his pulse and 
trying to find signs of life, Friday turns on his side (154). In the second encounter, Friday 
turns to the wall. The third encounter involves Friday’s body half buried in the mud, with 
‘his hands between his thighs’ (157). One of the notable differences in these encounters is 
the presence/absence of Friday’s necklace, which was given to him by Susan (in the main 
narrative) when they arrive to England to testify to his freedom. In the first scene, the 
narrator describes in detail his first encounter with Friday’s body; in the entire page-
length description, the narrator does not mention any sign of Friday’s necklace (154). 
Unlike the first, the description of the second encounter is very brief; the narrator 
suddenly realises s/he had missed the mark on Friday’s neck: ‘[a]bout his neck - I had not 
observed this before - is a scar like a necklace, left by a rope or chain’ (155). In the last 
encounter, the narrator finds Friday underwater, inside the shipwreck; ‘I come to Friday. I 
tug his woolly hair, finger the chain about his throat’ (157). In the three encounters, the 
necklace presents three possibilities: it does not exist, a trace of it exits, and it is still on 
Friday’s neck. Again, there is no reason for the reader to favour any of these 
possibilities—the necklace may have or may not have existed. 
Moreover, Foe has not one but three endings. As Parker notes, one ending 
concerns the main narrative while the other two are metaleptic: ‘[i]n one ending, Susan 
and Foe begin to teach Friday to write; in another, Friday voices the sounds of the island; 
and in yet another, he voices his indictment’ (36). The first ending (Foe 152) takes place 
before the last chapter; it marks a break between the main narrative and the uncanny 
narrative of chapter IV. The second ending, two pages later, ends with the sentence: 
‘From his mouth, without a breath, issue the sounds of the island’ (154). Despite giving 
the illusion of an ending, the narrative continues for three more pages as a repetition of 
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the last couple of pages with the variations discussed above, and the actual text ends with 
the scene of Friday underwater (157). Similar to the beginning of the narrative, which 
gets misplaced in the middle of another story, the ending is also unsettled by offering 
three alternatives to emphasise the multiple realities of the narrative, as well as the 
impossibility of a definitive ending. Furthermore, the tension the reader feels as a result 
of the unresolved questions, particularly in the last chapter, represents another way of 
destabilising the sense of closure the reader anticipates as s/he gets closer towards the end 
of the text. In this sense, Foe is intentionally written as an antinarrative to disappoint the 
reader as it grants him/her no beginning, no events, and no ending. 
The multiple realities and the many possibilities of stories offered in Foe are 
impossible to falsify, separate, isolate or discard, as they all exist as parallels with no core 
story to anchor them. This technique is what Gary Saul Morson refers to as 
sideshadowing; it represents the opposite idea of the narrative as a ‘closed system’ where 
a single beginning and a set of events neatly lead towards a cohesive ending. Morson 
defines sideshadowing as ‘two or more alternative presents, the actual and the possible, 
are made simultaneously visible. This is a simultaneity not in time but of times: we do not 
see contradictory actualities, but one possibility that was actualized and, at the same 
moment, another that could have been but was not’ (118). Interestingly enough, the 
definition of sideshadowing ‘parallels’ the definition of quantum logic as ‘the 
simultaneous coexistence of several different possibilities. Each possibility, under the 
right circumstances has a probability of being observed’ (Mills ‘Storytelling’). 
Foe takes sideshadowing a step further by destabilising the boundaries (as shall be 
seen in the last chapter of Foe) between the actualised and the possible presents. This 
unconditional openness to, and endorsement of, the possibilities of the narrative, without 
a guiding/actualised story/possibility, can be described as a quantum posthumanist 
narrative [QPN]. This type of narrative utilises different techniques (as we shall come to 
see more clearly) to achieve its parallelism, multidirectionality, and uncertainty. QPN 
thus accommodates all possibilities without fearing contradictions and embraces all the 
alternative narratives including its anti-narrative(s). As demonstrated, Coetzee achieves 
this by changing the accounts, versions, and stories of the characters, while leaving others 
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unresolved either through contradictions or withheld details. These unresolved accounts 
of stories become later a source of profound clarity: stories are versions of each other 
without an original story they refer to. This extends to Defoe’s narrative; it is only a 
possibility of what could have been written and is not more ‘original’ than the other 
possibilities other narratives have since offered.  
As I have argued so far, QPN embodies the posthumanist impossibility of the 
notion of ‘origin’, which extends to the ultimate of ‘origin’: the origin of Man at the heart 
of humanist ideals. Although Darwinian theory has refuted the sacred origin, it 
nonetheless proposed the animalistic origin of the human. The QPist view, however, 
deconstructs the very concept of origin altogether. It replaces the need for origin with 
notions of entanglement, nonlinearity, multiplicity, and parallelism. Through Foe, not 
only is the originality of Defoe’s narrative contested but also, and most importantly, the 
need for such a linear perspective. Instead, the narratives that preceded and followed the 
publication RC, as well as the possible stories of each character within Foe, are viewed as 
parallel narratives. Another implication of this QPN is the multiplicity of possible truths, 
and hence, the impossibility of truth. Truth (as a singular noun) necessarily requires a 
single narrative that discards all the other narratives—a view that fundamentally violates 
the premise of QP premise and the QPN. Furthermore, truth is essentially an end, another 
impossibility in the constantly becoming world of QP. Truth, therefore, becomes 
insignificant and arguably irrelevant in the QPN where the emphasis lies in the dynamic 
process and relations (becomings) rather than that the static outcome/results/ends.  
Foe, as I have argued so far, is a QPN par excellence. The narrative does not 
progress or regress; it instead shifts the focus to the dynamics of the narrative itself. 
Through various techniques, it manipulates its relationships with other texts, repositions 
its beginning(s) and destabilises ending(s). Every story of and within the narrative 
multiplies into other possibilities for other realities. 
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4.5. Chapter IV168 and the Reader 
The main narrative ends at chapter III with Susan and Foe trying to teach Friday 
how to write. The following chapter, also the final chapter of Foe, starts with an 
anonymous first-person narrator who enters a house, which s/he later identifies as 
Defoe’s, and where s/he finds ‘the couple’s dead bodies’ (presumably Susan and Foes’) 
and Friday’s struggling body. Notably, the chapter does not seem to be a continuation of 
the main narrative for semantic, linguistic, and thematic reasons. The logic of time, space, 
and language is impaired. Time appears fluid and undefined, scenes are incoherent and 
cyclic, and language is repetitive and inconsistent. The chapter, nonetheless, holds dense 
intratextual relations with the main narrative; as Marco Caracciolo notes, ‘[e]verything 
looks eerily familiar to the reader, and yet there are inconsistencies between this chapter 
and the rest of the book’ (‘Foe’ 94). It is a liminal narrative that seems to have elements 
from the main narrative and from the real world, which allows for the creation of a 
narrative in-between. 
In this chapter, Coetzee introduces what can be truly described as a QPN. It is 
posthumanist as it downplays the centrality of meaning, reasoning, logic, and language. It 
is quantum as it deconstructs the notions of time, space, and linearity, and celebrates 
uncertainty, parallelism, and contingency. Also, the narrative deconstructs the classical 
notion of causality, a foundational concept in the classical physical paradigm. The events 
do not follow the logical sequence of cause and effect. Furthermore, they do not progress 
or build up into a conclusion. Consequently, the chapter exhibits extreme temporal, 
spatial, and linguistic uncertainty, more so than the main narrative. 
In this transitional, uncanny space, all the textual creatures are dead: Susan, Foe, 
the Captain; only the new narrator and Friday survive. Since Friday could not be 
incorporated into the figurative world of Cruso, Susan, and Foe, he is the only character 
to stay alive in the last chapter, where language proves impossible. Along with Friday, a 
new first-person narrator steps in; s/he seems familiar with the story and the names of the 																																																								
168 Coetzee, as a great admirer of Samuel Beckett, might have drawn inspiration for his ending from Watt, 
which offers a similar ending to Foe. Coetzee, nonetheless, seems to transfer this technique into a more 
political context. 
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characters, yet ontologically detached from them, seemingly existing in a parallel reality. 
Critics have different opinions regarding the identity of this narrator. Some critics 
suggest that it might be an unnamed character, a fictional narrator (Bongie 264), a 
fictionalisation of Coetzee himself (Marais 14), or ‘an imaginative merging of character 
and author’ (Parker 35). Others suggest that Friday is the narrator; they argue that since 
this chapter creates an impossible reality, only a character like Friday can be a narrator 
for that world (Doležel 221–2). 
However, I argue that the narrator is a fictional stand-in for the reader as Marco 
Caracciolo proposes169. The narrator comes from a different reality than that of the 
characters. As Caracciolo puts it, the narrator does not seem to be on the same 
ontological level as the other characters (91). There are several clues to suggest this; for 
example, the narrator finds the manuscript of Susan’s narrative that she sent to Foe: 
‘[b]ringing the candle nearer, I read the first words of the tall, looping script: 'Dear Mr 
Foe, At last I could row no further'’ (Foe 155). The narrator is also able to read the sign 
on Foe’s house as ‘Daniel Defoe, Author’ (155), thus clearly declaring the extratextual 
reference to Defoe’s narratives. Furthermore, upon inspecting Friday’s body, the narrator 
confirms details of Susan’s narrative: ‘[i]t is indeed like lambswool’. Also, as s/he tries to 
listen to Friday’s breath, s/he confirms, ‘as she said, the roar of waves in a seashell’ 
(154). Furthermore, the narrator’s uses pronouns to refer to the characters instead of their 
proper names, implying his/her familiarity with the main narrative. The narrator also 
seems particularly interested in continuing Susan’s attempts to decipher Friday’s silence. 
All of these clues suggest that the narrator is a fictionalisation of the reader. 
Moreover, the narrative seems to be mentally constructed; as it collapses, 
changes, and repeats itself, it appears to portray fragments of the shifting consciousness 
of the reader as s/he tries to make sense of the narrative. Caracciolo suggests that this 
chapter is a hermeneutic space, ‘a metafictional allegory for the hermeneutic interaction 
between readers and texts’ (92). What Caracciolo refers to as the hermeneutic space I 
propose as a QPist embodiment of the intra-activity and the lack of inherent boundaries 																																																								
169 For the detailed argument on the reader as the narrator of the fourth chapter of Foe, see Caracciolo’s  
‘J. M. Coetzee’s Foe and the Embodiment of Meaning’. 
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between the agencies of meaning in their becoming within the phenomenon of meaning. 
Indeed, the reader becoming-(within)-the-narrative goes beyond the simple 
interaction between the reader and the text. As I have argued so far, the reader constitutes 
an integral part of the formation of meaning within the literary event. The significance of 
Foe’s last chapter is that it portrays the embodiment of the reader’s becoming within the 
phenomenon of meaning. The narrative forces the reader to contemplate the act of reading 
while reading; in other words, it allows the reader the rare opportunity to witness his/her 
becoming. Thus, and instead of ‘hypnotising’ the reader through an emotionally guided 
narrative towards a rewarding ending, this reflective QPN ‘awakens’ the reader to the 
entangled nature of the phenomenon of meaning by allowing him/her to witness it from 
within. The reader simultaneously reads and observes his/her reading as s/he tries to 
make sense of the narrative(s). Thus, while the reader expects to continue to gaze through 
the imaginary glass that s/he feels ontologically separates him/her from the characters in 
the main narrative; s/he, nevertheless, faces a mirror in the last chapter that forces 
him/her reflect on his/her presence within the narrative. The possible/parallel narrative 
paths thus become flickers of the possibilities of the reader’s consciousness.  
By contemplating his/her futile attempts to make sense of the narrative, the actual 
reader might finally see that his/her quest to find a single meaning is inherently flawed. 
Stories are multifaceted and entangled; isolating a single story or believing in the 
possibility of a single account is necessarily partial. Caracciolo mentions that the reader 
has been chosen to be the one who ‘dives’ in the shipwreck to find out the truth. In one of 
their conversations, Susan asks Foe, ‘But who will do it?’ I asked. ‘It is easy enough to 
lie in bed and say what must be done, but who will dive into the wreck? . . . But if Friday 
cannot tell us what he sees, is Friday in my story any more than a figuring (or 
prefiguring) of another diver?’ (Foe 142). Caracciolo argues that the reader is the only 
one who can dive into the wreck to find out what happened to Friday. The reader does 
indeed dive into the wreck in the last few pages (Foe 155). As Caracciolo explains, the 
act of diving is but ‘an embodiment of the reader trying to make sense of the novel, and 
of Friday’s silence in particular’ (96); the reader’s diving, however, ends in vein as s/he 
learns nothing about what happened to Friday. 
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However, I believe this ‘diving’ is a mockery of the countless attempts of Susan, 
the reader (and the critic) to find a truth that supposedly underlies the inconsistent events 
of the narrative. If this diving were to resolve the questions of the narrative, it would 
necessarily entail that all the possibilities will have to be homogenised and moulded into 
one single narrative that cancels all the others. Consequently, the narrative would be 
refuting the very QPist qualities I argue it embodies. The diving of the reader, thus, had 
to fail for the QPN to succeed. 
However, hypothetically, if truth were possible, it would necessarily be beyond 
the realm of possibilities, which prompts its impossibility within the linguistic and 
quantum realms. Both the linguistic and the quantum entities are anti-truths in their 
proximity, probability, and parallelism. Since truth is not a linguistic or a physical entity, 
it is beyond human conceptualisations. Morton refers to this inaccessibility as withdrawn; 
he writes, ‘[w]ithdrawn doesn’t mean hard to find or even impossible to find yet still 
capable of being visualized or mapped or plotted. Withdrawn doesn’t mean spatially, or 
materially or temporally hidden yet capable of being found, if only in theory. Withdrawn 
means beyond any kind of access, any kind of perception or map or plot or test or 
extrapolation’ (Realistic 54). This impossibility of any epistemological accessibility is 
acknowledged in quantum theory with regard to uncovering the nature of reality. In his 
essay ‘Realism and Objectivism in Quantum Mechanics’, Karakostas maintains,‘[w]ithin 
the domain of quantum mechanics, knowledge of ‘reality in itself’, ‘the real such as it 
truly is’ independent of the way it is contextualized, is impossible in principle’(1).170  
This view is key to understanding the impossibility of truth in Foe in general and 
Friday’s story in particular. The impossibility of truth is embodied in Friday’s silence in 
its impenetrable resistance to any linguistic mediation. The last chapter can be seen thus 
as an extension of Friday’s silence in its attempt to deconstruct language from within. 
The ‘real such as truly is’ echoes in the narrator/reader’s words as s/he describes the 
space of the narrative: ‘[t]his is a place where bodies are their own signs’ (157). Only 
through the impossibility of representation can truth be ‘possible’, and only through 
silence can truth be ‘spoken’. 																																																								
170 I discuss the realist/antirealist debate in quantum theory in more depth in the footnotes in the concluding 
chapter of the thesis. 
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4.6. RC, Foe, and the Dilemma of Representation 
The contrast between RC and Foe opens the door for consideration of the 
perennial realist/antirealist debate171. As a novel, RC is realist both in its themes and 
narrative techniques. However, most importantly, RC is a realist novel in so far as it 
regards the novel as a true reflection of human experience. In his commentary on Defoe, 
Ian Watt describes this as formal realism172; he explains that Defoe builds his entire 
narrative based on the premise of offering a full report of the human experience, and his 
narrative, therefore, is saturated with details of the story, including incredible 
specifications of times, places, and events (32). More comprehensively than any writer 
before him, Watt argues, Defoe expresses varied elements of individualism that 
accompanied the rise of the novel (62). Furthermore, thematically, as Watt notes, Crusoe 
leaves his home and family to improve his economic status, a ‘classic reason of homo 
economicus’ (65). What distinguishes RC from most of the travellers in literature is that it 
clearly embodies the ‘tendencies of the life of his time’ (67). Moreover, RC exhibits the 
classic dualism between soul and body, represented in Crusoe’s merchandise and world 
travels on the one hand, and his Christian faith and strong belief in God, and his 
reflections on his life as a sinner on the other. 
Foe, on the other hand, seems to be written as a postmodern antirealist response to 
RC’s realism. As I have already explained in detail, on multiple levels, Foe’s narrative 
techniques challenge the idea of (hi)story as a representation of reality. Contrary to the 
sense of completeness and linearity the reader gets from reading RC, the reader of Foe 
struggles to make sense of the narrative. This question of representation is also carried 																																																								
171 Depending on what we mean by realism and in which context it is used, realism has several meanings; 
Ruth Ronen sums up the main types of realism: (1) Realism is metaphysically a doctrine stating the 
existence, or possible existence, of a nonconceptual domain. (2) Realism is ontologically a belief in the 
independent existence of two separate orders: the order of the real and the order of the linguistic; entities of 
language designate entities in reality. (3) Realism is epistemically the view that there is at least a partial 
access from language to reality. (4) Realism is semantically the assumption that access from the order of 
language to the order of the real is based on a relation of a particular kind (of representation, 
approximation, convergence, accuracy, truth, correspondence, or their likes) (191). 
In the context of RC, we can trace these different types of realism, whether on the level of themes and 
narrative techniques, or in the existential beliefs of Crusoe himself. 
172 Watt describes formal realism as ‘[t]he narrative method whereby the novel embodies [a] circumstantial 
view of life’ (32). 
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thematically in the novel through Susan’s lengthy contemplations, and conversations 
with, Foe on storytelling, and her metafictional moments on the representational powers 
of language, stories, and history. 
Evidently, RC presumes a prior, logical, chronological reality and its 
‘representability’, echoing the Classical Newtonian physics of presupposing the existence 
of inherent pre-existing values of objects prior to measurement. Foe, on the other hand, 
does not make such a presumption; the stories of Cruso, Susan, Friday, and Foe are 
constantly revisited and their beginnings altered, making it impossible for the reader to 
build the scattered events into a coherent story or to imagine any events pre-existing the 
moment of narration. Furthermore, similar the Newtonian detached observer, the reader 
of RC is treated as an external observer to the meaning of the narrative. The narrative is 
written as a closed system of meaning where there is little to no significance of the reader 
within the narrative. On the other hand, the reader steps into Coetzee’s narrative and 
becomes-the-narrative. Positioning the reader within the narrative is both a testimony and 
an embodiment of the impossibility of an external observer outside any phenomenon of 
becoming.  
The intra-active world Coetzee creates where he lets the reader into the narrative 
signifies the QPist lack of inherent boundaries between the real and the virtual 
summarised by Herbrechter: ‘in the age of virtualization [...] factual-constative and 
performative-fictional forms of knowledge can no longer clearly be distinguished’ (176). 
By positioning the observer/reader within the narrative, Coetzee abolishes the boundaries 
between reader/author, external/internal, real/virtual, and ultimately fiction/nonfiction. 
Additionally, the understanding of the role of the reader’s consciousness within the 
narrative through entanglement and interference carries similar implications. Since 
consciousness is equally implemented within the fictional and nonfictional constructions 
of reality, or, as Hirsch’s earlier statement suggests that ‘there is no magic land of 
meaning outside … consciousness (‘Reinterpreted’ 202), then, consequently, the 
fictional/nonfictional distinction is permanently disturbed.173 This leaves us with the most 																																																								
173 It is important here that this statement is not confused with the antirealist argument that proposes that 
consciousness is the ultimate creator of reality. I argue here for an entangled agnostic view where our 
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entangled view of the literary event as being ontologically indistinguishable from all 
other phenomena of meaning. This conclusion illuminates a new angle in reading 
Coetzee’s different attempts to disturb the boundaries between histories/stories and 
fact/fiction—a theme that runs in Foe and Coetzee’s work at large. 
My proposition concerning the nature of the literary event as a phenomenon of 
meaning can be summarised from all the previous discussions as the following: 
• The literary event emerges through the entanglement of the agencies of 
meaning (the author, the reader, and the text). 
• The distinctions between the agencies of meaning are flexible, temporary, 
agential cuts within the phenomenon of meaning. 
• Meaning is emergent; it has is no inherent, definitive values prior to 
reading. 
• The author, reader, and text are entangled with the meaning they claim as 
theirs. 
• There is nothing outside the phenomenon, including the phenomenon of 
meaning. 
• The ultimate subject/observer of the phenomenon of meaning is the 
emergent event itself. 
• The reader effect influences the meaning making from within. 
• The literary phenomenon is indistinguishable from all others phenomena 
of meaning that happen on the level of consciousness. 
 
 
 
																																																																																																																																																																					
perception/experience of the world is a manifestation of both consciousness and reality becoming—or 
emerging through each another—not where one of these is the object/consequence of the other. This view 
implies neither the possibility nor the impossibility of an objective reality; however, it suggests the 
impossibility of an objective perception that is not consciousness-based. I extend on this argument in the 
concluding chapter of the thesis. 
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CONCLUSION  
Suppressing the Blind Spot: Contemplating the Worlds of Science and Fiction 
 
QP has a fundamental task to accomplish: to destabilise the boundaries between 
science and literature and to envisage human knowledge as an entangled and emergent 
whole. The underlying assumption of the thesis from the beginning is the entanglement of 
human knowledge. The aim of this view is to deconstruct Aristotle’s division of 
disciplines that is deeply rooted in the Western tradition and our perception of knowledge 
in general.  
Bohr states that the goal of quantum mechanics is not to uncover truth but 
discover relations: ‘[i]n our description of nature the purpose is not to disclose the real 
essence of phenomena but only to track down as far as possible relations between the 
multifold aspects of our experience’ (Atomic 18). In a similar fashion, and through the 
merging of quantum theory with critical posthumanism to the casual (and arguably 
speculative) use of many quantum terms in the literary analysis of Coetzee’s texts, the 
aim of the thesis is not to prove or validate but rather to experiment and to contribute to 
establishing a sense of familiarity and connection between science and literature.  
In this section, I advance my proposition on entanglement by arguing that the 
modelling of human knowledge, including science and literature, shares broad principles 
and practices. I demonstrate the similar ways in which science and fiction construct our 
experiences of the world. I also propose moving beyond the traditional realist/antirealist 
debate, thus equally shunning both antirealist postmodernism and realist scientism. What 
is left for the reader is to contemplate the manifestations of these propositions in the 
fields of the sciences and the humanities. 
In the previous chapters, I have argued for the reader-author-text entanglement. I 
have also proposed that the literary text has no definitive value or objective meaning 
outside the phenomenon of meaning. The observer is part of observation in quantum 
mechanics as much as the reader is part of the formation of meaning in literary 
interpretation and the construction of imaginary worlds. The outcome of the phenomenon 
of meaning is not equal to the sum of its individual constituents; it is rather governed by 
the unpredictable laws of entanglement and emergence. To demonstrate the inseparability 
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of knowing from the knower and its agencies of perception, Humberto Maturana and 
Francisco Varela provide a simple experiment: cover your left eye and stare at the cross 
in Figure 4, keeping the page about fifteen inches distance. You will soon realise that the 
black dot disappears. They explain this phenomenon, called the blind spot, by noting that 
in this specific arrangement, the dot ‘falls into an area of the retina where the optic nerve 
emerges’ making it insensitive to light (19). 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The blind spot experiment (Maturana & Varela 20) 
 
Indeed, the most important implication of this experiment is, unless such manipulation is 
conducted intentionally, the discontinuity will always go unnoticed within our continuous 
visual experiences. As Maturana and Varela put it, the most intriguing aspect of the blind 
spot is that ‘we do not see that we do not see’ (19). 
One of many other experiments Maturana and Varela offer is Otto von Guericke’s 
coloured shadows in 1972. It involves using two sources of light, one of which is filtered 
using red cellophane. When placing a hand in the beam of light, one of the shadows has a 
new colour (blue-greenish) unrelated to the colours of light (red, white, or a mixture of 
both ‘pink’). In other words, the wavelength of the new colour does not correspond to the 
measurements or the composition of wavelengths in the experiment. This demonstrates 
that colour is not an inherent quality of objects or the light they reflect but an emergent 
property of the entangled phenomenon of perception (21). The results of this experiment 
are not limited to the colours of the objects but also extend to ‘any perceptual modality’ 
(22).  
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The implications of these results emphasise some of the QPist arguments 
proposed so far: a) objects have no inherent definitive qualities prior to observation—
they are relational entities with emergent qualities; b) the world is constructed of 
phenomena, not of objects; c) phenomena are irreducible to the value of the individual 
components, and the outcome is not the sum of the parts; d) the knower/observer is an 
entangled and a composing part of the phenomenon it claims to witness/observe. These 
implications equally apply to the phenomenon of meaning: meaning is irreducible to any 
of its components, including the intention of the author, the consciousness of the reader, 
or the semantics of the text, or any configuration of these components. The traditional 
literary criticism that assumes knowledge of author, text, or history, is unwittingly a key 
participant of the phenomenon of meaning it claims to describe. Inspired by Maturana 
and Varela’s aphorism, ‘[a]ll doing is knowing and all knowing is doing’ (26), I contend 
that all thinking is becoming. 
The most significant implication of Maturana and Varela’s experiments is the 
deconstruction of the illusory space that separates the observer/observed, subject/object, 
knower/known, and, correspondingly, reader/meaning. This understanding becomes 
evident every time we come closer to examine an object, only to realise how impossible it 
is to separate ourselves (perception, action, consciousness) from the object and the world 
(23). As Maturana and Varela put it, ‘[w]e do not see the “space” of the world; we live 
our field of vision. We do not see the “colors” of the world; we live our chromatic space’ 
(23). This analogy applies to reading: the reader does not read the texts—s/he lives it 
through his/her consciousness, emotions, judgments, and language. While Derrida’s 
famous axiom, ‘Il n'y a pas de hors-texte’(De la Grammatologie 227) [there is no 
outside-text]174, is concerned with language and différance, I propose another, 
ontological version of the axiom, concerning reality and consciousness: Il n'y a rien en 
dehors [there is no outside].  
																																																								
174 I use the French edition of Derrida’s book (as opposed to Derrida’s other publications mentioned 
throughout the thesis) because this particular axiom has a different English translation than what is 
proposed here, which might invoke a different meaning. As Alex Callinicos mentions in his article, 
‘Obituary: The Infinite Search’, the English translation of Derrida’s axiom ‘there is nothing outside the 
text’ is rather misleading as it arguably reduces ‘everything to language’. Callinicos proposes the 
translation ‘there is no-outside text’ to refer more clearly to Derrida’s idea of the impossibility of 
understanding reality independently of language (290). 
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Maturana and Varela provide an interesting example of a similar yet more artistic 
realisation of the blind spot. In the Bronx Zoo in New York, there is a Great Ape House 
which contains apes, gorillas, and chimpanzees. Among them is a separate cage with a 
sign at its bottom ‘The Most Dangerous Primate in the World’. As one looks between the 
bars, one is surprised to see their own reflection in the mirror. The caption explains that 
the human has killed more animals and species than any other animal on earth. This key 
moment of reflection when the observer is also the observed illuminates aspects of 
oneself to which one is often blind. This specific arrangement allows the observer to be 
aware of his/her ‘blind spot’ that is difficult to be noticed otherwise (23-4). It is a 
moment of ‘suppressing the blindness’ in a life that is normally ‘blind to itself’ (24).175 
I contend that literature functions in a similar way to the mirror in the cage, the 
bluish-green shadow Guericke’s experiment, and the dot in Figure 4: it acts as a means to 
recreate moments of reflection where we become capable of momentarily suppressing 
our blindness, questioning our certainties, and looking at familiar things with radically 
new perspectives. The reader in the last chapter of Foe finds the same mirror that 
suppresses his/her blindness, revealing the nature of his/her becoming within the 
narrative. Human knowledge in general, including science and literature, functions as a 
means to revisit our blind spots and to realise both the limitations of our perception and 
the possibilities of new experiences within the world. 
 
5.1. The Similar Worlds of Science and Fiction 
The MWI176 proposes that there is a(n) (in)finite number of parallel universes, and 
our world is only one of these possibilities. It suggests that all alternative histories and 
futures exist as parallel universes to ours. The difficulty, however, lies in the 
impossibility of verifying or measuring these universes. The multiuniverse thus remains 
an hypothesis in the realm of scientific theory. In the textual world, however, parallel 
narratives exist within the ontological parameters of imaginary possible worlds. As 
demonstrated in Chapter Four, there is a measurable parallelism in the way texts affect 																																																								
175 Interestingly, I believe that a more profound realisation of another blind spot in this example is yet to be 
realised: the mirror inside the cage set to condemn humans for their treatment of animals takes place in the 
zoo—a place where animals are captured against their will and put on display. 
176 The MWI is expressed in different fields of knowledge; they are sometimes called ‘alternate universes’, 
‘quantum universes’, ‘parallel dimensions’, or ‘alternate realities’. 
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each other with no regard to the linear chronological order in which they seemingly exist. 
This is evident in the intertextual relations between RC and other historical texts. 
Furthermore, the QPN, exemplified in the last chapter of Foe, embodies this idea by 
allowing the narrative to multiply itself into other narratives that exist simultaneously. 
This mode of narrating offers the reader a chance to experience the multiuniverse or 
parallel worlds of the characters, where difference is not perceived as a contradiction, but 
rather celebrated as a possibility. 
Due to its fluidity, flexibility, and the many unique abilities it exhibits in 
manipulating time and space, it is safe to presume that fiction plays an integral role in 
modelling many of these quantum notions, such as parallel, multilayered realities, 
through utilising the multifaceted nature of consciousness. It is, therefore, a useful tool to 
import and interpret the quantum advances, which are otherwise accessible only through 
mathematical symbols and equations, into our daily experiences. Without the powers of 
imagination, it is impossible for the ordinary consciousness not only to relate to these 
physical equations and their implications but also to discover them.  
However, opponents of such comparisons argue that our relation to the material 
world is different than to the hermeneutic world of fiction, and dealing with subatomic 
particles is not equivalent to dealing with language and metaphors. There are two 
variables to this argument that need addressing separately. First, the nature of the medium 
determines our understanding of quantum mechanics. Born within mathematical 
equations, the linguistic reading of quantum theory is inherently interpretive—it is never 
a translation or an explanation of its mathematical counterpart. The relationship between 
the two mediums (and consequently between the science and the humanities) is 
fundamentally interpretive. Therefore, dealing with quantum theory in linguistic terms is 
always dealing with an interpretation of it.177 Second, the nature of the experience, 																																																								
177 There is another way to tackle this argument; if we are to accept the Brukner and Zeilinger approach to 
information in quantum theory, namely the view of information as the foundation of reality, it is still 
possible to argue for comparability between quantum theory and its linguistic interpretations, based on the 
view of mathematics and language as both mediums of information and mediums made of information. 
This approach, nonetheless, produces its own inherent paradox or performative contradiction: ‘the system 
of information is explained by the characteristics of information’. It also generates unresolved questions on 
the nature of this information: ‘[w]hose information? And information about what?’ (Bilban 33). 
Furthermore, this approach remains antirealist at heart (Christopher Timpson describes it as informational 
immaterialism (70)) and is problematic to align with other arguments made here, including Vailinger’s, and 
the non-committed position regarding the (im)possiblity an independent reality. 
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namely the difference between the actual and the imagined, the physical and the verbal 
worlds, renders the literary experience incomparable with the material one. I argue 
differently; the two experiences are comparable to each other. According to the latest 
research in neurology178, for example, and through measuring the electrical activity in the 
brain, scientific consensus holds that the brain responds in a strikingly similar manner to 
real and imagined stimuli. Furthermore, studies have shown that real and imagined 
stimuli overlap to construct our experience of the world.179 In particular, certain neurons 
in the brain, called mirror neurons, demonstrate this entanglement as they respond in the 
same manner when performing or witnessing an action.180 This comparability between 
the actual/virtual suggests that the worlds of particles and metaphors are, in some aspects, 
analogous to each other. Therefore, it is safe to suggest that fiction offers an embodiment 
of many interpretations of quantum mechanics.  
As rich as this encounter already seems to be, the relationship between science 
and literature is far more entangled than this. The exploration of the relationship between 
science and fiction should not stop at examining only one part of the interaction, that is, 
the implementation of scientific notions in the exploration of literary texts. This has been 
one of the rooted problems of many ‘consilient’ movements in the literary field. A good 
example of this is literary Darwinism, which started as an ambitious consilient project in 
English studies and wound up a narrow ultra-reductionist paradigm with extremely 
limited capabilities in exploring the potentials of literary texts. Instead of enriching the 
interaction between the two fields, literary Darwinism revoked any relations with the 
current literary (theoretical and practical) field, while becoming immaturely fascinated 
with the sciences. Needless to say, the movement failed not only in delivering its grand 
promises of literary rejuvenation but also in fulfilling a much simpler mission—having a 																																																								
178 Expanding on the research done will inevitably overwhelm the discussion. Many scientific papers 
specifically examine the chemical effects on the brain as a result of being exposed to fiction; see 
‘Amygdala and Heart Rate Variability Responses from Listening to Emotionally Intense Parts of a story’, 
and ‘Neural Correlates and Network Connectivity Underlying Narrative Production and Comprehension: A 
Combined fMRI and PET Study’. Other anthropological works have also tackled the same issue; see Brian 
Boyd’s On the Origin of stories: Evolution, cognition, and fiction; studies on memory are particularly 
illuminating, see Alan Baddeley’s Essentials of human memory. 
179 For a detailed account of the scientific data, see Christopher C. Berger’s Where Imagination Meets 
Sensation: Mental imagery, Perception and Multisensory Integration (2016). 
180 Some scientific papers on the function of mirror neurons include: ‘Empathy Towards Strangers Triggers 
Oxytocin Release and Subsequent Generosity’, and ‘The Role of Mirror Neurons in Processing Vocal 
Emotions: Evidence from Psychophysiological Data’, among many others. 
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healthy relationship with the sciences, which should involve importing as well as 
exporting new knowledge, adaptation of (rather than adherence to) foreign terms and 
theories, and a critical, rather than a passive, stance throughout these intra-actions. 
An integral part of the posthuman project is the deconstruction of such hierarchal 
disciplinary relationships and the creation of more reciprocal and entangled relations 
between science and literature. To approach this relationship from a different perspective, 
the question might be reversed. How is fiction deeply implicated within science? How do 
the processes of imagination constitute a crucial part in the construction of scientific 
theories, such as quantum mechanics? Posing such questions challenges the profound, 
rooted distinction that separates science as objective, logical, and factual, on the one 
hand, and fiction, as subjective, descriptive, and imaginative, on the other. 
It is often falsely believed, particularly among humanists, that science follows a 
rigid process of experimenting with evidence based on which a verified theory is formed, 
and that theory represents a pre-existing reality. Representationalism, rooted in the 17th 
century’s understanding of scientific observation as a method to reveal an established 
reality is quite problematic. In his book The Philosophy of ‘As if’ (1911), Hans Vaihinger 
argues that science only deals with reality ‘to the extent of establishing the inevitable 
sequences and co-existences’ (67). Science is not reflection on or of, but rather a 
perspective, of reality; this fact is demonstrated in the works of many quantum physicists, 
most notably Bohr. The theoretical physicist Rovelli explains the same idea regarding the 
nature of the scientific models in different words: 
science is about constructing visions of the world, about rearranging our 
conceptual structure, about creating new concepts which were not there 
before, and even more, about changing, challenging, the a priori that we 
have. It has nothing to do with the assembling of data and the ways of 
organizing the assembly of data. It has everything to do with the way we 
think, and with our mental vision of the world. Science is a process in 
which we keep exploring ways of thinking and keep changing our image 
of the world, our vision of the world, to find new visions that work a little 
bit better (‘Science’). 
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Scientific modelling provides the sense of order and coherence that is needed to 
manage the world. These models are constantly being modified, altered, and replaced. 
Interestingly, narratives behave in the same manner; they are constructs that create a 
sense of coherence, order, unity, and comprehensiveness to what are otherwise scattered 
events. In The Power of the Story, Michael Hanne argues that stories are ‘the radar-like 
mechanism we use to constantly scan the world around us, by which we give order to, 
and claim to find order in, the data of experience. If we cannot narrate the world in this 
everyday manner, we are unable to exercise even the slightest degree of control, or 
power, in relation to the world’ (8). Both literary and scientific narratives represent 
human attempts to establish connections, relations, and meaning, and to make sense of 
the world and the experience of living.  
Figure 5 by Maturana and Varela illustrates how knowledge is formed. The figure 
demonstrates that our perception of the world goes through various stages of organisation 
and structure to create coherence and meaning and to generate action and ethical 
response. The phenomenon of knowledge, as Maturana and Varela call it, is ‘all of one 
piece’ and shares the same groundwork (27). It is worth noting that the similarities 
between the scientific and the literary modelling do not neutralise the obvious differences 
in their methodology and applications. However, in terms of the ways in which human 
knowledge forms, functions, and serves, these models can, in fact, be justly compared. 
In their attempt to explain how scientific knowledge is formed, Maturana and 
Varela define four essential conditions of any scientific proposition181; these are:   
a. Describing the phenomenon (or phenomena) to be explained in a way 
acceptable to a body of observers. 
b. Proposing a conceptual system capable of generating the phenomenon 
to be explained in a way acceptable to a body of observers (explanatory 
hypothesis). 
c. Obtaining from (b) other phenomena not explicitly considered in that 
proposition, as also describing its conditions for observation by a body 
of observers. 
d. Observing these other phenomena obtained from (b) (28). 																																																								
181 As Maturana and Varela note, these conditions are not sequential or separated from one another. 
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Evidently, not only do these conditions highlight the descriptive, contextual, and 
relational nature of the scientific perspective, but they also highlight the ‘narrativity’ and 
the quest for coherence and meaning in constructing explanations, models, and structures 
of the observed phenomena. Consequently, the framework of the sciences is, as Waugh 
puts it, ‘as hermeneutic as the humanities’; the only difference, however, is that it is not 
‘aware of its real hermeneutic status’ (‘Emergence’). 
 
Figure 5: Knowing how we know (Maturana & Varela 14) 
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Science constructs models that constantly change, not due to change of 
observations or results but due to the emergence of new models that better explain/narrate 
reality. To put it differently, science always seeks a better story to explain the world. 
Byron Jennings explains how scientific models are replaced. He writes, 
Observations do not kill models, models do. The ether was only 
abandoned after Einstein proposed the special theory of relativity; the 
Michelson-Morley experiment was not sufficient. Michelson and Morley 
may have provided the ammunition, but it was Einstein that pulled the 
trigger. [...] Einstein did not prove that the ether did not exist. Rather he 
showed that the ether hypothesis, like the Omphalos hypothesis, has no 
predictive power, and in the end, it was eliminated by appeals to 
simplicity. […] The big bang model of the universe beat out the steady 
state model because it predicted the three degree microwave background, 
the quark model beat out rivals with the discovery of the J/Psi particle, and 
continental drift beat out the fixed continent model when the seabed of 
Atlantic was explored in detail (‘Science’). 
I argue that the behaviour of scientific models is strikingly similar to the way that 
narratives replace one another. Narratives (historical, social, religious, and others) change 
in order to offer a better understanding of a new reality. Their modifications are a result 
not of progression towards a more truthful representation of reality but of the emergence 
of a more suitable narrative that better explains the world at a certain point of space-time. 
The value of a certain narrative has little to do with the narrative’s abilities to reflect 
reality and more to do with its ability to provoke, question, and challenge our perception 
of it. This understanding of all human narratives puts them at an equal degree of validity 
and bases their selection on utility rather than representativeness. Viewing science and 
literature as means to explore and experience, rather than represent or reflect, the world, 
challenges ‘the Cartesian epistemology and its representationalist triadic structure of 
words, knowers, and things’ (Barad, Meeting 97).  
Moreover, the falsely rigid roles assigned to science and literature, namely, 
science as a space of observation and literature as a space of imagination, are also 
misleading. As I have argued in the previous chapters, the collapse of boundaries is real 
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between the material/nonmaterial, history/story, truth/fiction, which inevitably leads to 
the collapse of borders between science/literature, and subsequently the sciences/the 
humanities. Moreover, science and literature employ both powers of observation and 
imagination to create their own distinctive models with which reality can be experienced.  
In his book, Vaihinger argues that some of the major concepts and laws in science 
are (or at least started as) fictions. These include scientific notions such as the concept of 
‘infinity’ in mathematics (61) and the atom in physics182 (70), among others. These 
concepts, according to Vaihinger, are not observable or measurable by/in nature; they 
exist within conceptual frameworks and function accordingly. However, they are ‘useful 
fictions’, and their validity is determined based on their capacity to explain and verify our 
perspectives of the world. Although they might give the illusion of comprehending the 
world, they, nonetheless, are valuable in their capacities to guide us ‘in the realm of 
actuality’ (65). This type of paradox should not bother us, Vaihinger holds, in so far as 
we focus our attention on the utility of these fictions rather than on their 
representativeness of a corresponding reality. This relieves us of the burden of believing 
that scientific ‘facts’ are intrinsically true, and thus of accepting or struggling with the 
possible controversial social and ethical implications they may carry.183 
Vaihinger believes that science has two tasks: ‘(1) to determine the actual 
sequences and co-existences; (2) to give the ideas with which we invest reality a more 																																																								
182 According to Vaihinger, atoms cannot be seen directly; they are presumed to exist. However, they are 
crucial in the modern physics. Vaihinger describes this paradox, ‘without the atom science falls. And yet, 
with it, true knowledge and understanding are impossible. It is a group of contradictory concepts which are 
necessary to deal with reality. Of late it has been recognized that the atom is a fiction, a fictional counter’ 
(70-1). Vaihinger quotes the German philosopher Otto Liebmann in his argument on the fictional nature of 
the atom; ‘[t]he atom is a transitional idea whose provisional character is obvious. Its imaginary conceptual 
existence is due to a conceptual equilibrium of a peculiarly unstable character […]. It is true that the atom 
is a mere theoretical counter, a provisional fiction, an interim-concept, but for the present it is an 
exceedingly useful interim-concept’ (71). However, it is important to note that Vaihinger’s book was 
published in 1911 when the atom was still an idea and remained as such for a long time. It is only recently 
that scientists revealed that atoms are observable using a scanning tunnelling microscope, developed in 
1981. Nonetheless, Vaihinger’s argument remains relevant because the idea of the atom was used in 
physics long before it became observable. Its utility, not observability, is what secured its place in 
theoretical physics.  
183 Janet Kourany notes that accepting scientific models as true entails accepting all of its findings even if 
proven to be socially harmful, sexist, or racist, because truth supposedly has some ‘intrinsic value’ that 
‘should not be repressed’. On the other hand, presuming that this knowledge is useful implies that it still 
has some value, but, at least, leaves the door open for perusing other equally useful possibilities without 
those, or with less, disadvantages (S89). However, Kourany argues against the compulsion to choose 
between truth and utility, or realism and antirealism stance, noting that it encourages ‘a socially uncritical 
outlook toward scientific knowledge’ (S90). 
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concise, more adequate, more useful and more harmless form’ (67). The task of literature, 
I believe, is analogous to that of science in its quest for order, meaning, coherence, and 
ethical and social responsibility. Science and literature both work as tools to re-write 
narratives that are no longer relevant, or sometimes harmful to the ways in which we 
perceive the world and others. As I have demonstrated in Chapter Four, Coetzee and 
other authors’ attempts to revisit Defoe’s narrative shed a new perspective on the story of 
Crusoe in the light of new and more relevant political and social realities. 
 
5.2. The Realist/Antirealist Debate 
This discussion of science and literature modelling as perspectives, rather than 
representations of reality, inevitably invites the interminable realist/antirealist debate. 
Within quantum theory, it is often believed that quantum mechanics essentially favours 
an antirealist perspective.184 Nonetheless, many quantum interpretations are associated 
with realist and antirealist views.185 These opposite stances are often the result of the 
																																																								
184 It is helpful first to draw Carl von Weizsäcker’s distinction between three types of realism: metaphysical 
realism, radical realism, and practical realism. Metaphysical realism is not a scientific stance but an 
ontological worldview. Radical realism, on the other hand, maintains that ‘there are no non-objectifiable 
statements, that every statement must have an objective meaning content and must have its truth-value 
independently of the availability of verificatory experiences’. According to von Weizsäcker, by its very 
empirical and experimental nature, quantum theory refuses this type of realism. Practical realism, however, 
refers to ‘objectifiable statements about the world’ (qtd. in Mohanty 381). This latter type of realism is the 
most problematic when it comes to the current philosophical interpretations of quantum theory.  
185 It is very important to pause here to discuss some common stances on realism/antirealism in quantum 
interpretations. The problem with any form of realism from the viewpoint of quantum theory is that, as 
Karakostas explains, ‘any a priori identification of ‘physical objects’ with ‘physical reality’ is inadmissible, 
since—whatever the precise meaning of ‘physical objects’ may be—we have to expect that such systems 
… are entangled by non-separable correlations of the EPR-type, so that they lack intrinsic individuality, 
intertemporal existence’ (3). This corresponds to the statement that is allegedly attributed to Bohr by 
Petersen: ‘[t]here is no quantum world. There is only an abstract quantum physical description. It is wrong 
to think that the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about 
nature’ (12). Many authors, therefore, make the mistake of equating antirealism with quantum theory. 
Arthur Fine, for example, declares the death of realism in the hands of quantum theory (112). Fine’s 
declaration, however, reduces the meaning realism to classical realism. The realist/antirealist debate within 
quantum theory is much more complicated than this. There are as many realist as there are antirealist 
interpretations of quantum mechanics. There are also other interpretations that fall in between the two 
extremes. As an example of an antirealist quantum interpretation is Zeilinger-Brukner's informational 
foundations of quantum mechanics, based on the view of an elementary informational system that builds 
reality where information only refers to itself; the interpretation maintains that information and reality 
cannot be distinguished from each other (Bilban 32). On the other hand, Bohmian mechanics, or the de 
Broglie–Bohm theory presumes an actualised event or reality independent of consciousness. Other 
interpretations, such as the Von Neumann–Wigner interpretation (also described as ‘consciousness causes 
collapse’) entail an antirealist understanding of the world, but with a separation of the process of 
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attempts to explain quantum laws while maintaining either the principle of locality or 
realism. Karakostas notes that although the nontraditional views of quantum mechanics 
might be tempting to interpret as antirealist, the source of such judgment is the classical 
and common-sensical understanding of the issue of realism (3). Some scholars, such as 
Michael Nielsen and Isaac Chuang, maintain that both locality and realism should be 
dropped to have a ‘good intuitive understanding of quantum theory’ (117), for it was 
thought for a long time (based on the EPR paradox186) that it is theoretically impossible 
to maintain both.187  
Attempting to move beyond this controversy, Fine proposes the ‘natural 
ontological attitude’ (NOA) towards science. He argues for accepting both realism and 
antirealism as ‘pro attitudes toward science’ (‘Piecemeal’ 93-4), finding what both share 
in relevance to science, without burdening those attitudes with philosophical 
interpretations (94). Similarly, Kourany suggests that since this debate has proven to be 
interminable for centuries, we can either stop engaging in it altogether or possibly engage 
by collecting normative and empirical data on the aims of the science in order to have 
more helpful answers (S98). 
Fortunately, one must not feel obliged to either submit to a realist or an antirealist 
stance in approaching QP. Irrespective of the realist/antirealist implications, QP only 
agrees to the fact that what is observed is directly the result of our measurement. This 
stance (which is the original stance of quantum theory) favours neither the traditional 
realist nor antirealist viewpoint. In other words, it neither claims the existence nor 
defends the nonexistence of an inaccessible reality; it simply states that our 
measurements/interpretations of the world are always contextual.  																																																																																																																																																																					
consciousness (thus acting as a new Cartesian viewpoint within the quantum tradition, which considerably 
weakens the proposition). 
186 The EPR paradox refers to a 1935 thought experiment in quantum mechanics by Einstein and his 
colleagues Boris Podolsky, and Nathan Rosen. It attempts to demonstrate the incompleteness of the wave 
function and the CI in the explanation of physical reality. The paradox is based on the impossibility of 
measuring two variables (position and momentum) simultaneously. The paradox is now known to be a 
manifestation of the phenomenon of entanglement.  
187 Some interpretations did in fact preserve both factors. Bohr’s interpretation, for instance—which has 
been justly described as ‘ontological realism and epistemological anti-realism’ (qtd. in Bilban 40)—
maintains some form of realism (as some have argued, including Bilban) and reconciles it with locality by 
stating that the position and momentum are definitive but cannot be measured simultaneously, not without 
knowing the physical state of the entire universe. Also, the MWI preserves both realism and locality, but 
the counterfactual definiteness is consequently sacrificed. 
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Informed by Husserl’s phenomenology and Bohr’s philosophy, Bilban’s stresses 
the fact that the quantum information is always the observer’s (39); this stance benefits 
from both the antirealist informational foundation interpretation and its realist critiques. 
While it is undetermined whether objects have definitive existence prior to measurement, 
our measurements can never be assumed to be the pre-existing properties of the observed. 
Bilban refuses representationalism but does not fully submit to the impossibility of any 
form of realism. She offers an alternative, correlative, ontic and epistemic relationship 
between the observer, the information, and the observed (3). She states, ‘[f]rom the point 
of view of the observer (which is the only point of view we can have), the observed has 
the potential to give information even when not in the observation process’ (38). As the 
statement gently implies, the possibility of a form of predictability and stability 
associated with the existence of an independent reality is not completely dismissed.  
This understanding can be applied to the earlier analysis of the narrative of RC in 
Chapter Four. As argued earlier, the meaning of RC and its connotations change over the 
years in the collective consciousness. While this might be taken in an antirealist 
postmodern fashion to argue for the impossibility and undecidability of meaning, the core 
of RC, nonetheless, remains a story of survival. The relative stability of the general idea 
of the story, which survives in all readings and throughout time-space, opens the 
possibility of a form of predictability and objectivity associated with a hybrid form of 
realism. Nonetheless, it constitutes by no means a realist proposition of the existence of 
an autonomous meaning independent of the reader and other elements of the phenomenon 
of meaning. Also, this relative stability is impossible to translate into a single unified 
understanding of RC, because, as a phenomenon of meaning, RC is always becoming. In 
short, although there is a certain degree of predictability to suggest a certain level of 
objectivity in the general idea of the text, it is not enough to conclude the autonomy of 
the text or the separation of meaning. 
However, the ultimate purpose of human knowledge lies not in the 
realist/antirealist debate, nor in the problem of truth and representation. According to 
Vaihinger, the purpose of thought is not self-reference but behaviour, and in particular, 
ethical behaviour (65). This understanding of the value of knowledge, according to 
Vaihinger, can liberate us from the pressure we encounter to resolve logical 
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contradictions that emerge naturally within our conceptual frameworks. This perspective 
of knowledge is precisely the ethical ground of critical posthumanist thought. The 
ultimate posthumanist goal of knowledge is to achieve moral responsibility and an ethical 
understanding of life on the planet and true co-existence with other life forms. 
Posthumanism constantly revisits and suppresses our blind spots in our relations within 
the world and with others. This ethical engagement, which replaces the idealistic quest 
for truth, is embodied in the last chapter of Foe. The actual reader constantly fails in 
his/her attempts in finding truth in Foe. The lesson of the story lies in the ethical 
engagement of the reader with the stories of the characters knowing that there is no truth 
to harvest at the end. It is the familiar less-than-ideal situation that we encounter in our 
everyday life: despite our lack of truth, we are unavoidably ethically entangled within 
situations which require our action. The story of RC and its many alterations throughout 
the years becomes, therefore, one that reflects us, our moral choices and reasoning, our 
fears and desires—our consciousness. We, as readers, do not read texts, nor do we re-
create or co-create them. We become what we read, in every sense of the wor(l)d. 
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